the analyst suspects that two people are actually the same person, the circles are overlapped. Circles and lines should be arranged so that their relationship lines do not cross. In complex cases, such as large groups, the circles should be arranged to keep the number of relationship-line intersections to a minimum.

The relationship of an individual to an organization can be shown a number of ways. When an individual is confirmed to belong to an organization, that individual's circle is placed within the organization's rectangle. By overlapping organizations, the analyst shows that an individual belongs to more than one organization and that there is a connection between the two organizations.

In cases where an individual is connected to but not a member of an organization, a line is drawn from the individual outside the organization to the rectangle representing the organization. If an individual's contact within the organization has been confirmed, the relationship line would be drawn between the circles representing the individuals.

Indicator List

The activities that reveal a COA are called indicators. Indicators are essential to discerning threat intentions. The analyst uses indicators to cross-reference specific events and activities with probable threat COAs and intentions. When used with other analytical tools (e.g., threat models, event templates, pattern analysis, matrices, and link diagrams), indicators are the key to estimative intelligence. During IPB, indicators are developed for each NAI to focus collection and analysis efforts. This list of indicators is constructed to satisfy the commander and staff's PIRs and IRs.

Indicator lists are formed by asking questions. Intelligence analysts develop a list of threat indicators by focusing on METT-T questions. Using METT-T, analysts determine what the threat must do and define the threat's probable activities (see the example below). These determinations become indications and warning.

Example: Forming an Indicator List Using METT-T

PIR: Will the threat defend objective C using a reverse-slope defense between 230600 to 270800 hours?

Mission: What does the threat commander accomplish by forming a reverse-slope defense?

Enemy: What types of units are available to conduct the defense? What units are necessary to construct and aid in the defense?

Troops and Support: Are threat troops experienced in reverse-slope techniques? What is their SOP for reverse-slope defense?

Terrain and Weather: Is objective C suitable terrain for a reverse-slope defense? If so, where is the most suitable terrain?

Time Available: How long will it take to develop a prepared defense versus a hasty defense? Will threat forces be able to prepare or assume a defense in the specified time period?

To further develop the indicator list, analysts can refine the questions developed using METT-T by breaking them down by battlespace functions. Information based on IPB, OOB factors, and experience aids intelligence analysts in deriving lists of activities that answer the commander's PIRs. These questions serve to narrow and focus on certain activities, equipment, troops, and training which an adversary must possess or do to accomplish their mission. For a representative listing of common tactical level indicators, see appendix C.

CHAPTER 8. TARGET DEVELOPMENT AND COMBAT ASSESSMENT

Successful MAGTF operations depend on an efficient, organized targeting effort to affect those enemy capabilities that could interfere with achievement of the friendly mission and objectives. The targeting process of detecting, selecting, and prioritizing targets requires coordinated interaction between intelligence, maneuver, fires, and planning elements of the MAGTF, joint force commander (JFC), Service components, and supporting agencies. This chapter introduces the targeting cycle, intelligence targeting support, the analyst's role in target development, and combat assessment.

SECTION I. TARGETING

Based on the friendly scheme of maneuver and tactical plans, targeting includes an assessment of the weather, terrain, and enemy to identify those enemy formations, equipment, facilities, and terrain which when attacked or controlled will ensure success. Through the targeting process, analysts develop a prioritized list of targets to be attacked and determine the weapons required to achieve the desired effects.

Targeting Cycle

Defined as deliberate or reactive, targeting is an integral part of the planning process that begins with receipt of the mission and continues through the development of the approved plan. Deliberate targeting is associated with fixed or semi-fixed targets, while reactive targeting is associated with mobile targets. Whether deliberate or reactive, the targeting cycle integrates intelligence, maneuver, fires, and C2 processes to assist the commander in deciding which targets to engage when, where, and to what effect.

Through the targeting cycle, fires planners and targeteers derive nomination lists of forces, installations, or locations that if attacked will promote the commander's warfighting objectives. The higher the command level performing the targeting process, the more formal it becomes and the more the process focuses on events well in the future. At the MAGTF or joint force level, the targeting cycle tends to be deliberate, encompasses greater resources, and involves—

- Establishment of commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.
- Target development, nomination, validation, and prioritization.
- Capabilities analysis.
- Commander's decision and force assignment.
- Mission planning execution.
- Combat assessment.

At lower tactical levels, the same process tends to be reactive, occurs in a shorter time span with less formality, and focuses on events of an immediate nature. The tactical-level targeting cycle is simplified to decide, detect, deliver, and assess

(D3A). Figure 8-1 depicts the joint targeting cycle and its relationship to D3A. Although intelligence is an integral part of each targeting cycle phase, intelligence P&A directly affects target development (decide) and effects assessment (assess).

Target Development

Target development is the analysis of potential enemy military, political, or economic systems to determine their significance and relevance to the commander's objectives, guidance, and intent. The analysis proceeds from broad systems to specific components and finally to individual elements or aim points. Analysts evaluate system components and interrelationships to establish their criticality to the threat's operation and their vulnerability to attack. Through this systematic evaluation, analysts develop targeting strategies to select potential targets and to determine the type of damage that will accomplish the friendly commander's defined objective. Objective definition and target development must comply with the commander's guidance, law of armed conflict, and rules of engagement.

Analysts evaluate each target's lethal and nonlethal capabilities to develop a prioritized list of targets and the intelligence requirements that support target acquisition and combat assessment. The scope, level of detail, and time involved depend on the situation and the level of command conducting targeting. Common processes and procedures employed in target development include IPB, target value analysis, HPT identification, and use of the high-payoff target list (HPTL).


Figure 8-1. Joint Targeting Cycle and D3A.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Through the IPB process, intelligence analysts contribute to target development by—

- Determining the threat commander's COAs through systematic analysis of the region, weather, terrain, and doctrine.

- Evaluating doctrinal templates to identify a threat's COGs, critical vulnerabilities, and HVTs.

- Constructing situation templates and examining the threat commander's decision cycle and each potential COA's decision points to refine HVTs.

- Wargaming, mentally, each COA and the threat commander's decisions to identify his key assets as HVTs.

- Developing event and decision support templates to help identify NAIs, decision points, decision phase lines, TAIs, and HPTs.

- Analyzing the threat's target systems, complexes, and components to develop their relevance and importance.

Target Value Analysis

Target value analysis is a method of identifying and ranking potential HVT sets in a COA. The target analyst, in coordination with the G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, fire support coordinator, and other staff members, war game the COAs to—

- Finalize individual staff estimates.

- Develop a fire support plan, a scheme of maneuver, as well as friendly and threat decision support templates.

- Determine critical assets required by the threat commander to accomplish his mission.

High-Value and High-Payoff Target Identification

An HVT is an asset that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of a mission. Its loss to the threat can be expected to contribute to substantial degradation of an important battlespace function. Contributing to the targeting development process, G-2/S-2 section personnel, the fire support coordinator, and other staff members identify key threat assets that must be dealt with and nominate HVTs to be HPTs. The key to HPTs is that they are based on the friendly commander's scheme of maneuver.

The HPTs are developed during the wargaming process. As the staff fights the different options, the G-2/S-2 identifies specific HVTs. The HPTs for a specific phase of the battle are recorded on the decision support template and synchronization matrix. Those locations where HPTs are expected to appear become TAIs.

The G-2/S-2 and/or collection manager evaluate HVTs at different points in the battle to determine required collection asset capabilities and to provide the necessary target resolution. This evaluation becomes the basis for the collection plan for intelligence support to targeting. Because of their importance, HPTs receive priority in the allocation of detection systems. The G-2/S-2 and the commander must consider the impact the priority will have on maintaining situational awareness, because the same collection assets are used for targeting and battlespace awareness.

The fire support coordinator, air officer, electronic warfare officer, C2W and other representatives use their knowledge of friendly lethal and nonlethal means to determine if a capability exists to attack the HVT and the expected effects of the attack. The G-2/S-2 then assesses the threat response. This effects-based targeting assessment sequence helps determine if attacking the HVT is necessary to ensure the success of the friendly force. If the HVT is acquirable, attackable, and capable of ensuring friendly success, it becomes an HPT. The HPTL identifies prioritized HPTs for a specific battle point.

High-Payoff Target List

The commander-approved HPTL is a tool in determining attack guidance and in developing targeting intelligence collection, production, and dissemination plans.

Collection

Collection efforts focus on NAIs and TAIs that the IPB process identifies during the decide phase. Knowledge of target type and its associated signatures (electronic, visual, thermal) enables friendly forces to direct the most capable collection asset to be tasked against the target. The asset is positioned in the best location based on friendly estimates of when and where the threat target is located.

The decision to destroy, degrade, disrupt, or delay a given HPT results in a requirement to detect that target. Intelligence needs to support the detection of the target are expressed as PIRs and IRs. The PIRs and IRs that support detection of a target are incorporated into the collection plan. The collection manager translates the PIRs and IRs into ICRs and supporting specific IRs. The collection manager considers the availability and capability of MAGTF and external collection assets.

Production

Production efforts focus on developing timely, tailored intelligence products to meet maneuver and fires needs.

Dissemination

Dissemination efforts focus on ensuring CIS readiness to support both routine and time-sensitive intelligence reporting in support of MAGTF targeting needs.

Target Analysis

Target analysis helps to determine the military importance, priority of attack, scale of effort, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. Other considerations for analysis include target criticality, accessibility, and recognizability. While target analysis helps to determine which targets to hit, operations planning determines how to do it. At strategic and operational levels of war, targeting is more deliberate and focuses on fixed installations or large arrays of targets.

At the tactical level, the MAGTF commander has capabilities to strike deep targets that support threat maneuver or ground forces. These targets are often complex groupings of installations, units, and defenses that may require a methodical approach to ensure success. This methodology is referred to as target system analysis.

Target System Analysis

A target system includes installations, facilities, or forces that are functionally related and situated in the same geographical area. A target system comprised of components and elements can be either fixed installations or mobile target sets. While an individual target may be significant based on its characteristics, its worth is usually derived from its relative importance within the target system. Target system elements are smaller, more intricate parts of the target system than the component and are necessary to the operation of the component. Figure 8-2 depicts the relationship of a target system, its components, and its elements.

Components

A target system's components can also be targets, such as airfields, which are a component of an air defense system. Within industrial or economic systems, a system component belongs to one or more groups of industries or basic utilities

Figure 8-2. Target System, Components, and Elements.

required to produce individual parts of an end product. Target system components can also refer to component services. For example, an air defense system may include C2, early warning and target acquisition radars, antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile batteries, support facilities, and other components that are neither industries nor utilities.

Activity

Target system activities encompass those actions or functions performed by the target system components in pursuit of system goals. By this definition, a combined-arms maneuver division could be viewed as a target system, with components that include air defense units, artillery, armor, mechanized infantry, and engineers. The target development process should focus on the activity of the system or its components. Analysts conduct a comprehensive evaluation of target system components and elements to understand the activities of the total system.

Once analysts have identified the enemy activity that must be affected or defeated, they can determine the key target systems, components, or elements that should be attacked, degraded, or exploited to produce the desired effects. For example, enemy air attacks against friendly ports and LOCs may seriously threaten resupply of friendly forces. To modify or defeat this enemy activity, targeteers analyze the enemy's air force system and identify threat system components and elements. They target the enemy aircraft home bases and identify runways; petroleum, oils, and lubricants storage; and maintenance facilities as potential target elements, which

friendly forces should modify to defeat the enemy's air attack activities.

Linkage

Analysts must understand the linkage or connection between installations performing identical, similar, related, or complementary activities or functions. To develop targets, analysts identify critical nodes or points where target system components and elements are linked and dependent upon each other. These key nodes also exist where target systems interact with other target systems. Matrix and link analysis, as discussed in chapter 7, are highly effective tools for determining linkages and critical nodes.

Target development focuses on identifying the critical nodes within target systems that will satisfy objectives. For example, an enemy's air defense system consists of a number of components, such as surface-to-air missile sites, early warning and ground-controlled intercept sites, antiaircraft artillery sites, and airfields. To function effectively, the elements are linked at a sector headquarters, which exercises responsibility for a specific geographic area. Analysts would target these sector headquarters to sever the critical node within the air defense system.

Target Complex Analysis

A complex is a group of physical elements in close proximity containing multiple target elements that are integrated to contribute to some function of military or civilian value. For example, a system of military airfields distributed throughout the country is made up of individual airfields (e.g., target complexes), containing multiple elements (e.g., individual aircraft, runways, hangars) in close proximity.

After target system analysis identifies a critical target complex, target complex analysis identifies the target environment and defenses associated with the complex. Target complex analysis is used to determine specific targets within the complex as well as supporting actions (e.g., defense, suppression, deception, tactics) that may be necessary to attack the target.

Target Element Analysis

A target element is the smallest identifiable activity of a target component (e.g., sheltered aircraft, control tower, defensive radar site). Based on the targeting objectives, target elements are evaluated as targets for attack. Detailed analysis must be conducted on the individual target element. When conducting target element analysis, the target intelligence officer is responsible for evaluating the element's—

- **Location**—Exact location expressed in geographic or UTM coordinates.

- **Elevation**—Altitude above sea level of the element's ground location expressed in feet or meters.

- **Identification**—Accurate determination of—

  - **Type**—Brief description of the target's military functions.

  - **Size**—Length, width, and height dimensions.

  - **Shape**—Definition of the spatial form.

  - **Attitude**—Azimuth of the element's long axis expressed in degrees (090-270) or descriptive words (east-west).

  - **Dispersion**—Pattern of individual elements in the target area expressed as a short word-picture description.

- **Vulnerability**—Susceptibility to fire.

- **Recuperability**—Time required for enemy to reactivate the target or reconstitute it in another location.

- **Importance**—Value within the enemy's operation and degree to which destruction of the potential target would reduce the enemy's capability.

Role of the Target Analyst

Target analysts should complete the following steps when conducting target P&A:

- Collect target information and intelligence.

- Collate data.

- Evaluate potential list of targets.

- Construct flow of threat target component, complex, and system.

- Determine most suitable targets.

- List targets and priorities.

- Present recommendation.

- Refine data and develop required intelligence products.

Target Analysis Products

Analysis products used in target development include a target list, no-strike target list, restricted target list, target files, and collection requirements.

List of Targets

Target intelligence analysts conduct a thorough analysis of targets and coordinate with the other P&A personnel and the G-3/S-3 maneuver and fires targeting team to provide required intelligence supporting the list of targets for the commander's consideration. The fire support coordinator maintains and prioritizes the list of targets in order of relative importance to the commander's objectives. The operations section and ultimately the commander are responsible for validation of targets and formulation of the commander's target list, which is derived from the HPTL developed during IPB and COA wargaming.

No-Strike Target List

During the target validation process that occurs during target development, some potential targets are placed on a no-strike list. Commanders designate no-strike targets, which are prohibited from attack, to avoid—

- Interference with military operations.

- Damage to relations with indigenous personnel or governments.

- Violation of international law, conventions, or agreements.

No-strike lists are nominated by elements of the joint force and approved by the JFC. This list also includes no-strike targets directed by higher authorities. Examples of no-strike targets include—

- Hospitals.

- Schools.

- Places of worship.

- Cultural shrines.

Restricted Target List

This list is composed of targets with specific restrictions. Actions exceeding those restrictions must be coordinated with the establishing headquarters. Restricted targets are nominated by elements of the joint force and approved by the JFC. This list also contains restricted targets directed by higher authorities. The decision to restrict a target centers on the importance of the target to the threat and the plans and intentions of the friendly commander. The following are examples of restricted targets:

- An area in which a friendly reconnaissance team is operating. To avoid fratricide, fires may be placed into the area, but only upon coordination with the establishing headquarters.

- A bridge identified by a commander as critical to future operations. To ensure the bridge is available to friendly forces, this target may be restricted as to the type of ordnance that can be used against it or the level of damage that may be inflicted on it.

Target File

A target file contains pertinent target system, complex, or component information collected during the target development process. Information in the target file is used to build target studies once HPTs are approved or validated. Generally, target files deal with fixed or semi-fixed targets. This information may be in the form of—

- Data bases.
- Selected imagery.
- Graphics.

Collection Requirements

Throughout the target analysis process, analysts identify targeting intelligence gaps and develop ICRs to obtain needed data. The ICRs must be stated early and clearly in the form of PIRs, IRs, and specific IRs. Analysts and planners have to think beyond the traditional picture (i.e., imagery) and use intelligence sources such as SIGINT, HUMINT (i.e., defectors, refugees, prisoners of war, travelers, aircrew debriefs, and special forces), and other sensor data that can provide indications of a target's status. Gaining a familiarity with collection system capabilities is critical. Requesters should recognize the various intelligence sources' strengths and limitations and understand how to best exploit them.

Target or Objective Studies

Once the commander approves a target, intelligence sections develop target or objective studies to support mission planning. These studies are focused, detailed intelligence products that aid in the application of fires or the maneuver of forces against a specific target set or area. Smaller MAGTFs and units use these studies for mission preparation and execution.

Target or objective studies are graphically oriented and may use many of the graphics derived during the IPB process, such as a target folder. Depending on the specific mission, the study may contain the following information:

- Orientation graphic.
- Time-distance graphic.
- Weather forecast.
- Hydrographic forecast and astronomical data.
- Intelligence briefing notes for mission.
- Graphic intelligence summary.
- Objective area graphic enhancements, such as—
  - Orientation graphic (10–20 km around objective).
  - Mission planning graphic (5 km around objective).
- Objective area imagery.
- Imagery and graphics of insertion points.
- Survival, evasion, resistance, escape plan.
- Challenge and reply passwords.
- Mission-specific data as required.

SECTION II. COMBAT ASSESSMENT

The final step of the targeting cycle, combat assessment is the determination of force and weapons system employment effectiveness during military operations. The combat assessment objective is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. A G-3/S-3 responsibility, combat

assessment is performed as a coordinated effort by the operations, intelligence, and fires staffs. Conducted at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and MOOTW, the combat assessment process is used by analysts to—

● Provide the commander with information on the status of an operation.

● Help formulate subsequent battle plans.

● Serve as a benchmark for validating objectives.

● Collect data on weapons and weapons system performance.

The three components of combat assessment are BDA, munitions effects assessment (MEA), and reattack recommendations (RR). Intelligence analysis has a major role in determining BDA, which includes physical damage, functional damage, and target assessment (see fig. 8-3).


Figure 8-3. Combat Assessment Process.

Battle Damage Assessment

A key component of the combat assessment process, BDA is the timely and accurate esti-

mate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against an objective or target. Primarily an intelligence responsibility, BDA requires extensive coordination with operations and fires elements. The BDA is munitions-independent (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) and is target-independent (fixed strategic and mobile or movable tactical targets).

Munitions Effects Assessment

Munitions effects assessment is analysis of the friendly military force in terms of the weapons system, munitions, and weapon delivery parameters to increase force effectiveness. While the operations and fires staffs are responsible for MEA, the MEA is conducted concurrently and interactively with BDA, which is conducted by the intelligence staff.

Reattack Recommendations

Based on results of BDA and MEA, the operations and intelligence team make RRs for the target nomination and development process. The RRs should address operational objectives relative to the target, target critical elements, and enemy combat forces. When making RRs, the operations and intelligence team considers the—

● Current level of achieved operational and tactical objectives.

● Weapons systems and munitions.

● Target and aimpoint selection.

● Attack timing.

Battle Damage Assessment Components

Physical damage assessment (PDA), functional damage assessment (FDA), and target system assessment (TSA) are three subcomponents of BDA.

Physical Damage Assessment

Referred to as Phase I BDA, the PDA is a quantitative estimate of physical damage that occurs to a target through munitions blast, fragmenta-

tion, and fires. This assessment is based on observed or interpreted damage.

The unit controlling the weapons system and the intelligence collection observers develop Phase I BDA reports. Figure 8-4 illustrates the flow of Phase I BDA.

For example, visual observation of an enemy artillery battery (the target) verifies four self-propelled howitzers with shattered and dislodged tubes, recoil mechanisms, and turrets. Track damage to one howitzer is noted. Another


Figure 8-4. Phase I BDA or PDA Information Flow.

howitzer has no visible damage. The PDA of the battery is 65 percent destroyed. The PDA for large, complex targets is keyed to specific aim-points and critical elements.

Combat Strength Assessment

When dealing with threat ground combat units, the more common term for Phase I BDA or PDA is combat strength assessment. Combat strength is the actual strength on hand of a ground unit in terms of operational tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery. This strength is expressed as either a count of generic type equipment or as a percentage of the T/O and T/E. Threat combat strength is a critical factor to commanders preparing for combat. During operations, commanders rely on combat strength assessment to account for enemy losses and to assess remaining enemy strength.

Combat Strength Baseline

Prior to operations, analysts establish the combat strength baseline of beginning strength numbers. These numbers remain constant for the duration of combat and serve as a benchmark against which losses or gains are measured (see table 8-1). The baseline combat strength represents the maximum amount of equipment possible for a unit, while combat losses represent verified losses.

Table 8-1. Example of Combat Strength Assessment.

105th Mechanized Infantry Division	Tanks	Armored Vehicles	Artillery
T/E	102	135	45
Beginning Strength	98	135	42
Combat Losses	17	22	4
Replacements	6	3	0
Combat Strength	87	116	38
Percent of T/E	85	85	84
Current Combat Strength = 85%			

Combat Strength Computation

Combat strength for each type of equipment is computed by subtracting the confirmed losses from the beginning strength and adding the replacements to that total. The percent of T/O and T/E is calculated by dividing the combat strength by T/O and T/E numbers. The T/O and T/E percentages are totaled and divided by the number of equipment types to determine the current combat strength for the assessed system. Note that while the baseline combat strength represents the maximum amount of equipment possible for a unit, combat losses represent only verifiable losses. Current combat strength can be viewed as a worst-case estimate since it only takes into account confirmed losses. Replacements are included when known. Equipment categories are limited to generic types.

Personnel Losses

Personnel are not normally included in determining combat strength. Acquiring accurate casualty figures and accounting for replacements is extremely difficult, and past experience has shown that body counts are often misleading. A more appropriate and meaningful assessment of the impact of personnel losses can be made as part of combat effectiveness assessment. In MOOTW, however, where personnel may be the threat's principal strength, personnel losses may have to be tracked and combat strength assessed accordingly.

Functional Damage Assessment

The FDA is an estimate of the friendly military force's effect on degrading or destroying the functional or operational capability of the target and an evaluation of the friendly force's operational objective success level. This assessment is based on all-source intelligence and includes an estimate of the time required for reconstitution or replacement of the target function. The FDA is also referred

to as Phase II BDA. Figure 8-5 illustrates the Phase II BDA information flow.

Target System Assessment

The TSA is a broad assessment of the friendly military operations impact and effectiveness against a target system capability. This assessment may be used to measure the threat's combat effectiveness. Based on the commander's operational objectives, a TSA may address significant target system subdivisions.

Analysts compile individual target FDAs to produce TSAs, which are applied to the current system analysis or OOB. For example, the threat's fire support system is known to have 21 artillery battalions. Partial destruction of one battery has minor impact on the effectiveness and capability of the threat's overall fire support system. A complex and resource intensive process, TSA is generally performed at the theater level. The TSA is also referred to as Phase III BDA. Figure 8-6 illustrates the Phase III BDA information flow.

Figure 8-5. Phase II BDA or FDA Information Flow.

Figure 8-6. Phase III BDA or TSA Information Flow.

Responsibilities

The intelligence officer and the MEF ISC integrate intelligence and operational weapons system and munitions effects data provided by the G-3/S-3 to determine the effects of an executed COA on threat strength and combat effectiveness. In coordination with the G-3/S-3, the intelligence officer or ISC—

● Recommends HVTs.

● Develops and recommends IRs to include those for targeting and BDA.

● Coordinates with the G-3/S-3, air officer, and fire support coordinator to develop coordinated targeting, intelligence, BDA, MEA, and RR plans.

● Develops integrated collections, production, and dissemination plans to answer the commander's IRs.

● Requests collection and production support for intelligence required to satisfy targeting objectives and BDA.

● Establishes procedures to ensure observation reports from forward observers, reconnaissance, pilots, etc., are readily available to BDA analysts.

- Matches BDA against the commanders objectives to determine targeting success and refines intelligence estimates of the threat's situation and capabilities, recommends target reattack, develops and maintains historical BDA data bases, and disseminates hard and soft copy intelligence and BDA products.

- Uses the results of BDA and combat assessment in determining the need to further develop enemy COAs.

Battle Damage Assessment Methodology

After the commander identifies PIRs, IRs, and targeting priorities, the intelligence officer or MEF ISC tasks intelligence collection assets to locate, identify, and track designated targets and directs production assets to plan and prepare needed intelligence products. The ISC, fire support coordinator, and air officer coordinate to identify the appropriate attack system to capture, destroy, degrade, suppress, or neutralize the target.

Based on targets and conditions set by the commander, the ISC refines the commander's BDA-related requirements and integrates them into the intelligence operation plan. These BDA requirements are answered through execution of the intelligence cycle.

As targets are attacked, the ISC coordinates P&A cell's BDA through execution of the intelligence cycle. The commander uses BDA to decide if the target should be reattacked or if the objectives have been met. Once a BDA-related PIR is satisfied, the commander decides if there is a need to establish a new BDA-related PIR or if limited intelligence assets will be used to support another aspect of the mission. The BDA-related PIRs should only address the commander's most critical requirements.

Tactical-level BDA provides a series of timely and accurate snapshots of the effect operations are having on the threat. The BDA helps commanders determine when or if their targeting effort is accomplishing goals and objectives and provides commanders the information needed to quickly allocate or redirect forces.

Battle Damage Assessment Principles

The intelligence officer must work closely with the commander and staff to ensure they know the characteristics and limitations of BDA, which is viewed in terms of objectivity, reliability, and accuracy.

Objectivity

The BDA must be objective and supported by the most reliable data available. Generally, data collected through objective means (imagery) are more reliable than data collected through subjective means (pilot reports). The intelligence officer and ISC should strive to verify conclusions and resolve discrepancies in BDA reporting. It is particularly important to maintain BDA objectivity when BDA becomes the deciding factor for determining and executing a specific COA or decision. When disseminating intelligence, the ISC must make a distinction between facts and estimates.

Reliability

The quantity and quality of available collection and production assets impact BDA reliability. The degree of reliability and credibility of the assessment relies on the resources employed for BDA collection. Collection and production assets must be properly balanced, managed, and supervised to produce reliable reports that are concrete, quantifiable, and precise.

Accuracy

To obtain accurate BDA information, the AO must be frequently and adequately covered by a combination of national, theater, and tactical collection and production assets. Frequent coverage is necessary to accurately determine pre- and post-strike damage.

Battle Damage Assessment Reporting

The intelligence officer or ISC ensures BDA reports conform to the operational plan, reports target damage and destruction, and assesses the degree of mission success. When possible, BDA reporting includes the visual verification of physical damage and an analysis of the damage effects on the threat unit. The MAGTF and subordinate elements are primarily concerned with reporting Phase I BDA or PDA.

Reports

Reports used in BDA include—

- Mission reports and in-flight reports.
- Aircraft cockpit video or weapons system video.
- Imagery and IMINT (e.g., national, theater, and tactical imaging systems, UAVs).

- SIGINT.
- HUMINT.
- Open source intelligence (e.g., television broadcasts, radio broadcasts, newspapers).
- Visual reports from combat units, air controllers, or forward observers.

Reporting Methods

The intelligence officer compiles, refines, and validates the various sources of BDA and develops consolidated PDA or combat strength assessments. The MSCs and major subordinate elements forward consolidated BDA reports to the MEF, usually covering set time periods. See appendix D for an example of a consolidated BDA report format.

At the MEF level, P&A company, intel bn, is responsible for compiling MEF Phase I BDAs or PDAs and for adjusting master OOB data bases to reflect threat combat losses. The BDA cell also prepares and disseminates formal Phase I BDA reports according to theater and national policies and procedures. Defense Intelligence Report, DI-2820-2-99, *Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Reference Handbook (U)*, provides detailed joint procedures and formats regarding BDA analysis, reporting formats, standard terminology, and resources. This final draft document is available on-line via INTELINK and INTELINK-S.

CHAPTER 9. INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

Intelligence production is the conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and synthesis of all-source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements. Production involves translating the results of analysis into usable intelligence products that are timely and tailored to the unit, subordinate units, and other supported commands' missions and IRs. The analyst must strive to provide knowledge and understanding that the decisionmaker can visualize and absorb. If possible, that knowledge and understanding should be presented in the form of coherent, meaningful images rather than in the form of accumulated lists, texts, or data fields. During the production phase of the intelligence cycle, information is—

- Evaluated to determine pertinence, reliability, and accuracy.
- Analyzed to isolate significant elements.
- Integrated with other relevant information and previously developed intelligence.
- Interpreted to form logical conclusions, which bear on the situation and support the commander's decisionmaking process.
- Applied to estimate possible outcomes.
- Placed in a product format that will be most useful to the user.

During MAGTF CE deliberate planning, production normally entails the development of detailed, all-source intelligence estimates and studies through the combined efforts of several intelligence and reconnaissance operation elements. During tactical execution, time constraints and ongoing battle demands require rapid processing and production with an emphasis on development of simple, mission-focused intelligence products (e.g., annotated image, target description, overlay depicting current and future threat dispositions). The value of intelligence production is measured in terms of time or resources expended and how well it places information into context, converts it into knowledge and understanding through analysis and synthesis, answers the PIRs and IRs, and applies that knowledge to the decisionmaking process.

There is an inherent friction between the desire to provide as complete and accurate an intelligence product as possible and the continuous requirement to support the time-sensitive urgency of tactical decisionmaking. In practice, these conflicting demands must be balanced by using both stated direction, such as the commander's intent and PIRs, and knowledge of the operational situation to determine when to finish and disseminate a product. To provide a framework to make these determinations, intelligence production is viewed as occurring on deliberate and immediate levels.

Production Categories

In the MAGTF, the primary categories of production are deliberate and immediate.

Deliberate Production

Deliberate production is employed when there is sufficient time to thoroughly evaluate, analyze, and synthesize available information and intelligence. The results of deliberate production efforts are formal, comprehensive intelligence products. Intelligence products that fit into this category include—

- Contingency intelligence studies.
- Detailed, fully developed IPB studies.
- Intelligence estimates.
- Target or objective studies.

Immediate Production

Immediate production is a time-limited, highly focused effort that satisfies an immediate tactical requirement. This type of production involves the rapid processing, analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence to influence tactical decisionmaking. Often, immediate production is facilitated by, and builds on, a previously completed deliberate production effort.

Elements of data are subjected to a compressed version of the production cycle, and the resulting product is rapidly disseminated to those who are affected. Immediate production is normally conducted during execution and results in simple, mission-specific intelligence products (e.g., situational assessments or answers to specific, individual intelligence requirements).

The nature of the situation and pertinent intelligence requirements dictate the amount of time available to complete each production effort. Intelligence products that fit into this category include—

● Intelligence reports that provide alarm or warning information.

● Reconnaissance and surveillance data related to decision points for branches or sequels.

● Reactive targeting intelligence or hastily prepared intelligence briefings for initiation of small unit action.

Principles

Whether deliberate or immediate, intelligence production is guided by the following principles.

Purpose and Use of Intelligence

To understand the needs of the consumer and to answer the IRs, the producer must know the user's command level, mission, IRs, time sensitivity, responsibilities, and purpose of the intelligence products.

Objectivity

Producers must be objective and unbiased to avoid any tendency toward preconceived ideas. When conflicting information exists, efforts should be made to resolve the difference. If time and resources are inadequate to provide explicit intelligence, the commander must be made aware of the uncertainty. Commanders need pertinent intelligence, including conflicting or contradictory information and opinions.

Provision of Integrated and Tailored Products

Intelligence analysts integrate and tailor information from multiple sources to provide decisionmakers with a clear picture of the battlespace.

Coordination Among Echelons

Intelligence production should be coordinated between national, theater/operational, and tactical-level echelons. The JTF intelligence officer directs and coordinates production activities to ensure they are mutually supporting and not duplicative. Forces at every echelon accomplish joint and combined operations intelligence production, which includes Service-unique products at component commands and operating forces. Higher echelons use organic collection assets and production capabilities to produce intelligence and to refine and compile intelligence received from subordinate units and external organizations. Subordinate units use intelligence products sent to them by the senior command to determine or adjust their mission and operations.

Responsibilities

Higher echelons are responsible for ensuring subordinates are provided the required intelligence exceeding the subordinate's organic capabilities. To provide subordinate commands with required intelligence products and services, higher echelon commanders and intelligence officers identify and task organizations

that can contribute to resolution of subordinate commanders' IRs.

Management

Production management ensures effective and efficient intelligence production in support of operations. Intelligence personnel must receive, review, validate, prioritize, and coordinate production requirements to determine the task, producer, forms, and production schedule.

Production Cycle

The goal of the intelligence cycle is to produce timely, usable intelligence. The production cycle is in essence the intelligence cycle, with the constituent parts of directing, collecting, processing and exploiting, analyzing, and finally producing, disseminating, and using the intelligence. The production cycle spans months or minutes, depending on the level of command conducting production and the nature of the IRs. During the production cycle process, intelligence section personnel must focus on delivering the product in a timely, tailored, complete, and usable manner.

Define Intelligence Requirements

Properly articulated, mission-oriented requirements focus the intelligence effort and define IPRs. The commander, staff, and subordinate commanders play a role in developing the command's IRs. The intelligence officer formulates most of the initial requirements during IPB step 1 by identifying gaps in current intelligence holdings and by defining the scope and detail of production required for IPB support.

As IPB and staff planning progresses, analysts identify additional IRs, which are generally linked to proposed COAs, potential decisions, and targeting. Analysts working to satisfy the

command and supported units' IRs also generate new IRs.

Based on the commander's intent and the current phase of the PDE&A cycle, the intelligence officer validates, refines, and prioritizes these additional requirements and converts them into integrated ICRs, IPRs, and IDRs. This is not a one-time effort, but instead a dynamic process of new, existing, and satisfied or no longer relevant requirements. The relative importance of each requirement changes as the PDE&A cycle progresses and as phases of the operation are executed. The intelligence officer must periodically confirm the assignment of priorities with the commander to ensure the intelligence effort is focused on the commander's desires.

Define and Prioritize Intelligence Production Requirements and Tasks

Once IRs have been clearly stated and properly defined, analysts define and prioritize IPRs and tasks by answering the following questions:

● What do I need and where can I obtain the information? The analysts must determine research needs and information sources. The tactical intelligence analyst may have access to a wide range of information and intelligence sources and documents. The product required may have been produced by another source or agency. This requirement may generate ICRs to provide the necessary information.

● When is the product required and in what form? Determination of production assets is based on time and final product requirements (e.g., document, report, supporting study, briefing).

● Who can produce the intelligence product? A small intelligence section does not have the assets to complete a large, detailed study in a short period of time.

● Who will get the product?

- Is this a product that can or must be shared with multinational allies? The intelligence product's classification and releasability must be considered.

- Does this product require supporting work? The analyst must determine the need for supporting requirements (e.g., imagery exploitation, topographic analysis).

Develop Intelligence Production Plan and Schedule

When dealing with large or complex IRs and IPRs, development of an intelligence production plan and a supporting schedule aids in effectively applying resources to accomplish the task. Production plans and schedules are particularly important at higher echelon commands and intelligence centers where numerous long-term projects are managed and coordinated. At lower echelons, production plans and schedules may consist of the intelligence officer conducting a quick mental assessment of the task and developing a time line for its completion.

Considerations

When developing a production plan and schedule, the first consideration is always priority. The requester's needs drive the due date. Once priority and time available are established, factors to be considered include—

- Research required.
- Time available to collect new information and data.
- Coordination needs.
- Review and quality control procedures.
- User's format requirements.
- Graphic preparation.
- Reproduction or conversion requirements.
- Dissemination requirements.

Preparation Methods

For large, long-term products, the production schedule is time lined with various milestones, due dates, and completion projections annotated. In large organizations with distinct collection, exploitation, editing, graphics, and dissemination assets, this time line synchronizes those assets to ensure efficient and timely project completion.

Plans and Tools

The principal planning vehicle for a MAGTF is tab B, (Intelligence Production Plan), to appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan), to annex B (Intelligence), to an OPLAN or OPORD. Other tools that may be used by intelligence officers and their production leaders are the intelligence production matrix and the periodic intelligence production status report. Appendix E to this publication provides guidance and suggested formats for use of these plans and tools within a MAGTF. Specific instructions and formats are specified in unit SOPs.

Allocate Resources

The availability of the following organic and external resources required to produce the intelligence product must be determined:

- Intelligence production personnel.
- Time.
- Ongoing analysis.
- Preprocessed information sources.
- Collection assets.
- Automated information systems.
- CIS.

Assign Tasks

Specific tasks are assigned to the various collection and production resources that assist in the production process. The priority of tasks is

based on the priority of the IR, the time available, and the production schedule.

Prepare the Product(s)

During this step, existing information, data, and intelligence is researched and integrated with new information derived from collection operations and other all-source intelligence reporting. The resulting information set is analyzed and synthesized to develop conclusions and estimates. A final intelligence product(s) draft is produced based on the analysis performed.

Review and Quality Control

Procedures must be established for product review and quality control before final product approval and dissemination. A balance must be achieved between timely delivery and proper review.

Approve and Distribute the Product(s)

Responsibility for final approval of the intelligence product normally rests with the producing unit intelligence officer. At the MEF level, product approval responsibility is generally delegated to the ISC; however, time and the situation may dictate delegating this authority to lower levels. The intelligence product is only of value if it is distributed to the requester in time for proper use.

Follow Up

The final and most critical step in the production cycle is to follow up with commanders and other intelligence product users to—

- Ensure the product is understood.

- Determine whether PIRs and IRs are satisfied.

- Determine if the intelligence product generated new PIRs or IRs.

Production Management

Efficient management of the production cycle ensures effective military intelligence production in support of MAGTF and joint operations. Production management satisfies established PIRs and IRs in a complete, timely, and efficient manner; helps prioritize competing requirements to ensure timely response; and ensures the most effective use of limited intelligence resources.

Functions

Management of the production cycle encompasses the following functions:

- Determining the scope, content, and format of each product.

- Developing a plan and schedule for the development of each product.

- Assigning priorities among the various IPRs.

- Allocating processing, exploitation, and production resources.

- Integrating production efforts with collection and dissemination.

Production Managers

While intelligence production centers and agencies have separate production managers, management of the production cycle at other command levels is conducted by—

- Intelligence battalion commanding officer, serving as ISC under the staff cognizance of the MEF AC/S G-2, at the MEF CE level.

- Intelligence operations officer or air combat intelligence officer at the MSC level.

- Intelligence staff officer at lower tactical echelons.

- Officer in charge of an intelligence direct support team supporting a lower unit.

Production Management Elements

The following elements are essential for production management:

Production Requirements Development

Each IR must be validated through the chain of command and examined to determine scope, form, and content of the request. These validated and examined IRs are IPRs. A well-developed IPR includes—

● Point of contact and best way to communicate.

● Priority of the requirement.

● Date required and latest time the intelligence is of value.

● Classification, releasability, and format desired.

● Mission background.

● Brief description of the desired requirement.

● Justification for the requirement.

● Sources and documents previously consulted.

● Dissemination instructions (e.g., primary and alternate communications means or channels, designated recipients, quantities required).

Prioritization of Requirements

Production requirements are prioritized for limited intelligence resource use.

Asset Allocation

The intelligence officer and intel bn production manager consider internal or organic and external resources (e.g., JTF, theater, and national) for intelligence production tasking. Although internal resources should be considered first, production managers forward requirements for large, complex products to higher command levels. For example, IPB is an inherent function of staffs at every level; however, the production of detailed terrain analysis products may be more appropriately performed by the MEF intel bn or other supporting agencies.

Scheduling

Production managers must schedule and synchronize task elements in the time allotted to successfully complete intelligence production.

Integration with Collection and Dissemination

Production management starts in the planning and direction phase of the intelligence cycle where IRs are determined. The PIRs and IRs are either answered by intelligence products that are readily available or they become a collection or production requirement. Ultimately, products are disseminated to individuals and organizations that need them. Although collection, production, and dissemination involve their own unique internal procedures and cycles, they must be synchronized to provide a timely, pertinent, and usable intelligence product.

Intelligence Products

Intelligence products may be in graphic, written, or oral form and may be as simple as an answer to a question or as complex as a contingency intelligence study. Although they may be used to produce warnings or to identify opportunities, intelligence products are intended to facilitate planning and decisionmaking.

Graphics are the preferred product form because intelligence products should convey an accurate image of the battlespace or threat to the decisionmaker in a form that facilitates rapid understanding. The use of automated information systems is increasing the capability to develop graphic products that can be disseminated and displayed over web-based systems. Graphics developed by the MEF P&A cell may be pulled via the MAGTF tactical data network from the MEF SIPRNET web site or shared via IAS. Use of these graphics reduces or eliminates MSC production.

In time-sensitive situations, the verbal report or short text message may be the most expeditious and useful intelligence product form. For more complex or precise planning needs, graphics reinforced with detailed supporting text is usually required.

Whether oral, text, or graphic, intelligence products should use standard formats. Baseline formats may be modified to suit unit needs, but format modifications may impact interoperability so they must be thoroughly coordinated with all users. The following intelligence products are the principal intelligence products developed and used in the MAGTF.

MAGTF Contingency Intelligence Study

This baseline intelligence study is prepared in advance for standing OPLANs and likely contingencies. In written form, this study is based on the intelligence estimate format and can be converted to an intelligence estimate when a contingency becomes a reality. Many of the products created in steps 1 through 4 of the IPB process (e.g., MCOO, weather effects charts, threat models, doctrinal templates) can be prepared either as supporting graphics or as stand-alone products.

Intelligence Estimate and Supporting Studies

The intelligence estimate provides basic and current intelligence and mission-specific IPB results. Normally prepared by echelons of battalion or squadron size and larger during the planning phase, estimates are frequently disseminated to other units to keep them current on intelligence. Supporting studies may cover particular aspects of the enemy situation or the AO. See appendix A for the intelligence estimate format and discussion of the relationship between IPB and the intelligence estimate.

Target or Objective Study

This intelligence product provides mission-specific intelligence in support of small unit execution. There is one basic form, but many variations can be used. The study is used to support attack aviation as well as MEU(SOC) and regular combat operations. See chapter 8 for a discussion of the basic target or objective study.

Intelligence Summary

The intelligence summary (INTSUM) provides a synopsis of the intelligence situation covering a specified period prescribed by the unit intelligence SOP or annex B (Intelligence) to the OPORD. Used to report threat activities, threat capabilities changes, and P&A results, the summary is designed to update original and subsequent intelligence estimates.

At lower tactical echelons, INTSUMs are prepared according to the unit SOP or annex B to the OPORD. At higher commands, a daily INTSUM (DISUM) is published every 24 hours. Using the basic format, units tailor the INTSUM to fit the situation. Automated information systems facilitate graphic production of INTSUMs and DISUMs, which are posted on networks with links to detailed supporting intelligence products, reports, and data bases. See appendix F for the INTSUM format.

Intelligence Report

The intelligence report (INTREP) is a standardized report that is disseminated as rapidly as possible based on its importance to the current situation. This report is the primary means for transmitting new and significant information and intelligence when facts influencing threat capabilities have been observed or when a change in threat capabilities has taken place. Generally, a separate report is prepared for a single item of information by the first intelligence element acquiring the information. When time permits, the INTREP should include the

originator's interpretation of the information or intelligence being reported. See appendix G for the INTREP format.

Briefings

Intelligence briefings should always convey mission-essential intelligence and other pertinent information tailored to the audience and current IRs. Intelligence personnel must be able to prepare and orally convey relevant intelligence in a clear, concise manner to brief commanders, staffs, and subordinate units.

Briefings should be supported with graphics to enhance understanding in the least amount of time. Graphics may be as simple as a sketch or acetate overlay or as complex as a multimedia presentation delivered via video teleconferencing. Intelligence personnel must ensure graphics are clear, legible, simple, visible, and focused on relevant information.

At lower tactical levels, briefings are generally informal and often called on short notice. At higher levels, briefings may be structured and scheduled on a recurring basis. The intelligence brief is usually part of a staff briefing coordinated by the chief of staff, executive officer, or the operations officer. Intelligence briefings can be in the form of an information, decision, or confirmation brief.

Information Brief

This is the most common form of brief intended to enhance situational awareness and understanding. The commander's morning update is an example of an information brief. See appendix H.

Decision Brief

The second type of brief is for the purpose of obtaining a decision from the commander. A briefing conducted to convey wargaming results and to gain the commander's preferred COA is an example of a decision brief.

Confirmation Brief

This brief is a final review of a planned action to ensure participants are certain of the objectives and are synchronized with each other.

Organic MAGTF Intelligence Production

In the MAGTF, deliberate production of detailed, all-source intelligence products supports planning. While deliberate production draws heavily on external national, theater, and Service-level production sources, organic MAGTF intelligence sections tailor products to the MAGTF mission and needs. Small unit intelligence sections, intelligence watches at the regiment or Marine aircraft group and battalion or squadron levels, and intelligence direct support teams conduct primarily immediate production.

Unit Intelligence Sections

The MAGTF CE and MSC intelligence sections primarily conduct deliberate production to satisfy planning requirements. They produce the contingency intelligence studies that lower-level commands tailor to their needs.

Units conduct IPB and prepare estimates and target or objective studies that are tailored and focused on their mission and level of command. The IRs that are beyond a unit's production capability are normally forwarded via the chain of command to the MEF G-2 or intel bn. A well-prepared IPB is the basis for rapid and effective immediate intelligence production.

Small unit intelligence sections (e.g., regiment or battalion and Marine aircraft group or squadron) primarily conduct immediate production to satisfy tactical decisionmaking and operations. Immediate production conducted at higher echelons focuses on alarms or triggers associated with the commander's decision points or reactive targeting against identified HPTs. As units

and sensors collect data related to NAIs, TAIs, decision points, and HPTs, this information is rapidly assessed, placed in context, and disseminated as intelligence to the commander and appropriate agencies for immediate action. Often the product is a verbal report or short INTREP sent via electronic means.

Intelligence Direct Support Teams

Two direct support teams are organic to the P&A company, intel bn, and one each for the division, MAW, and FSSG headquarters. They are designed to allow the MEF or MSC commander and their G-2s to focus intelligence support to designated subordinate units. These teams tailor higher and external intelligence products to the needs of the supported unit and assist the supported unit in the production of IPB and other intelligence products to support detailed mission planning and execution.

Production and Analysis Company, Intelligence Battalion

The P&A company produces and disseminates all-source fused tactical intelligence, IMINT, and GEOINT products in support of the MAGTF, MSCs, and other commands as directed. As the focus of the deliberate production effort, P&A company satisfies IPRs for the entire MAGTF. The P&A company has the personnel and equipment resources and CIS connectivity to national, theater, and Service-level organizations' intelligence products and production resources for augmenting organic capabilities. See chapter 9 for additional information.

External Production Support

Marine Corps intelligence assets are optimized for the production of tactical intelligence in support of MAGTF operations. While organic assets are generally sufficient to meet MAGTF requirements, national, theater, and Service intelligence agencies and centers provide unique intelligence production capabilities. The MAGTF has the ability to exploit external intelligence assets to enhance its organic capabilities. The following key external capabilities are employed to support MAGTF operations:

- National, theater, and Service-level intelligence P&A.
- Geospatial information and services.
- P&A of target intelligence and target materials.
- National imagery collection, exploitation, and production.
- Collection and production support from the U.S. SIGINT System.
- National and theater-level CI and HUMINT collection and production.
- Liaison elements from national and theater intelligence agencies.

To exploit external intelligence support resources, the MAGTF must have—

- Trained personnel experienced with external intelligence assets.
- Sufficient, reliable, CIS connectivity and interoperability with national, theater, and Service intelligence architectures to receive, process, and disseminate information.
- Integration of Marine intelligence specialists into national, theater, and Service intelligence organizations to articulate Marine Corps capabilities and requirements, to influence decisions, and to optimize intelligence support to expeditionary forces.
- Established liaison between the MAGTF and supporting intelligence agencies through dedicated communications and exchange of officers.

Department of Defense Support

Within the Department of Defense (DOD) intelligence production community, the DOD Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP) provides the analytical and production resources to support

operational forces. The DODIPP incorporates basic principles that minimize duplication of effort and make the specialized expertise of its analytical personnel available to support DOD customers. The DOD intelligence production community is comprised of the following agencies, centers, and activities:

- DIA.
- Service production centers (e.g., MCIA).
- Unified command JICs or joint analysis centers, components, and Reserves.
- Allied production activities participating in the shared production program (SPP) or during crisis surge situations.
- National Security Agency, which produces SIGINT.
- National Imagery and Mapping Agency, which produces geospatial information and GEOINT.

National Production Support

The DIA and its supporting agencies (Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center and Missile and Space Intelligence Center) are responsible for intelligence production in the following areas:

- Foreign national military policy, doctrine, strategy, and planning, including—
  - National military leadership.
  - Mobilization process and potential.
  - Strategic or large scale military operations.
  - Integrated, combined, or joint forces on military net assessments and assessments or estimates focusing on military issues at the national, regional, and global levels.
- Current indications and warning intelligence and strategic targeting and planning by the joint staff.
- Integrated force trends and projection assessments.
- Nuclear weapon programs and doctrine.

- Intelligence on proliferation and technology transfer.
- Technological capabilities of antitank guided missiles, surface-to-air missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, and antiballistic and antitactical ballistic missiles.
- Medical and biological warfare intelligence.
- Global topics, such as military geography, industrial resources, transportation systems, demographics, military industrial and resource bases, and military economics.
- Intelligence production programs on counterterrorism, counterdrug intelligence support to law enforcement agencies, foreign intelligence and security forces, and deception analysis.
- Intelligence programs fulfilling DOD-wide responsibilities of common concern, such as targeting and foreign materiel.
- OOBs and associated facilities and installations assigned under the SPP, to include assessing the general military capabilities of those forces.

Unified Command Production Support

A unified command's intelligence production is performed by a production center or JIC, which is assigned to the unified command in support of theater or specialized forces. The JICs fulfill intelligence requirements of unified command CINCs and subordinate commanders by providing tailored, finished intelligence products to support theater mission planning and execution. Regional and functional unified command JICs' production responsibilities vary.

Centers

Unified command intelligence production JICs include—

- U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Forces Intelligence Command.
- U.S. Central Command's JIC.

- U.S. European Command's Joint Analysis Center (JAC).

- U.S. Pacific Command's JIC.

- U.S. Special Operations Command's JIC.

- U.S. Southern Command's JIC.

- U.S. Space Command's Combined Intelligence Center.

- U.S. Strategic Command's JIC.

- U.S. Transportation Command's JIC.

Responsibilities

The JICs' intelligence production responsibilities include—

- Operational intelligence, current intelligence, and indications and warning for forces deployed within the command's area of responsibility.

- OOBs and associated facilities and installations assigned under the SPP, to include assessing the general military capabilities of those forces.

- Foreign military forces unit-level training and/or operational readiness.

- Physical environment of deployed or committed forces, including terrain analysis and IPB.

- Targeting support, including target materials, bomb damage assessments, tactical BDAs, and special operations forces targeting support.

- Support to command-sponsored joint planning and exercises.

- Tailored and focused intelligence produced elsewhere to meet the specific requirements of command customers.

- Background and tactical intelligence to customers within the theater, including operational and allied forces.

Services Production Support

The Service production centers are responsible for Service-specific intelligence production and for production relative to U.S. Military Forces assigned for the SPP.

Centers

The Service production centers are—

- Army—National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).

- Navy—National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).

- Marine Corps—Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA).

- Air Force—National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC).

Responsibilities

The centers' intelligence production responsibilities include—

- Weapon system technical data, characteristics, performance, system vulnerabilities, and capabilities to support Service and defense acquisition activities and force developers and to support Service operational training and preparation for contingencies or conflicts.

- Basic ground, naval, and aerospace intelligence and foreign intentions and capabilities.

- Service-unique doctrine, force structure, force modernization, training and education, and acquisition.

- Support to Service schools and commands relative to training, exercises, predeployment, or crisis responsibilities or activities.

- OOB and associated facilities and installations assigned under the SPP, to include assessing the general military capabilities of Services.

Service-Unique Responsibilities

The following Service production centers have unique intelligence production responsibilities:

- NGIC produces ground-related systems and develops intelligence on—
  - Armor.
  - Infantry.
  - Field artillery.
  - Air defense guns.
  - Landmines.
  - Chemical warfare.
  - Helicopters.
  - Munitions.
  - Engineering and transport or logistic equipment.
  - Associated technologies.
- NMIC, Office of Naval Intelligence, produces naval-related systems and develops intelligence on—
  - Surface and subsurface combatants.
  - Antisubmarine or surface auxiliary and support naval ships and programs.
  - Weapons, merchant shipping, and ocean science information.
  - Associated technologies.
- NAIC produces aerospace-related systems and develops intelligence on—
  - Intercontinental ballistic missiles.
  - Intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
  - Medium-range ballistic missiles.
  - Bombers.
  - Fighters.
  - Special mission aircraft.
  - Munitions.
  - Space launch systems and satellites.
  - Associated technologies.
- MCIA produces amphibious and expeditionary warfare intelligence on—
  - Shallow water mines.
  - Coastal artillery.
  - Foreign marine and naval infantry forces.
  - Antilanding capabilities.
  - Expeditionary studies.

Non-Department of Defense Intelligence Production Support

Intelligence production in support of military forces is available from agencies outside DOD (e.g., Central Intelligence Agency). Generally, DIA serves as the focal point for tasking these agencies; however, theater and JTF intelligence staffs can access support through their national agency's liaison office or an assigned national intelligence support team (NIST).

A NIST is a nationally sourced, task-organized team composed of intelligence and communications experts from DIA, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, NIMA, or any combination of these. A NIST provides the supported command with increased IR management, production and dissemination capabilities, and a direct conduit to national agencies. The size and composition of the NIST varies according to the size and nature of the crisis and the mission and intelligence needs of the supported command.

Production Support Requests

A PR begins as an IR levied on the unit intelligence section. Before requesting production support, the unit intelligence officer must determine if the—

- Intelligence request or request for intelligence (RFI) is most appropriately answered by intelligence resources.
- Information or intelligence is already available in unit intelligence files, data bases, or information resources.
- Intelligence can be obtained by organic collection assets and developed into intelligence by its production assets.
- Intelligence request can be answered from other unit or component intelligence elements.

Once the unit intelligence officer determines that the requirement cannot be met with local resources, the requirement is forwarded up the chain of command for satisfaction. The intelligence officer determines whether to submit the requirement as RFIs, ICRs, IPRs, or PRs. (The acronym IPR is currently unique to the Marine Corps, while the acronym PR, established in joint doctrine, is chiefly applicable to intelligence operations at the MEF CE level and above.)

Generally, an RFI is submitted if the requirement is a fairly straightforward question. In a noncombatant evacuation operation, a RFI may be, "How many personnel require evacuation?" In this case, no extensive collection or production is required because the intelligence is generally available.

A PR is more appropriate when the IR is complex or substantial, for example, "What is the capability of country X to defend its coastline against an amphibious assault?" This requirement may result in an IPR for the MEF CE or a PR to the JTF headquarters because the answer will require the collection and analysis of a large amount of information ranging from hydrographic conditions to available threat weapon systems. Such analysis may be beyond the capabilities of a small unit intelligence section and more appropriately performed at the theater or Service level where access to information and ability to task collection resources are greater.

A PR is also appropriate to satisfy a requirement that may be recurring in nature or in a denied area, for example, "How many aircraft are maintained on alert status at airfield Y?" The unit intelligence officer submits a request for theater and national production assets, because the airfield will need to be monitored for a period of time to determine the answer and the requesting unit probably does not have the collection resources to monitor the airfield.

As an RFI travels up the chain of command, it is satisfied (from available information or intelli-

gence or by collecting new data), converted into a PR, or forwarded to the next higher level for satisfaction. Each unit in the chain of command validates the PR and either satisfies it from within or passes the requirement to the next higher authority for action. Figure 9-1 illustrates the generic flow of PRs.


Figure 9-1. IPR Flow.

Request Process

Most IPRs are levied on the intel bn, P&A company's P&A cell, which is the MAGTF's principal deliberate production asset. Based on the commander's guidance and the G-2/S-2's direction, the intel bn commander or ISC—

- Plans, manages, and conducts MAGTF IPR management.
- Exercises staff cognizance over MEF collection and production elements to fulfill PRs.
- Determines which PRs are produced locally and which PRs are forwarded to the appropriate theater, Service, or national DODIPP production center validation office (VO).

The VO reviews the PR, determining whether to accept and satisfy the PR, forward the PR to another production center, or invalidate the PR. The combatant commander, the JFC, or the MAGTF commander directs PR and RFI procedures, which vary from theater to theater. For example, a MAGTF preparing to deploy submits PRs through the normal Service chain of command to the MCIA VO. However, a MAGTF operationally assigned to a combatant commander submits PRs through the established operational chain of command to the VO supporting that theater. A theater intelligence directorate (J-2) may delegate validation authority to a JTF J-2 during a crisis, providing the JTF J-2 a streamlined path for JIC production support and priority over other non-crisis production requirements. For most crises and contingencies, annex B to the joint force commander's OPLAN or OPORD specifies policies and procedures for requesting intelligence production support.

Request Format

The same basic format is generally used for RFIs and PRs. This facilitates conversion of an RFI into a PR at a later time. A basic level production request must include—

- Organization(s) and specific office(s) or individual(s) requesting the product.

- Statement describing the—
  - Required information and intelligence.
  - Sources consulted by the requester and source shortcomings relative to the request.
- Latest time information of value.
- Product form (e.g., hard copy text, electronic file on disk) and total quantity of each.
- Requirements prioritization for multiple elements.

The basic format provided above is sufficient at lower tactical levels; however, at higher levels the format becomes more structured. Defense Intelligence Management Document 0000-151C-95, *Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP): Production Procedures (U)*, stipulates the format for PRs, which ultimately will be forwarded to a DODIPP VO and production center. See appendix I for PR format. Each combatant command defines formats and procedures in their applicable intelligence TTP documents. The MEF CE and MSC headquarters SOPs defines formats for their headquarters subordinate elements.

Automated Production Request Procedures

Community On-line Intelligence System for End Users and Managers (COLISEUM) provides an automated capability for the preparation, submission, validation, and assignment of PRs within the DOD intelligence production community. With this system, the requester researches existing requirements and responses to reduce the submission of duplicate requirements. Commands and production centers with access to COLISEUM have immediate visibility of existing and new requirements validation and production status and product completion notification.

Designed to function as an application under the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) program, COLISEUM is currently available on JDISS 1.01 and JDISS 2.0. The IAS also provides access through JDISS. In addition, the COLISEUM is available on INTELINK sensitive compartmented information (SCI) under

DIA, Directorate of Intelligence Production. The principal inject sites for Marine Corps operating forces PRs are the MEF and Marine Corps forces (MARFOR) G-2s. The MEF, MARFOR, CINC, and DOD policy documents govern procedures for submitting PRs via COLISEUM.

CHAPTER 10. OPERATIONS

Intelligence enables the planning and execution of successful operations. Unity of effort, high tempo, timely decisionmaking, rapid execution, and the relentless exploitation of decisive opportunities characterize MAGTF operations. Intelligence P&A must have the flexibility, agility, and sustainability to support MAGTF operations. This chapter discusses intelligence P&A planning and execution considerations for various MAGTF operations and phases.

Expeditionary in nature, MAGTF operations are conducted according to the following Marine Corps maneuver warfare and emerging operational concepts, which present unique challenges and considerations for intelligence support:

- Operational Maneuver From The Sea—The maneuver of operational-level naval forces projects sea-based power ashore to deal a decisive blow at a place and time of our choosing. Operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) focuses on operational objectives and embodies the application of the principles of maneuver warfare to a maritime campaign.

- Sustained Operations Ashore—Those campaigns in which MAGTFs fight as sea-based operational maneuver elements. Embracing the tenets of OMFTS, sustained operations ashore (SOA) envisions a series of operational-level missions designed to enhance the joint force campaign and exploit weaknesses exposed in the opposing force. Normally, SOA involve a MEF assigned to a larger joint or combined force.

- Military Operations Other Than War—The conduct of Marine and naval expeditionary operations across the range of military operations short of war. MOOTW encompass a wide variety of activities intended to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities.

SECTION I. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER FROM THE SEA

Success in OMFTS depends on the ability to seize fleeting opportunities and quickly take advantage of enemy vulnerabilities. Emphasis is placed on deception, surprise, speed, and battlespace preparation to create delay, uncertainty, and ineffectiveness in enemy actions. Intelligence provides the knowledge and understanding that enables the effective conduct of OMFTS. Operational maneuver from the sea relies on intelligence to drive planning, COA development, wargaming and selection, and execution by—

- Identifying the enemy's COG(s), strengths, and weaknesses.

- Exposing critical vulnerabilities to be exploited by naval forces operating from the sea.

- Assessing the potential for maneuver offered by the battlespace, to include identifying entry points where the force can establish ashore.

- Providing the foundation for effective force protection and C2W efforts, which facilitate the preservation of surprise and the employment of deception to disrupt and disorient the enemy during OMFTS.

Requirements

Key OMFTS intelligence P&A support requirements include—

- IPB and situation development covering a broad air, sea, and land maneuver space.

- Threat analysis focused on determining COGs and critical vulnerabilities.

- Detailed terrain and hydrographic analysis, which identify suitable entry points and support maneuver of widely dispersed combat and CSS elements.

- Responsive processing, analysis, and production capabilities that can rapidly develop the critical intelligence required to shape operational and tactical decisionmaking and to provide the intelligence segment of the common operational or tactical picture.

- Indepth intelligence support of force protection and C2W activities.

- Detailed information regarding local resources (e.g., petroleum, oils, lubricants, water) to reduce MAGTF ashore sustainment requirements.

Considerations

Although the requirements appear similar to the traditional amphibious operations intelligence support requirements, OMFTS presents the following unique considerations:

- The large potential AO may extend 200 nautical miles or more from the sea base.

- Points of entry may be widely dispersed instead of being grouped into a single force beachhead.

- The sea space becomes a maneuver area for LCACs and advanced amphibious assault vehicles transiting to the shore from over the horizon, requiring extensive and detailed hydrographic analysis over a larger area.

- The OMFTS forces rely on rapid maneuver for maximum effectiveness and survivability, necessitating detailed and accurate terrain analysis.

- The vision of dynamic, precision fires at maximum engagement ranges requires precise targeting data and BDA.

- Analysis must occur in real or near-real time and must be available simultaneously to every MAGTF unit and element.

- Intelligence products must be in a format that can be rapidly updated and displayed in graphic form on automated information systems to be used by units, staffs, and decisionmakers.

Support During Planning

Initial production efforts are directed at providing an extensive description of the battlespace and threat required to focus the planning effort. Under the direction of senior Navy and Marine intelligence officers, the MAGTF, MSC, naval expeditionary force, amphibious staff, and ship's intelligence sections engage in a collaborative effort to plan and execute intelligence and reconnaissance operations necessary to support development of intelligence products that support the force.

Individual intelligence sections normally concentrate on their particular areas of expertise, satisfying their units' requirements while contributing a broad-scope product to the general production effort. The MAGTF G-2 CIC or P&A cell may focus on describing the battlespace and enemy C2, logistics, and reserves; while the ground combat element's intelligence section studies the enemy ground forces. The amphibious force and the aviation combat element's intelligence sections both look at air and air defense threats, and the amphibious task force (ATF) intelligence staffs concentrate on the naval, sea mine, and coastal defense threat.

Intelligence personnel access national, theater, and adjacent component resources via reach back to augment organic resources of the force. The integrated Navy and Marine amphibious force intelligence center provides a comprehensive IPB analysis, intelligence estimate, HVT list, and supporting intelligence studies by coordinating amphibious force efforts. As the

planning phase continues, production efforts are concentrated on identifying enemy vulnerabilities to be exploited, providing IPB products, HPTs, and intelligence estimates to support specific COAs under consideration.

In the final stages of the planning process, the production effort shifts to development of mission-specific intelligence products focused on the selected COA(s). These products include IPB graphics, point of entry studies, and target or objective studies. In addition, an extensive all-source intelligence effort supports deception, operations security, psychological operations, and electronic warfare planning according to the commander's information operations or C2W strategy. The production effort becomes increasingly decentralized as MSC and subordinate element intelligence sections focus on their units' specific requirements. The MAGTF CE intelligence section continues to provide products to support the entire force, concentrating on elements designated as the main effort.

Support During Execution

During the execution phase, emphasis is placed on rapid processing and production of intelli-

gence that supports timely decisionmaking, enhanced situational awareness, and engagement of HPTs. Because OMFTS depends on decisive action and operational tempo to break the enemy's cohesion and ability to resist, intelligence personnel must be able to—

- Demonstrate flexibility, agility, and responsiveness to recognize threat vulnerabilities and identify opportunities as they develop during battle.

- Demonstrate an awareness of ongoing operational and tactical activities and potential threat actions or reactions.

- Integrate rapidly all-source intelligence information with sensor data and combat reporting to develop a coherent, timely, and tailored picture of enemy dispositions and an assessment of its intentions and capabilities.

- Convey rapidly the developed picture and assessment to commanders in time to exploit identified opportunities.

- Engage fully in planning for future operations by continuing IPB analysis, delivering BDA results, satisfying new intelligence requirements, and participating in the decisionmaking process.

SECTION II. SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE

Sustained operations ashore require broad-based intelligence support that bridges the operational and tactical levels. Tactical plans are based on operational-level intelligence assessments, which identify the enemy's COG(s) and critical vulnerabilities across the entire theater.

In SOA, MAGTF intelligence operations contribute to the operational level assessments while translating the conclusions from those assessments into relevant tactical intelligence.

While OMFTS focuses on operations from a sea base, SOA entails large-scale, potentially long-term, land operations supported from the sea. Critical aspects of SOA include a large AO and rapid operational tempo. While P&A in OMFTS is heavily tasked with identifying points of entry, SOA focus on infrastructure related to sustaining a large force. Analysis of threat COGs and vulnerabilities, detailed terrain studies, precise targeting data, and BDA remain requirements under SOA.

Considerations

Considerations for the development of intelligence in support of SOA are similar to those for OMFTS. Intelligence support during the execution of SOA requires the same agility and responsiveness as in OMFTS, with the focus on providing critical intelligence to support tactical decisionmaking. However, SOA are normally conducted over a greater area and with a larger size force than in OMFTS, creating the requirement for a larger and more widely distributed intelligence operation support structure. The potential for integration with theater, allied, and other Service intelligence assets are also greater than in OMFTS.

Support During Planning

P&A efforts in support of SOA parallel those for OMFTS. Initial production is broad in scope, with the focus narrowing as particular COAs are selected and a concept of operations is developed. In SOA, GEOINT production takes on added importance; opportunities for ground and air maneuver as well as LOS profiles for observation, weapons employment, and communications-electronic equipment operations are major considerations. Mapping enhancements, LOC studies, and IPB graphics (e.g., cross-country mobility, weather effects, and COOs) are key products.

Threat analysis must be comprehensive and generally deals with large ground and air formations. This analysis covers reserves as well as committed forces and must take into account factors that impact the enemy's ability to fight at the operational and tactical levels (e.g., leadership, doctrine, training, readiness, and sustainability).

An extensive production effort is devoted to supporting logistic operations. The main components of this effort are studies of the local climate, infrastructure, and resources as well as the rear area threat. Products from national, theater, and joint force intelligence agencies contribute to the production effort, but many of these products will be tailored by the intel bn's P&A company, other intelligence producers, and the MSCs' intelligence sections to satisfy particular MAGTF requirements.

Support During Execution

During execution, emphasis is placed on rapid processing and production of tactical intelligence to support operational decisionmaking in the current battle, while at the same time providing detailed intelligence to shape plans for future operations.

SECTION III. MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Military operations other than war include the following missions and tasks, which present unique intelligence requirements:

- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
- Noncombatant evacuation operations.
- Maritime intercept operations.
- Show of force.
- Strikes and raids.
- Peace operations, including peace enforcement and peacekeeping.
- Support to counternarcotics operations.
- Recovery operations.

Requirements

Intelligence shapes operations during MOOTW as it does during other types of MAGTF operations. However, in addition to understanding the physical environment and the threat, the commander must have intelligence on political, economic, and sociological conditions to develop sound military plans that will accomplish the assigned mission. To support MOOTW, MAGTF intelligence personnel must be able to—

- Focus on areas with the greatest potential for the execution of contingency operations.

- Respond with minimal warning and preparation.

- Adapt to a wide variety of potential missions and possess expertise and specialized capabilities to provide MOOTW intelligence.

Considerations

Intelligence P&A activities in MOOTW are generally characterized by—

- The initial lack of detailed data bases on the AO and threat forces.

- An extensive list of nonstandard intelligence requirements that must be satisfied to support planning and execution (e.g., uncertain force protection requirements).

- Analysis of nonmilitary related data.

- A rapidly changing situation resulting from crisis conditions in the AO.

- Compressed timeframe for intelligence development.

- Restrictions on collection operations and the dissemination of intelligence, particularly with multinational military forces, NGOs, and PVOs.

- Increased likelihood of participation by coalition partners.

Support During Planning

Intelligence P&A requirements in MOOTW are normally focused on nontraditional subject areas and IRs. For example, more detailed knowledge of the host nation's economic, transportation, medical, and public works infrastructure will be required to develop plans for humanitarian assistance operations. A threat study to support a peacekeeping mission must encompass an extensive treatment of political, cultural, and sociological factors related to various insurgent or paramilitary factions in addition to the conventional military capabilities of the opposing sides.

Collaboration and coordination with area specialists and expertise from external intelligence organizations, non-DOD agencies (e.g., State Department, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development) and NGOs or PVOs are crucial to satisfying MOOTW requirements. In turn, the requirement to share information and intelligence with those same agencies, as well as host-nation and allied forces, has a significant impact on analysis, production, and dissemination. While the goal is to provide necessary information and intelligence to participants in the operation, some information must remain releasable only to U.S. forces or allies with long-standing intelligence exchange agreements.

Production formats generally must be adapted to the requirements of a particular situation (e.g., normal IPB products must be modified to highlight factors critical to the specific MOOTW mission). In addition, P&A in MOOTW must be responsive to the unique needs of a large number of small elements conducting independent activities throughout the AO. Production in support of these elements must be tailored to specific mission requirements and provide details pertinent to the small unit level. Intelligence that increases the situational awareness of individual Marines (e.g., information on local customs,

language, health and sanitation) is an important part of this effort.

MOOTW IPB Requirements

The principal difference between IPB for conventional war and MOOTW activities is the focus and the degree of detail required to support the commander's decisionmaking process. Another major difference is the enormous demand for demographic analysis, since the population often is the focus in MOOTW. Typically force protection IRs take on greater priority. The four steps of the IPB process and sample aspects and considerations for various MOOTW activities, are discussed below. (See FM 34-130/FMFRP 3-23.2 for a discussion of each type of operation.)

Define the Battlespace Environment

Intelligence personnel define the MOOTW battlespace environment by expanding the AOI, assembling data on terrain and infrastructure, and compiling data on the host nation.

Expand the AOI

To expand the MOOTW AOI, intelligence personnel must—

- Identify potential sources of assistance to friendly force operations from outside the country or AO.

- Identify military, paramilitary, governmental, nongovernmental, and private volunteer organizations that may interact with the friendly force.

- Identify and locate external influences on the operation.

- Consider media, political, and third nation support or interference.

- Identify the geographic boundaries of the operation, applicable legal mandates or terms of

reference, and other limitations or constraints that may impact on the operation.

Assemble Data on Terrain and Infrastructure

To assemble data on MOOTW terrain and infrastructure, analysts must—

- Identify existing infrastructures that have the potential for use by either threat or friendly forces in the operational area.

- Include sources of basic sustenance and energy, as well as transportation and communication networks.

- Identify facilities in adjacent or intermediate countries that could support the introduction of friendly forces or the delivery of necessary materials.

- Compile data on the geography and climate of the area, to include unusual or violent weather patterns or natural disturbances.

Assemble Data on the Host Nation

To assemble data on a MOOTW host nation, intelligence personnel must—

- Identify the existing government and military infrastructure.

- Pay particular attention to their capabilities and limitations with regard to support for or interference in the operation.

- Begin compiling demographic data on the population, to include age, education, religious beliefs, cultural distinctions, ethnic makeup, allocation of wealth, political affiliations and grievances, languages, values, and practices.

Describe the Battlespace Effects

Intelligence personnel describe MOOTW battlespace effects by identifying legal aspects, conducting terrain and weather analysis, evaluating the threat, and determining threat COAs.

Identify Legal Aspects

The MAGTF staff judge advocate should fully explain the impact of legal mandates, terms of references, or other diplomatic agreements. Intelligence personnel should include legal mandates in place that will have a major effect on friendly COAs, particularly rules of engagement and use of force.

Conduct Terrain Analysis

To conduct terrain analysis for MOOTW, intelligence personnel must—

- Use military aspects of terrain or KOCOA.
- Pay attention to routes and areas that offer good observation for friendly security forces.
- Depict potential obstacles, choke points, and ambush sites.
- Ensure that air and ground AAs are included.
- Include analysis of the urban terrain.

Conduct Weather Analysis

To conduct a standard weather analysis for the MOOTW AO, intelligence personnel must consider the effects of weather on—

- Displaced persons or refugees.
- Hostile groups.
- Trafficability.
- Air operations.
- Seaborne operations.
- Night operations.
- Communications.
- Threat tactics and civil disturbances (e.g., rallies and demonstrations).

Evaluate the Threat

Doctrinal templates for typical types of threats faced in the MOOTW environment are rare because there are many threats. Intelligence personnel must evaluate the threat according to the specific mission.

Weather

In missions involving humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, where the environment is the threat, intelligence personnel should—

- Evaluate the environmental impact on the population and friendly operations by determining, for example, if continued rains and flooding could trigger mudslides isolating portions of the population and inhibiting relief operations.
- Prepare climatic studies showing historical paths and frequencies of destructive weather (e.g., hurricanes or typhoons), which can serve as a sort of doctrinal template to determine if earthquake aftershocks could collapse fragile water and sewage treatment facilities leading to an increase in waterborne diseases and environmental hazards.

Competing Factions

In missions involving competing factions, some critical information and intelligence may exist in coalition, host nation, or U.S. data bases, which could be used to begin building a threat model for the operation. Intelligence personnel should recognize differences in threats, strategy, procedures and tactics, as well as weapons, equipment, material, and personnel.

Environment

When evaluating the threat, intelligence personnel must—

- Determine if the environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile to U.S. forces entering with or without host nation approval.
- Determine if the population supports U.S. forces and if that support is contingent on some type or form of material compensation from U.S. forces (e.g., food, water, shelter, weapons).
- Determine if the population is organized to oppose U.S. forces and if the people are

armed and at what level (e.g., weapons, mines, vehicles).

- Identify dissident groups among the population that may publicly support but clandestinely oppose U.S. forces.

- Identify which terrorist groups are present, thought to be present, or have access to the AO, and if they are supported or directed.

- Identify leaders, trainers, and key staff members and develop psychological profiles on key personnel.

Determine Threat Courses of Action

This step in the IPB process is the culmination of battlespace environment analysis and threat evaluation. The success of U.S. operations in MOOTW depends on the combined efforts of state department officials, numerous government agencies, a unified command and its component Services, special operations forces, and the National Security Council. These organizations work together to accomplish foreign policy objectives of the United States and foreign allies. To determine threat COAs, intelligence personnel must—

- Template or describe the actions of the threat that would interfere with friendly operations (e.g., in peacekeeping operations any violations of the existing legal mandates by either belligerent could adversely effect friendly operations and security).

- Develop COA models depicting the reactions of the threat to friendly operations within the AO and AOI.

- War game each COA.

- Analyze reactions of local populace, multinational partners, NGOs, PVOs, and other key third or neutral parties to friendly COAs.

- War game terrorist and sabotage actions and other activities where the threat could reasonably avoid claiming responsibility, which could jeopardize friendly operations or security.

MOOTW IPB Products

The IPB products that may be useful in the MOOTW environment include (but are not limited to) population status, logistics sustainability, LOC, and key facilities and target overlays, as well as coordinates registers and pattern analysis plot sheets.

Population Status Overlay

To construct a population status overlay encompassing areas in the operation, intelligence personnel should, at a minimum, depict the population by political affinity or regional majority sentiment (e.g., progovernment, anti-American, neutral). If unable to ascertain some root causes of regional unrest (e.g., religious, ethnic, racial, or economic differences), intelligence personnel may display the population in terms of demographic differences. Points where demographic differences intersect often pose the greatest potential for conflict and possible disruption of friendly operations. See figure 10-1.

Logistics Sustainability Overlay

To construct a MOOTW logistics sustainability overlay, intelligence personnel should identify sources of food, potable water, fuel, etc. that could be used by the population, threat, or friendly forces. See figure 10-2.

Lines of Communications Overlay

To construct a MOOTW LOC overlay, intelligence personnel should—

- Identify routes into and out of the operational area.

- Include major streets, highways, railways, subways, waterways, etc.

- Analyze and depict the communication systems in place that could be used to support the operation (e.g., telephones, radio, television, satellite, and microwave systems). See figure 10-3 on page 10-10.

Figure 10-1. Population Status Overlay.

Figure 10-2. Logistics Sustainability Overlay.

Figure 10-3. Sewers and Subterranean Overlay.

Key Facilities and Target Overlay

Intelligence personnel construct a key facilities and target overlay to depict mission-essential facilities and potential threat targets (e.g., embassies, religious or cultural facilities, military installations, television and radio facilities, government buildings, airports, port facilities, medical facilities, public utilities).

In a noncombatant evacuation operation, the U.S. embassy or the evacuation control center would be considered a mission-essential facility, but it would also be considered a potential target for belligerents.

Coordinates Register and Pattern Analysis Plot Sheet

Because intelligence data bases and doctrinal templates are often limited for many MOOTW situations, intelligence personnel use tools such as the coordinates register and times pattern analysis plot sheets (discussed in chapter 7) to conduct pattern analysis and to rapidly gain an understanding of threat TTP and methodologies.

SECTION IV. JOINT OPERATIONS

Marine Corps forces participate in full partnership with other Services in joint operations, either as a component or as the nucleus of a joint force. A coordinated intelligence effort makes a critical contribution to the success of joint operations. During joint operations, Marine intelligence P&A must be fully integrated with joint intelligence activities to ensure unity of effort, mutual support, and effective employment of limited intelligence resources. Effective intelligence support in joint operations depends on—

● Agreement on policies and procedures.

● Mutual intelligence support.

● Sharing of intelligence capabilities and assets.

- Full interoperability and connectivity among participants.

- Robust liaison.

Responsibilities

The JFC is responsible for intelligence support within the joint command and has responsibility and authority to determine, direct, and coordinate mission-related collection, production, and dissemination activities through centralized or apportioned intelligence requirements management efforts. Component commanders remain responsible for the intelligence function within their commands and employ organic intelligence capabilities to support their assigned missions. The JFC makes national, theater, and joint force intelligence assets available to support the efforts of component commanders. At the same time, component capabilities must be available to assist the joint intelligence effort.

Marine Corps Component Production and Analysis

When assigned as a joint force component, Marine Corps intelligence personnel at each level of command perform the P&A required to support their planning and decisionmaking based on prioritized information requirements; requirements unsatisfied with organic resources are forwarded up the chain of command. Each level of command also disseminates intelligence products to subordinate and adjacent units. Because these higher, adjacent, supporting, and subordinate units may be from a different Service, Marine Corps intelligence sections and units participating in joint operations must—

- Operate according to joint intelligence doctrine, theater TTP, and individual joint force procedures.

- Participate in joint intelligence mechanisms for the coordination of IR management (i.e., collection, production, and dissemination requirements).

- Provide P&A support to the joint force headquarters and other component commanders, as required.

- Employ joint or component P&A assets in support of Marine component operations.

- Ensure complete and reliable CIS connectivity within the joint intelligence architecture.

- Exchange liaison elements with the JTF intelligence directorate (J-2), joint intelligence support element (JISE), and/or other joint force component P&A entities as required.

Joint Task Force Headquarters Production and Analysis

A MAGTF may be designated as a JTF with the MAGTF CE forming the nucleus of the JTF headquarters. In this case, the G-2/S-2 must be prepared to function as the JTF J-2 with the MEF CE's intelligence section serving as the base for the establishment of a J-2 section and JISE. The JISE provides intelligence support to the JFC and the entire JTF.

Key Functions

When serving as a JTF J-2, MAGTF intelligence sections must operate according to joint doctrine and theater TTPs. The MAGTF G-2/S-2 must ensure that the P&A portion of the JISE is appropriately augmented or supported by specialists from national agencies, the theater JIC, and other Services possessing the necessary skills to satisfy the force requirements. Key functions performed in the JISE include—

- Centralized collection, production, and dissemination management for joint force and supporting intelligence and reconnaissance assets.

- All-source intelligence P&A to satisfy JFC and component IRs.

- Development and maintenance of intelligence data bases which support planning, operations, and targeting.

- Production of target studies and materials and intelligence support to force protection.

- Access to supporting national and theater intelligence assets.

Support During Planning

Intelligence product formats, standards, and dissemination means must be defined early to ensure JTF elements can exchange and use intelligence products. When possible, these definitions and standards should be planned for in advance and published in an SOP or TTP that is available to other Service units that may be assigned as part of a Marine-led JTF. The TTP or SOP should be exercised whenever possible to refine procedures and ensure unity of effort.

Support During Execution

The JFC, through the J-2, exercises complete coordination and some specified control over the P&A efforts of the joint force. Often, the J-2 is delegated direct IR validation, prioritization, and tasking authority for intelligence production by the supporting theater JIC. Incumbent with that authority, the J-2 is responsible for managing the force IRs and associated PRs.

SECTION V. COMBINED OPERATIONS

Marine Corps forces may participate in a variety of combined operations, ranging from routine bilateral exercises to coalition warfare in major regional contingencies. Instances of unilateral U.S. military operations are becoming less frequent, particularly in MOOTW. Joint doctrine serves as the doctrinal basis for combined or multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance must develop its own TTP for each operation. The coalition commander determines standardized procedures for coalition forces. NATO STANAGs and quadripartite standing agreements between U.S., British, Canadian, and Australian forces provide standards and guidance for the conduct of military operations by forces in these alliances. See STANAG 2936, *Intelligence Doctrine-AIntP-1(A)*, which governs intelligence operations.

Principles

Successful combined intelligence operations are based on the following principles and considerations.

Adjustment of National Differences Among Nations

Effective combined operations require minimizing the differences in national concepts and TTP for intelligence support. Commanders and their intelligence officers must be prepared to make adjustments to U.S. TTP to facilitate the sharing of intelligence and the integration and interoperability of intelligence and reconnaissance operations.

Unity of Effort Against Common Threat

Intelligence operations must be directed at the common threat. A threat to one alliance member must be considered a threat to all.

Intelligence Determination and Planning

Combined force's IRs and procedures should be identified, planned for, coordinated, and exercised prior to execution of operations.

Special Arrangements

Special arrangements should be considered for developing, communicating, and using intelligence where there are differences in nations' language, culture, doctrine, terminology, organization, as well as intelligence and CIS equipment.

Full Exchange of Intelligence

Each coalition member should share intelligence that supports planning and execution of coalition operations. Intelligence personnel should obtain authorization for foreign disclosure and outline procedures for disclosure and release of intelligence as part of the planning process. During execution, intelligence personnel should monitor the exchange of intelligence and adapt requirements to ensure coalition partners' needs are satisfied.

Complementary Intelligence Operations

Intelligence personnel should integrate and employ each nation's intelligence assets to capitalize on their strengths and offset their weaknesses, providing the coalition with the most effective blend of intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities.

Combined Intelligence Centers

A combined command headquarters should be supported by a combined intelligence center. The center should be manned by personnel from each nation and include appropriate linguist and translator support. This center—

- Develops coalition IRs.

- Validates and establishes priorities.

- Develops integrated intelligence plans.

- Commands and controls intelligence operations.

- Fuses intelligence received from alliance members.

- Disseminates this intelligence to the combined force.

Liaison Exchange

Exchange of intelligence liaison personnel between alliance partners bridges national differences and facilitates the exchange of intelligence and intelligence support.

Foreign Disclosure and Releasability

An important consideration for intelligence P&A in combined operations is the ability to release or disclose intelligence to non-U.S. members of the combined force in a timely manner.

Releasability involves the conveyance of information in documentary form to a foreign national. The document may be a publication, map overlay, imagery, computer disk, or any media that is physically provided to the foreign national.

Disclosure is the conveyance of classified information to a foreign national through either oral or visual means. Disclosure covers classified information that is retained by the United States but is discussed, briefed, or viewed by a foreign national. Often, regardless of whether information and intelligence is released or disclosed, the source(s) of that information and intelligence must not be revealed. Although the members of a coalition are united toward a common goal, it must be assumed that members' intelligence services will attempt to gather information on U.S. capabilities.

Policies and Procedures

The Director of Central Intelligence, DOD, Service, and theater policies and procedures govern foreign disclosure and releasability. The theater CINC is ultimately responsible for establishing policy regarding disclosure and releasability. During crises or contingencies, the CINC may choose to delegate authority to subordinate U.S. joint, combined, or component commanders. When so delegated, each recipient of that authority is responsible for publishing releasability and

disclosure guidance and procedures for their subordinate elements.

During combined operations, MAGTF CEs may be required to act as either a functional or Service component headquarters or as a combined task force headquarters, performing foreign disclosure oversight and guidance. Even when operating as an element of a combined force, every unit and individual Marine must be aware of foreign releasability and disclosure guidance.

Based on the established guidance and procedures, intelligence analysts must pay particular attention to the sources of information and the releasability of the information and intelligence derived from each of those sources. Often one version of an intelligence product must be produced for U.S. forces (and some standing alliance or quadripartite partners), and one version must be releasable to the multinational force.

Security

A balance must be struck between safeguarding classified information and intelligence and ensuring coalition partners are adequately informed and protected. One method for enhancing dissemination while providing necessary security of threat intelligence is to use the tear-line technique in the production process. This process ensures that intelligence and other information below the tear line is releasable to the combined force while simultaneously providing for the protection of U.S. collection intelligence sources and methods. Ultimately, the commander has the final authority to authorize foreign disclosure of information and intelligence directly related to a threat to any coalition partner.

Product Format Considerations

In combined operations, the form in which intelligence is conveyed is critical. Many potential coalition partners lack the technological and functional

sophistication to collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence and exercise C2 over intelligence operations. Access to networks using SIPRNET or JWICS is generally not possible due to the inability to restrict the user from accessing unauthorized intelligence and friendly information. Language barriers may affect less sophisticated forms of intelligence dissemination such as text documents or briefings. The ability to exchange and use intelligence may vary from partner to partner.

Solutions for these challenges must be addressed early in planning. Generally, production requirements increase as a result of the need to tailor intelligence for multiple recipients. Increased IRs should be matched with increased analysis, production, and dissemination resources to ensure the timely provision of intelligence throughout the force. Where possible, coalition intelligence personnel should assist in the production of intelligence tailored to support their forces.

Information Sources

The intelligence analyst in a combined operation has the increased burden of assessing the reliability and credibility of non-U.S. information and intelligence sources. While foreign militaries may lack the sophisticated technical means available to the United States, they often enjoy superior capabilities in HUMINT, particularly if they are ethnically or linguistically related to the population of the AO. The analyst may need time to establish the reliability of the source or the accuracy of the information. In addition, the analyst must be aware that foreign forces may withhold, filter, or distort the information provided to the United States to safeguard their intelligence sources and methods. The analyst should apply the techniques and procedures for assessing reliability and accuracy and be conscious of biases that may develop due to preconceived notions regarding the source.

SECTION VI. PRE-CRISIS PHASE

The MAGTF pre-crisis intelligence P&A efforts center on data base management, ongoing production activities, and training.

Data Base Management

The key to effective intelligence and CI P&A is the identification and maintenance of hard copy and electronic intelligence sources and data bases. Intelligence personnel should attempt to develop and maintain relevant data bases during day-to-day operations in garrison. Without the necessary pre-crisis P&A, the ability to provide needed support in a crisis will be diminished. Key sources of intelligence data include the intelligence reference library, statement of intelligence interest, and intelligence data bases.

Intelligence Reference Library

Although intelligence is produced and disseminated increasingly in electronic form, each intelligence section is required to maintain a basic intelligence library in support of command and intelligence functioning. The library should include publications which are tailored to the unit's mission and echelon and are necessary to support day-to-day intelligence planning, operations, and contingency operations. Publications should include maps, charts, imagery, graphics, pertinent finished intelligence, and key supporting documents. Intelligence library publications are categorized as required and nonrequired.

Required Publications

As higher headquarters-directed holdings, these publications represent the minimum required material needed to support intelligence and command functioning. The intelligence officer is responsible for reviewing and validating the command and subordinate command's required holdings to ensure that they meet the minimum

intelligence operation support requirements. Requests for additions or deletions of publications will be submitted via the chain of command according to the guidance contained in current directives.

Nonrequired Publications

Intelligence sections maintain nonrequired publications to supplement minimum required holdings, to conduct planning and training, or to use as reference material. The intelligence officer is responsible for ensuring nonrequired publications are available to support intelligence requirements.

National, Service, and unified commands produce intelligence publications that provide intelligence and guidance for intelligence functioning. Procurement procedures are contained in current directives and local SOPs. The manpower or personnel staff officer (G-1/S-1) is responsible for the procurement of doctrinal and tactical publications (e.g., JPs, MCDPs, MCWPs, MCRPs, FMs); however, the intelligence officer is responsible for identifying requirements for these publications.

Statement of Intelligence Interest

The statement of intelligence interest (SII) is the vehicle by which commands register requirements for all-source finished intelligence. Each command must establish an SII with DIA to receive automatic distribution of intelligence publications in support of command requirements. The intelligence officer is responsible for coordinating with the appropriate Dissemination Program Manger (DPM) to ensure the commands's SII is up to date. Statements of intelligence interest are requested through DIA's online Joint Dissemination System (JDS) via INTELINK/INTELINK-S under the Director of Information Systems and Services.

Accounts can be applied for online and are forwarded to the appropriate DPM, which is

Marine Forces, Atlantic, Marine Forces, Pacific, or MCIA, respectively. Once the account is established, it may be modified online. The appropriate MARFOR headquarters or MEF CE intelligence officer determines specific policies governing echelons that may apply for JDS accounts. The Defense Intelligence Production Schedules list DOD planned general intelligence production. Most intelligence producers maintain some type of production forecast on their INTELINK and INTELINK-S web sites.

Intelligence Data Bases

The establishment of intelligence data bases allows the intelligence section to manage and use the large volume of available information and intelligence. Intelligence agencies have established various data bases suited to their needs, resulting in different systems available to support intelligence operations at various levels. The intelligence officer at each command echelon must be aware of relevant intelligence agencies' data bases and plan for their use to support operations. In addition, the intelligence officer should maintain access to appropriate national, theater, and Service data bases.

Data bases are available to Marine Corps commands equipped with the JDISS and the IAS, either as applications or through access to INTELINK and INTELINK-S. As modern information systems technologies mature, the structure and titles of the data bases change frequently. The MCIA 1586-001-96, *MAGTF Contingency Reference Guide*, is a compendium of agencies, products, data bases, and INTELINK sites of potential interest. This publication is available in hard copy, disk, and on-line via both INTELINK and INTELINK-S. In addition, national, theater, and Service producers have created electronic links from their INTELINK web sites to other pertinent sites.

Each intelligence section should create local data bases to support their contingency planning and the development of contingency intelligence support products. Most current intelligence files can be maintained on automated data base systems. Finished intelligence products, imagery, maps, and graphics are available on-line to facilitate data search, access, and retrieval. When assembled, a pre-crisis data base should consist of—

- Current target country intelligence and CI estimates.

- Intelligence reference publications (e.g., intelligence TTP for combatant commands the unit may support, intelligence TTPs or SOPs for other Services with which the unit may operate).

- Standard intelligence data base segments (i.e., modernized integrated data base).

- Mapping, charting, geodetic, and other geospatial holdings.

- Imagery library and related holdings.

- Current intelligence files.

- Open source publications.

Production

Pre-crisis intelligence production includes contingency intelligence production, IPB, exercise intelligence, and other intelligence requirements.

Contingency Intelligence

The main pre-crisis P&A effort of MAGTF and MSC intelligence sections is contingency intelligence production in support of potential missions. The intelligence section must review standing contingency plans and tasking in conjunction with staff operations and plans sections. Intelligence personnel should coordinate with operations and plans personnel to define the mission, scope, and tasks using the following methodology.

Define the Intelligence Requirements

The IRs should be well defined after coordination with commanders and their staffs. Properly focused IRs save time and valuable intelligence assets.

Research Data Bases

Available intelligence data bases should be reviewed before submitting RFIs, ICRs, IPRs, IDRs, or PRs.

Analyze and Synthesize Data

Intelligence personnel must consider data, information, and intelligence from all available sources for analysis and synthesis.

Prepare the Products

Products must be prepared in user-friendly formats and delivered in a timely manner.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Pre-crisis IPB is conducted to develop basic and current intelligence needed to support the planning and execution of contingency operations. The extensive and detailed nature of intelligence required to support expeditionary operations demands that a comprehensive research, analytical, and production effort be undertaken far in advance of the initiation of such operations. This demands that commanders and staff principals conduct detailed contingency planning across functional areas and command echelons to identify specific detailed IRs. The pre-crisis period offers the opportunity to carry out a thorough, measured study of potential areas of MAGTF employment. Driving contingency planning efforts, the pre-crisis IPB is the principal contribution of intelligence to combat readiness.

Pre-Crisis Products

The IPB products that can be generated in pre-crisis analysis and production include—

- Battlespace characteristics analysis.
- Terrain and weather analyses and templates.
- Weather effects matrices for various seasons and conditions.
- Threat models.
- Threat capabilities assessments.
- Threat COAs, when possible.

Results

The completed pre-crisis IPB process provides the following products for each potential contingency area:

- Tailored intelligence data base(s).
- Contingency intelligence study.
- Intelligence and counterintelligence estimates.
- Validated intelligence collection, production, and dissemination requirements.
- Integrated intelligence operations plan (collection, production and dissemination).
- Tentative tasks for supporting intelligence and reconnaissance units.

Additional Purposes

In addition to the primary purpose of supporting contingency planning and execution, pre-crisis IPB—

- Develops an intelligence data base for selected areas.
- Educates personnel on potential missions and AOs.
- Identifies intelligence collection, production, and dissemination shortfalls (e.g., IRs, key personnel, and equipment).
- Trains intelligence personnel in the IPB process and the development of intelligence in support of actual contingency missions.

Exercise Intelligence

Exercise intelligence production should follow the same procedures as contingency intelligence production and should result in products that mirror image what will be used in an actual operation. The intelligence section should use real-world data bases, IPB, and scenarios whenever possible to enable realistic training of intelligence personnel and staff and to provide solid area and threat familiarization training for unit Marines and Sailors.

When conducting field training exercises, the intelligence section must provide the same quality of GEOINT, IMINT, SIGINT, CI or HUMINT, and other intelligence support as would be provided in an actual operation. Weather conditions and terrain will factor heavily into the success and safety of an exercise involving the actual maneuver and movement of air, land, and seaborne forces.

Other Intelligence

In garrison, the intelligence section is expected to provide indications and warning information and promote threat awareness. The intelligence section must keep the commander and staff, as well as those of subordinate units, informed on items of interest in the unit's assigned or potential contingency areas. This can be accomplished by providing periodic current intelligence briefings, affording access to intelligence publications, and/or preparing current intelligence read boards for commanders and staff members. With increased access to web technologies, the commander, staff, and subordinate units can review daily pertinent information posted on a web site. The intelligence section should always be prepared to field impromptu requirements as directed by the commander or staff.

Production and Analysis Training

While in garrison, intelligence P&A training is accomplished through individual training, element training, unit training, and MAGTF training.

Individual Training

The intelligence analyst receives an introduction to P&A topics at formal intelligence military occupational specialty training courses. However, to develop P&A proficiency, the intelligence section must have a continuing training program to enhance P&A skills.

Skills Development

The Marine intelligence analyst must train to further develop—

- Comprehensive study and understanding of threat forces' doctrine, operational and functional methodologies, and TTP.
- Familiarity with potential operating areas' cultural, ethnic, sociological, and religious orientations, organization, perspectives, values, and issues.
- IPB skills, which cover analysis of contingency AOs, threat COGs, critical vulnerabilities, tactical practices, capabilities, and COAs.
- Intelligence research methods (e.g., information and intelligence sources, agencies, functions, capabilities, limitations, automated information systems, data base availability and procedures).
- Methods of collecting and reporting information.
- Processing, recording, and filing information methods (e.g., manually and electronically preparing overlays and posting situation maps).

- Integration, analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and information synthesis skills to rapidly produce tailored intelligence products.

- Skills in the use of automated information systems to manage data, analyze information, and produce and disseminate GENSER and SCI intelligence products, using all means of presentation (e.g., briefings, text reports, graphics, overlays).

Exercises

Wargaming and command post exercises (CPXs) are the best vehicles for analytical training and must be done independently of major exercises to enhance analytical skills before they are needed. Normally, the majority of training comes as a result of practical application (i.e., preparation of IPB and other products in response to exercise or contingency requirements). Each product must be evaluated and critiqued with the analyst who developed it to improve their skills. The intelligence officer's wargaming goals should include—

- Providing participants with a thorough area and situation orientation.

- Validating the scope and area coverage of the initial IPB.

- Determining gaps in existing intelligence.

- Identifying areas for additional study.

- Developing new collection, production, and dissemination requirements.

- Developing an initial intelligence concept of operations and supporting contingency collection, production, and dissemination plans.

Element Training

Intelligence sections and elements must have an integrated training program to develop the individual, team, and unit skills and capabilities necessary to execute intelligence and reconnaissance operations during MAGTF operations. Section training should first emphasize building specialized individual production skills. Once individual skills are mastered, cross-training and develop-

ment of depth should be emphasized. A building block approach is used, starting with small group or team training (e.g., watch section, country team, or production element) and working up to exercises employing the entire G-2/S-2 section and those of subordinate commands.

While a command staff exercise, CPX, or field exercise normally provides the best environment for the conduct of intelligence section training, independent G-2/S-2 section training should be conducted in advance of a major command training event. This allows the section to develop and test SOPs, cross train personnel in a variety of functions, and conduct indepth instruction in intelligence P&A. Each production requirement or exercise is a training opportunity and should have specific training objectives associated with it.

Unit Training

Intelligence units conduct training according to their unit's specific mission and functions. As intelligence specialty units are often employed as small, independent subelements, the majority of their training should be targeted at the team, subteam, or detachment level. Intelligence unit training should also emphasize the planning and execution of operations in response to the supported unit's requirements.

Each unit training evolution is an opportunity to enhance P&A training by requiring the development of objectives for each exercise. In addition, unit training must encompass specific, detailed intelligence objectives for commanders and other staff section personnel. Unit training for P&A should—

- Train intelligence sections in meeting tactical requirements by exercising deliberate and immediate tactical production.

- Exercise the IR management process and intelligence cycle between consumers and producers.

- Test and improve standard product formats and content.

- Critique and provide P&A effort feedback.

- Evaluate the effectiveness of integrating intelligence production operations with those of collection and dissemination.

MAGTF Training

This training combines MAGTF units and trains on a larger scale, which provides intelligence personnel the opportunity to exercise the production management function as well as integrate collections and dissemination with P&A. The MAGTF training provides the opportunity to—

- Test requirement priorities and procedures.

- Test the integrated production between the MEF CE CIC, other intelligence and reconnaissance units, and MSCs.

- Determine if the resulting test products meet the commander and staff's needs.

SECTION VII. WARNING AND DEPLOYMENT PHASE

Warning and deployment sets the intelligence foundation for the entire operation. During this phase, intelligence is expected to produce a high volume of critical planning and decision-making support in a short period of time. This phase is further complicated by the need to prepare P&A elements for deployment within the MAGTF. The IPB and contingency intelligence study prepared in the pre-crisis period and the knowledge and skills gained by intelligence personnel, commanders, and other staff personnel during training exercises is the key to the ability to deliver intelligence support and products early in the warning or deployment phase. Initial P&A efforts, production management, and standardization of products frame the warning and deployment intelligence phase of operations.

Initial Production and Analysis

Determine Initial Requirements

Key to the success in determining initial IRs is a clear understanding of the command's mission, assigned tasks, commander's intent and guidance, and a defined AO. Command and staff element requirements should be integrated so that comprehensive products can be developed to meet as many needs as possible.

The P&A goal should be to produce a product only once to avoid duplicating effort and wasting time and assets. Time is the driving factor in determining the amount of detail that can be put into the P&A effort in the warning and deployment phase.

Assemble and Focus Data Bases

With an understanding of the mission and AO, intelligence personnel can refine data bases and other intelligence holdings. Units should agree on standardization of products and data bases early on in this process. Product and data base standardization should be a minor effort if SOPs or TTPs exist and units have worked and coordinated together previously in IPB contingency intelligence study preparation and training. This effort is more complicated in a joint or combined force.

Develop Initial Estimate and Supporting Studies

Preparing the intelligence estimate is easier if the contingency intelligence study is prepared and IPB is in progress. The initial IPB provides the baseline descriptive intelligence to initiate planning and, when paired with the contingency

intelligence study, supports the preparation of an initial estimate and supporting studies.

Develop Collection, Production, and Dissemination Requirements

Shortfalls identified during preparation of the initial intelligence and CI estimates become the basis for development of new collection, production, and dissemination requirements beyond organic capabilities. New requirements must be turned into collection, production, and dissemination plans, necessitating support requests to component, JTF, and/or theater commands for action. The MAGTF intelligence section is responsible for developing these requirements and for coordinating with the planning section to ensure requirements are focused on operations.

Production Management

Production management validates and prioritizes IPRs among competing requirements to determine which ones have the most impact on the mission's outcome. Production must be managed ruthlessly during this phase to ensure that limited assets are properly focused. The commander must be actively involved in—

● Directing intelligence operation efforts.

● Setting priorities.

● Providing the intelligence officer with guidance on where to focus the effort and what requirements are most important.

● Evaluating the effectiveness of operations.

Continuous interaction with staff planners and subordinate commanders and intelligence officers is required to ensure ongoing production supports the development of friendly COAs. Requirements typically change frequently during this phase as COAs are identified, refined, or rejected. Production management must ensure flexibility and responsiveness. Time is the critical element in production during this phase, because requirements must be met on time, even at the expense of detail.

Standardization of Products

The use of standard products simplifies production and dissemination. To provide a cut-and-paste or fill-in-the-blank capability, products should be standardized and automated. Establishing standard products and a regular update schedule is an effective way of managing production and dissemination during this phase. Product standardization can head off constant requests for updates by organizations, which can drain production and dissemination resources and detract the focus from essential requirements. A system of standard products should be developed during training and carried over with only minor modifications.

SECTION VIII. EXECUTION PHASE

In addition to production management, MAGTF intelligence P&A during the execution phase of operations involves support to current operations, future operations, future plans, and targeting.

Production Management

Production management remains critical during the execution phase, as requirements tend to change rapidly. P&A resources must be focused on the main effort according to the commander's guidance and intent, the PIRs, and the unit's operations and intelligence concepts. The commander must balance the production effort between support to current operations and future operations planning. Usually, the higher the echelon, the greater the focus is on future operations and planning; the lower the echelon the greater the focus is on current operations. Normally, at

higher command echelons, commanders and intelligence personnel must remain responsive to their own and lower echelon commanders' tactical needs. During execution, the time element is even more critical, because execution often depends on timely receipt of intelligence required for decisionmaking.

Support to Current Operations

Support to current operations consists primarily of immediate tactical production that is keyed to the commander's decision points, PIRs, and location of HPTs. Each piece of data, information, or intelligence received undergoes immediate tactical processing and assessment to determine if it is pertinent to the ongoing operation. If deemed pertinent, the information is quickly analyzed, impacts are determined, intelligence estimates are prepared, and results are disseminated. Intelligence personnel must maintain situational awareness and understand the operational situation, current PIRs and IRs, and likely enemy reactions to anticipate and meet the needs for immediate tactical production.

Support to current operations must include P&A in support of deep and rear operations and resist focusing on the close battle. Intelligence support to current operations must be balanced against the need to support future operations and plans. Assets cannot be devoted to current operations at the expense of supporting planning for future operations. In addition to short, tailored, mission-focused products in response to an immediate tactical need, production includes regularly scheduled update briefs and intelligence summaries that help maintain a common picture of the battlespace supporting situation development.

Support to Future Operations

Depending on the timeframe of the operation, scope of the operation, and level of command,

support to future operations consists of a mix of immediate and deliberate production. Future operations focus on the deep battle, which is defined either by distance or time. Intelligence products in support of future operations must focus on that same planning window and seek to provide the future operations team with a coherent projection of the battlespace and threat within that window.

The future operations cell focuses on a rolling or near-continuous IPB process by generating new COAs, ICRs, IPRs, IDRs and targeting priorities, DSTs, and synchronization matrixes as the battle or operation unfolds. Intelligence production supporting the future operations cell is focused on products generated during IPB, which have been constantly modified by the results of friendly and threat actions. Daily situation update briefings are necessary to ensure the future operations team remains aware of current actions that may impact future operations.

The primary intelligence P&A contributions are the BDA results and the estimate of the situation focused on the appropriate planning horizon. The BDA provides input into combat assessment, which in turn helps determine the nature of future operations. Derived from the continuous IPB effort, the situation estimate provides the basis for planning.

During future operations planning, IPB and estimates draw on and extend previous work rather than generating new production. The intelligence P&A effort requires continuous interaction with the future operations cell. As decisions are made concerning future operations, integrated collection, production, and dissemination requirements are developed and prioritized, missions are assigned, and mission-specific products are prepared. Management of the time element is critical to ensure that products reach the future operations cell, mission planners, and executers in a timely manner.

Support to Future Plans

The MEF CEs, components, and JTF headquarters often require an additional planning cell focused on the next campaign or major phase change within the CINC's campaign plan. This cell, or operational planning team, in the MEF CE looks into the future and deals more in assumption than fact. Production in support of future planning tends to be deliberate and generalized but still encompasses the basic elements of IPB.

Often, the future plans cell is located out of the immediate operations area and may locate in close proximity to the CINC headquarters to facilitate communication and collaboration. Given the timeframe and location of potential future operations, the supporting theater intelligence center may be more suited to produce required intelligence products, with MAGTF intelligence personnel tailoring these products to support the needs of the future plans cell.

Support to Targeting

Intelligence support to targeting requires a continuous, integrating support effort to current and future operations. This support consists of target development (generated through IPB), immediate tactical production of new intelligence related to particular targets, and BDA of the mission execution results. At higher command echelons, the targeting cycle can span days, while at lower echelons it may span hours or minutes. In MAGTFs with organic fixed-wing aviation, the intelligence support to targeting is driven by the ATO cycle. An important goal is the synchronization of the collection and production phases with the appropriate phases of the PDE&A and ATO cycles to ensure the provision of relevant and timely target intelligence.

APPENDIX A. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FORMAT

An intelligence estimate can be prepared at any level, from the battalion or squadron through the Marine expeditionary force command element and Marine Corps forces headquarters levels. The intelligence estimate should be succinct, yet provide the commander and staff the necessary information for decisionmaking. The scope and detail of an intelligence estimate are governed by the—

- Level of command preparing it.
- Nature of the operation it is intended to support.
- Current availability of intelligence.
- Prior contingency planning.
- Time and resources available.

Whenever possible, the intelligence estimate should clearly present the analysis and conclusions developed during intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). The finished estimate may be in written, graphic, or verbal form, but should always follow the general five-paragraph structure presented in the following pages. Subparagraphs and tabs may be added and omitted based on their relevance to the stated mission. For topics that require a large amount of data, information, and intelligence (i.e., beaches, weapons capabilities, technical characteristics), the salient facts and conclusions should be summarized in the body of the estimate and the detailed data included as a tab.

For a discussion of IPB and the intelligence estimate, see chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides a discussion of the various factors that constitute paragraph 2 of the estimate. Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the factors that constitute paragraph 3.

The sample on page A-2 is the format for an intelligence estimate in support of conventional combat operations. The sample on page A-10 is the format for an intelligence estimate in support of military operations other than war (MOOTW).

**SAMPLE FORMAT OF AN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
IN SUPPORT OF CONVENTIONAL COMBAT OPERATIONS**

(Local variations and modifications may be made as necessary to meet requirements.)

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no.__of__copies
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time of issue
Message reference number

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (NUMBER) (U)

(U) REFERENCES
  (a) Maps and charts
  (b) Other pertinent intelligence documents and online data bases

Intelligence and Information Cutoff Time Used for this Estimate: (Provide date-time group)

1. (U) Mission. (The command's restated mission as developed during the mission analysis phase of the planning process.)

2. (U) Characteristics of the Area of Operations. (State conditions that exist and indicate the effect of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission. Assess the estimated effects of these conditions on both enemy and friendly capabilities and operations.)

  a. (U) Military Geography

      (1) (U) Topography

      (2) (U) Drainage

      (3) (U) Vegetation

      (4) (U) Surface Materials

      (5) (U) Military Aspects of Terrain

      (6) (U) Effects of Terrain on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Operations

  b. (U) Hydrography

      (1) (U) Coastline Description

Page number

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    (2) (U) <u>Hydrographic Conditions</u>

        (a) (U) <u>Surf</u>

        (b) (U) <u>Tides</u>

        (c) (U) <u>Currents</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Beaches</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Effects of Hydrography on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Operations</u>

c. (U) <u>Climate and Weather</u>

    (1) (U) <u>Type and Characteristics</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Temperature</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Precipitation</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Visibility</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Winds</u>

    (6) (U) <u>Light Data</u>

    (7) (U) <u>Flight Conditions</u>

    (8) (U) <u>Effects of Weather on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Operations</u>

d. (U) <u>Transportation</u>

    (1) (U) <u>Airfields</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Helicopter Landing Zones</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Port Facilities</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Roads</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Railroads</u>

    (6) (U) <u>Inland Waterways</u>

    (7) (U) <u>Effects of Transporation on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Operations</u>

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e. (U) Civilian Telecommunications and Media

    (1) (U) International

    (2) (U) Domestic

    (3) (U) Mass Communications. (Types, capabilities, and key facilities.)

    (4) (U) Radio

        (a) (U) Television

        (b) (U) Print Media

    (5) (U) Effects of Telecommunications and Media on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Operations

f. (U) Economics and Infrastructure

    (1) (U) General Economic Activity and Conditions. (Industry, public works and utilities, finance, banking, agriculture, trades and professions, labor force, etc.)

    (2) (U) Monetary System

    (3) (U) Power and Utilities

    (4) (U) Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Facilities

    (5) (U) Effects of Economics and Infrastructure on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Operations

g. (U) Politics

    (1) (U) Political System and Climate

    (2) (U) Local Political Conditions

    (3) (U) Local Political Leaders

    (4) (U) Policy and Attitudes Towards the U.S. and the U.S. Military

    (5) (U) Effects of Political Situation on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Operations

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h. (U) <u>Sociology</u>

    (1) (U) <u>Cities and Towns</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Population and Distribution of Area and of Key Cities and Towns</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Ethnic Composition</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Languages</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Religions</u>

    (6) (U) <u>Customs and Norms</u>

    (7) (U) <u>Social Institutions and Attitudes</u>

    (8) (U) <u>Effects of Sociological Situation on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Operations</u>

i. (U) <u>Health and Medical</u>

    (1) (U) <u>Food Supply</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Water Supply</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Diseases and Other Medical Problems</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Plant and Animal Hazards</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Sanitation</u>

    (6) (U) <u>Medical Facilities</u>

    (7) (U) <u>Effects of Health and Medical Situation on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Operations</u>

3. (U) <u>Enemy Military Situation</u>

a. (U) <u>Ground Forces</u>

    (1) (U) <u>Composition, Organization, and Strengths</u>. (Describe the structure of enemy forces [i.e., order of battle] and describe unusual organizational features, identity, etc. State the number and size of enemy units in and others available for use in the area of operations. Provide estimated combat effectiveness of enemy forces.)

Page number

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(2) (U) <u>Disposition, Locations, Movements, and Activities</u>. (Describe the geographic location and latest known activities of enemy forces, including command and control facilities; fire support elements; and other key combat support forces.)

(a) (U) <u>Committed Forces</u>. (For ground forces, include units currently in contact or with which contact is imminent within the unit's area of operations, regardless of the specific friendly course of action. For amphibious or forcible entry operations, committed forces would be those that could immediately engage friendly units at their point of insertion. All fire support assets within range are normally considered committed, regardless of subordination. Conventional military forces are referred to by numbers of unit types [e.g., armor, infantry] two echelons below the friendly unit. Guerrilla or insurgent forces are expressed in terms of total numbers of personnel and fire support weapons.)

(b) (U) <u>Reinforcements</u>. (Describe the enemy's reinforcement capabilities in terms of possible forces and weapons that can react in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. Factors to be considered include time available to react, terrain, weather, road and rail nets, transportation, replacements, and possible aid from sympathetic or participating neighbors.)

(3) (U) <u>Weapons and Equipment</u>. (Describe the operational capabilities and technical characteristics of major items of equipment in the enemy's inventory.)

(4) (U) <u>Command and Control</u>

(a) (U) <u>Organization</u>

(b) (U) <u>Key Command and Control Nodes</u>

(c) (U) <u>Communications and Information Systems</u>

(5) (U) <u>Logistics</u>. (Describe levels of supply, resupply ability, and capacity of beaches, ports, roads, railways, airfields, and other facilities to support supply and resupply. Consider transportation, hospitalization and evacuation, military construction, labor resources, and maintenance of combat equipment, etc.)

(6) (U) <u>Training, Tactics, Operating Patterns</u>

(7) (U) <u>Capabilities and Effectiveness</u>

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b. (U) <u>Naval Forces</u>

    (1) (U) <u>Composition, Organization, and Strengths</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Disposition, Locations, Movements, and Activities</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Weapons and Equipment</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Command and Control</u>

        (a) (U) <u>Organization</u>

        (b) (U) <u>Key Command and Control Nodes</u>

        (c) (U) <u>Communications and Information Systems</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Logistics</u>

    (6) (U) <u>Training; Operational and Tactical Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; Methods of Operations; and Operating Patterns</u>

    (7) (U) <u>Capabilities and Effectiveness</u>

c. (U) <u>Air Forces</u>

    (1) (U) <u>Composition, Organization, and Strengths</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Disposition, Locations, Movements and Activities</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Weapons and Equipment</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Command and Control</u>

        (a) (U) <u>Organization</u>

        (b) (U) <u>Key Command and Control Nodes</u>

        (c) (U) <u>Communications and Information Systems</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Logistics</u>

    (6) (U) <u>Training; Operational and Tactical Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; Methods of Operations; and Operating Patterns</u>

    (7) (U) <u>Capabilities and Effectiveness</u>

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d. (U) Air Defense Forces

    (1) (U) Composition, Organization, and Strengths

    (2) (U) Disposition, Locations, Movements, and Activities

    (3) (U) Weapons and Equipment

    (4) (U) Command and Control

        (a) (U) Organization

        (b) (U) Key Command and Control Nodes

        (c) (U) Communications and Information Systems

    (5) (U) Logistics

    (6) (U) Training; Operational and Tactical Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; Methods of Operations; and Operating Patterns

    (7) (U) Capabilities and Effectiveness

e. (U) Paramilitary and Security Forces

    (1) (U) Composition, Organization, and Strengths

    (2) (U) Disposition, Locations, Movements, and Activities

    (3) (U) Weapons and Equipment

    (4) (U) Command and Control

        (a) (U) Organization

        (b) (U) Key Command and Control Nodes

        (c) (U) Communications and Information Systems

    (5) (U) Logistics

    (6) (U) Training; Operational and Tactical Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures; Methods of Operations and Operating Patterns

    (7) (U) Capabilities and Effectiveness

f. (U) Command and Control Warfare Capability

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    (1) (U) <u>Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Reconnaissance Capabilities</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Electronic Warfare Capabilities</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Psychological Warfare Capabilities</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Deception Capabilities</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Operational Security Capabilities</u>

  g. (U) <u>Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Capabilities</u>

  h. (U) <u>Night Combat Capabilities</u>

  i. (U) <u>Unconventional Warfare Capabilities</u> (e.g., guerrilla, subversion, sabotage, terrorism)

4. (U) <u>Capabilities and Analysis</u>. (List separately each enemy capability that can affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Each enemy capability should contain information on what the enemy can do, where they can do it, when they can start it and get it done, and what strength they can devote to the task. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering applicable factors from paragraphs 2 and 3, and attempt to determine and give reasons for the estimated probability of adoption by the enemy. Examine the enemy's capabilities by discussing the factors that favor or militate against its adoption by the enemy. The analysis of each capability should also include a discussion of enemy strengths and vulnerabilities associated with that capability. Also, the analysis should include a discussion of any indications that point to possible adoption of the capability. Finally, state the estimated effect the enemy's adoption of each capability will have on the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The term "capabilities" includes not only the general courses of action open to the enemy (e.g., attack, defend, withdraw), but also the particular courses of action possible under each general course of action. These courses of action should correspond exactly to enemy course of action models developed during step 4 of IPB.)

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5. (U) <u>Conclusions and Vulnerabilities</u>. (State conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4 to include: enemy centers of gravity, critical and other vulnerabilities and estimated exploitability of these by friendly forces, enemy courses of action beginning with the most probable and continuing down the list in the estimated order of probability, and the estimated effects adoption of each capability would have on the friendly mission.)

/s/ _____

_____

TABS: (omit or add other tabs as required)
A - Tactical Study of Terrain
B - Beach Studies
C - Climatology Study
D - Airfield Studies
E - Helicopter Landing Zone and Drop Zone Studies
F - Port Studies
G - Lines of Communications Study
H - Order of Battle Study

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SAMPLE FORMAT OF AN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no.__of__copies
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time of issue
Message reference number

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (NUMBER) (U)

(U) REFERENCES
    (a) Maps and charts
    (b) Other pertinent intelligence documents and online data bases

Intelligence and Information Cutoff Time Used for this Estimate: (Provide date-time group)

1. (U) Mission. (The command's restated mission as developed during the mission analysis phase of the planning process.)

2. (U) Characteristics of the Area of Operations. (Discuss characteristics of the host nation [HN], the area, and their probable effects upon the threat, the mission force, and the host government.)

    a. (U) Geography

        (1) (U) Strategic Location

            (a) (U) Neighboring Countries and Boundaries

            (b) (U) Natural Defenses, Including Frontiers

            (c) (U) Points of Entry and Strategic Routes

        (2) (U) Size and Dimensions

        (3) (U) Relief

        (4) (U) Beach Data

        (5) (U) Hydrography

            (a) (U) Coastal

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        (b) (U) <u>Lakes</u>

        (c) (U) <u>Rivers</u>

    (6) (U) <u>Land Use</u>

    (7) (U) <u>Geological Basics</u>

    (8) (U) <u>Vegetation</u>

    (9) (U) <u>Water Sources</u>

    (10) (U) <u>Natural Foods</u>

    (11) (U) <u>Population Centers</u>

    (12) (U) <u>Wildlife</u>

  b. (U) <u>Climate and Weather</u>

    (1) (U) <u>Type and Characteristics</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Temperature</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Precipitation</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Visibility</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Winds</u>

    (6) (U) <u>Light Data</u>

    (7) (U) <u>Flight Conditions</u>

    (8) (U) <u>Seasonal Effects of Weather on Terrain and Visibility</u>

  c. (U) <u>Demographics</u>

    (1) (U) <u>History</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Ethnic Composition</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Languages</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Social System</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Education</u>

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    (6) (U) <u>Living Conditions</u>

    (7) (U) <u>Cultural Customs</u>

    (8) (U) <u>Religions</u>

    (9) (U) <u>Taboos</u>

    (10) (U) <u>Grievances</u>

    (11) (U) <u>Psychology.</u> (Behavior patterns and motivating factors.)

d. (U) <u>Transportation</u>

    (1) (U) <u>Airfields</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Helicopter Landing Zones</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Port Facilities</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Roads</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Railroads</u>

    (6) (U) <u>Inland Waterways</u>

e. (U) <u>Civilian Telecommunications and Media</u>

    (1) (U) <u>International</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Domestic</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Mass Communications Types, Capabilities, and Key Facilities</u>

        (a) (U) <u>Radio</u>

        (b) (U) <u>Television</u>

        (c) (U) <u>Print Media</u>

f. (U) <u>Politics.</u> (Address existing situation, effects on threat, HN, and military force.)

    (1) (U) <u>National Government</u>

        (a) (U) <u>Structure</u>

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        (b) (U) <u>Regional and/or International Role</u>

        (c) (U) <u>Degree of Popular Support</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Political Parties.</u> (Both sanctioned and unsanctioned.)

    (3) (U) <u>Foreign Dependence or Alliances</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Controls and Restrictions</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Legal System.</u> (Civil and religious.)

    (6) (U) <u>Grievances</u>

g. (U) <u>Economics</u>. (Address existing situation, effects on threat, HN, and mission force.)

    (1) (U) <u>Current Value of Currency and Wage Scales</u>

    (2) (U) <u>Financial Structure to Include National and International</u>

    (3) (U) <u>Foreign Dependence</u>

        (a) (U) <u>Assistance Programs</u>

        (b) (U) <u>Foreign-Owned Businesses and Enterprises in Country</u>

        (c) (U) <u>Trade Agreements</u>

    (4) (U) <u>Agriculture and Domestic Food Supply</u>

    (5) (U) <u>Natural Resources and Degree of Self-Sufficiency</u>

    (6) (U) <u>Industry</u>

        (a) (U) <u>Types</u>

        (b) (U) <u>Production Levels</u>

        (c) (U) <u>Consumer Demands</u>

        (d) (U) <u>Unions</u>

    (7) (U) <u>Black Market and Illicit Trades</u>. (Drugs, weapons, etc.)

    (8) (U) <u>Technology</u>

        (a) (U) <u>Capabilities</u>

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(b) (U) <u>Expertise</u>

h. (U) <u>Health and Medical</u>

(1) (U) <u>Food Supply</u>

(2) (U) <u>Water Supply</u>

(3) (U) <u>Diseases and Other Medical Problems</u>

(4) (U) <u>Plant and Animal Hazards</u>

(5) (U) <u>Sanitation</u>

(6) (U) <u>Medical Facilities</u>

3. (U) <u>Threats</u>. (For each category of threat, except medical/environmental and natural disasters, discuss organization and leadership, to include composition; strength and dispositions; recent and present significant activities, strengths and weaknesses; and relationships with other threat categories.)

a. (U) <u>Conventional</u>

b. (U) <u>Insurgent</u>

c. (U) <u>Clans, Tribes, or Factions</u>

d. (U) <u>Terrorist</u>

e. (U) <u>Drug Producers or Traffickers</u>

f. (U) <u>Criminal Organizations</u>

g. (U) <u>Third-Party Nation and External</u>

h. (U) <u>Civil Unrest</u>

i. (U) <u>Medical and Environmental</u>

j. (U) <u>Natural Disasters</u>

4. (U) <u>Capabilities and Analysis</u>. (List current threat capabilities and discuss in regard to probability of adoption.)

a. (U) <u>Enumeration</u>. (Includes what, where, when, and how, for each category of threat.)

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(1) (U) <u>Basic Capabilities</u>

   (a) (U) <u>Conventional</u>

   (b) (U) <u>Insurgent</u>

   (c) (U) <u>Clans, Tribes, or Factions</u>

   (d) (U) <u>Terrorist</u>

   (e) (U) <u>Drug Producers or Traffickers</u>

   (f) (U) <u>Criminal Organizations</u>

   (g) (U) <u>Third-Party Nation and External</u>

   (h) (U) <u>Civil Unrest</u>

   (i) (U) <u>Medical and Environmental</u>

   (j) (U) <u>Natural Disasters</u>

(2) (U) <u>Supporting Capabilities</u>. (Includes intelligence, security, recruitment, organization, training, finance, and logistics.)

   (a) (U) <u>Conventional</u>

   (b) (U) <u>Insurgent</u>

   (c) (U) <u>Clans, Tribes, or Factions</u>

   (d) (U) <u>Terrorist</u>

   (e) (U) <u>Drug Producers or Traffickers</u>

   (f) (U) <u>Criminal Organizations</u>

   (g) (U) <u>Third-Party Nation and External</u>

   (h) (U) <u>Civil Unrest</u>

   (i) (U) <u>Medical and Environmental</u>

   (j) (U) <u>Natural Disasters</u>

b. (U) <u>Analysis and Discussion</u>. (Includes evidence supporting or rejecting the adoption of each capability.)

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5. (U) <u>HN Security</u>

   a. (U) <u>Situation</u>. (For each subparagraph, describe organization and leadership; strength and disposition; recent and present significant activities; and strengths and weaknesses.)

      (1) (U) <u>Public Order or Internal Security Forces</u>

      (2) (U) <u>Armed Forces</u>

      (3) (U) <u>External Support Forces and Dependency</u>. (Regional peacekeeping, foreign forces, mercenaries, etc.)

   b. (U) <u>Capabilities</u>. (What, where, when, how for basic capabilities and supporting capabilities.)

      (1) (U) <u>Public Order or Internal Security Forces</u>

      (2) (U) <u>Armed Forces</u>

      (3) (U) <u>External Support Forces and Dependency</u>

   c. (U) <u>Analysis and Discussion</u>

6. (U) <u>Friendly and Neutral Third-Party</u>

   a. (U) <u>Situation</u>. (For each subparagraph, as defined in paragraph 5.a.)

      (1) (U) <u>Embassies and Consulates</u>

      (2) (U) <u>Military</u>

      (3) (U) <u>Business Interests</u>

      (4) (U) <u>Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) and/or Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO)</u>

   b. (U) <u>Capabilities</u>. (As defined in paragraph 5.b.)

      (1) (U) <u>Embassies and Consulates</u>

      (2) (U) <u>Military</u>

      (3) (U) <u>Business Interests</u>

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   (4) (U) <u>NGO/PVO</u>

  c. (U) <u>Analysis and Discussion</u>

7. (U) <u>Conclusions and Vulnerabilities</u>

  a. (U) <u>Effects of the Operational Environment</u>. (State total effect of the area of operations upon courses of action.)

  b. (U) <u>Probable Threat Courses of Action</u>. (Listed in order of relative probability of adoption.)

  c. (U) <u>Threat Vulnerabilities</u>. (List exploitable threat vulnerabilities.)

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TABS: (as necessary)

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APPENDIX B. WEATHER CRITICAL VALUES

Establishing weather critical values is essential to weather effects analysis on threat and friendly operations. Critical values provide the parameters for assessing the exact impact of particular weather conditions. Critical values can be established for personnel, specific types of equipment, and types of military operations and tailored to the echelon of command, the composition of the force, and the likely operations the force will be expected to conduct. For example, a MEF may be concerned with general categories such as amphibious operations, fixed-wing aviation operations, and visual reconnaissance operations. A battalion may be concerned with foot mobility, line-of-sight restrictions, and effects on indirect fire support, while an unmanned aerial vehicle unit might be more concerned with visibility, cloud cover, precipitation, and temperatures aloft. Each level of command should focus on the unit mission-essential functions and specific equipment categories.

For each category or function, only weather elements that may have an impact are listed. For example, troops operating in a desert environment (depending on the desert and time of year) are generally not affected by snowfall. Similarly, windchill is not a critical factor when assessing fixed-wing aviation operations, but windchill may affect ground crews.

For each weather element selected, critical values are established that define impact levels. In table B-1, the levels of impact are defined as favorable, marginal, and unfavorable or as unrestricted, restricted, and severely restricted. An effective technique is to assign each level a color-code, such as green, yellow, or red, that can be transferred easily to a graphic weather effects matrix.

The companion weather effects matrix lists the same functions. If a weather element falls within the unfavorable or severely restricted range, the weather effects matrix is color-coded red for that function during the period of time the unfavorable element is forecast to occur. Weather elements that result in a marginal or unfavorable assessment are noted on the weather effects matrix (see chapter 6, figure 6-3).

The MEF command element intelligence section personnel, assisted by the G-2 section's staff weather officer, the intelligence support coordinator, and intelligence battalion personnel, usually compile the weather critical values chart. The commander, operations staff, and friendly force's functional elements define selected functions, weather elements, and critical values. Within a MAGTF, for example, the air officer and aviation combat element should establish weather elements that may impact aviation operations and platforms and define the values that constitute impact levels. Within an infantry battalion, the artillery liaison officer is the best source for effects on supporting fires and artillery delivered munitions.

Regardless of who compiles the list, the commander defines weather intelligence elements that are critical to decisionmaking. The identified weather elements and their established critical values are tracked closely and serve as the basis for weather effects graphics and updates. Like other intelligence requirements, the weather elements and their critical values must be reevaluated as the mission or season changes.

Unit intelligence section personnel develop mission, type unit, and equipment-focused critical values lists during peacetime operations, to include those equipment types and units which will normally be attached or in direct support during operations. Upon receipt of an alert or execute order, these critical values lists can then be refined and tailored to the forces, mission,

and environment assigned. See MCWP 3-35.7, *MAGTF Meteorological and Oceanographic Support,* and FM 34-81-1, *Battlefield Weather Effects,* for additional doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures guidance.

Weather critical values are established for threat as well as friendly forces. Due to differences in weapons and personnel characteristics, the same weather may have differing effects on the threat. For example, threat tanks without thermal sights will be severely restricted during periods of reduced visibility, while friendly tanks may be only marginally affected. Comparing the varying effects of weather on friendly and threat forces helps to identify advantages and vulnerabilities that may be exploited by either side.

Table B-1. Weather Critical Values Chart.

Function	Weather Element	Favorable (Unrestricted)	Marginal (Restricted)	Unfavorable (Severely Restricted)
Maneuver: Mobility (track vehicles, day)	visibility rainfall snow depth	> 1.5 km < 0.1 in/hr < 12 in	0.8 to 1.5 km > 0.5 in/hr > 12 to 20 in	< 0.8 km > 0.5 in/hr > 20 in
Maneuver: Mobility (track vehicles, night)	visibility rainfall snow depth	> 0.2 km < 0.1 in/hr < 12 in	0.1 to 0.2 km 0.1 to 0.5 in/hr 12 to 20 in	<0.1 km > 0.5 in/hr > 20 in
Maneuver: Mobility (dismounted infantry)	visibility rainfall snow depth temperature windchill	> 0.3 km < 0.1 in/hr < 3 in < 89.6 °F/32 °C > 32 °F/0 °C	0.1 to 0.3 km 0.1 to 0.5 in/hr 3 to 6 in > 89.6 °F/32 °C 32° F/0 °C to -22° F/-30° C	< 0.1 km > 0.5 in/hr > 6 in ---------- < -22 °F/-30 °C
Fire Support (155mm)	visibility ceiling surface wind snow depth	> 5.0 km > 800 ft < 35 knots < 4.0 in	1.5 to 5.0 km 500 to 800 ft 35 to 50 knots 4.0 to 6.0 in	< 1.5 km < 500 ft > 50 knots > 6 in
Fire Support (close air support)	visibility ceiling	> 8.0 km > 3000 ft	5.0 to 8.0 km 500 to 3000 ft	< 5.0 km < 500 ft
Aviation (rotary wing)	visibility ceiling surface wind precipitation	> 1.5 km > 500 ft < 20 knots none	0.4 to 1.5 km 300 to 500 ft 20 to 30 knots light	< 0.4 km < 300 ft > 30 knots freezing rain or hail
Aviation (air defense)	visibility ceiling rainfall	> 5.0 km > 5000 ft < 0.5 in/hr	3.0 to 5.0 km 3000 to 5000 ft 0.5 to 1.0 in/hr	< 3.0 km < 3000 ft > 1.0 in/hr

°C=degree Celsius   °F=degree Fahrenheit   ft=feet   in/hr=inches per hour   km=kilometer

APPENDIX C. TACTICAL INDICATORS

Indicators are any positive or negative evidence of threat activity or any characteristic of the operations area that points toward threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, or intentions. Each indicator is integrated with other factors, indicators, information, and intelligence before patterns are detected and threat intentions are established. Intelligence analysts develop indicators to—

- Assist in discerning answers to a commander's priority intelligence requirements and intelligence requirements.
- Correlate particular events or activities with probable threat courses of action.
- Determine what events or activities must occur for a threat to follow a particular course of action (COA).

As named areas of interest and the event template are developed during intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), analysts develop corresponding indicators which, when detected, will assist in rapidly identifying the particular COA the threat may adopt. While some indicators may apply to most or all of the possible threat courses of action, other indicators may be unique to a particular COA. Well-developed indicator lists also aid in detecting threat deception operations. By comparing indicators, intelligence, and operations reporting, the analyst arrives at an accurate picture of the battlespace and intelligence estimates.

Indicators may be present for more than one COA in the same threat force. For example, a threat division forced to withdraw (and providing indicators accordingly) may employ a subordinate unit (brigade, regiment, or battalion) in a delaying action to cover the withdrawal. Units in contact with the delaying force may characterize the indicators as delaying in nature, but the threat force overall is withdrawing. Indicators from all sources must be analyzed to assess the threat's true intentions.

The tables on the following pages provide some intelligence indicators commonly associated with operations. These lists are intended to provide a basis from which intelligence personnel can develop indicators specific to the threat and environment they are faced with. No one indicator can stand alone; indicators must be examined within the context of the doctrine, tactics, and structure of the specific threat force.

OFFENSIVE INDICATORS

Activity	Explanation
Massing of maneuver elements, armor, artillery, and logistical support.	May strengthen the main effort by weakening areas of secondary importance.
Deployment of combat elements on a relatively narrow frontage (not forced by terrain).	May provide maximum combat power at the point of attack by reducing frontages.
Massing of indirect fire support assets.	May indicate initiation of a main attack.
Extensive artillery preparation of up to 50 minutes in duration or longer.	Indicates preparation preceding an attack.
Dispersal of tanks and self-propelled or towed artillery to forward units.	Can indicate formation of combined arms assault formations with tanks accompanying the leading maneuver elements and artillery following in bounds.
Surface-to-surface missile units located forward.	Provides depth to threat offensive operations; places friendly support and rear areas in range. May also indicate, when employed alone, harassing or special weapons delivery.
Antiaircraft artillery and mobile surface-to-air missiles located well forward with maneuver elements.	Provides increased protection to massed forces prior to attack; extends air defense umbrella forward as units advance.
Demonstrations and feints.	May precede an attack; may deceive actual point of attack.
Establishment and strengthening of counter-reconnaissance screen.	Covers assembly and preparation of forces for attack.
Concentration of mass toward one or both flanks within the forward area.	May indicate intent for single or double envelopment, particularly if massing units are armor-heavy.
Increased patrolling (ground reconnaissance).	May indicate efforts to gather detailed information regarding friendly dispositions prior to attack.
Command posts located well forward; mobile command posts identified.	Enhances command and control during offensive operations.
Movement of noncombatants out of the combat zone.	Removes noncombatants, which hinder rapid forward movement of follow-on forces.
Extensive conduct of drills and rehearsals in rear areas.	Often indicates major attacks, particularly against fortified positions or strongly defended natural or man-made barriers, which require rehearsal of specialized tactics and skills.
Increased activity in supply, maintenance, and motor transport areas.	May indicate movement of additional forces to the front to sustain major attack.
Increased aerial reconnaissance (including unmanned aerial vehicles).	Refines threat's intelligence picture prior to operations.
Establishment of forward arming and refueling points, auxiliary airfields, or activation of inactive airfields.	Increases sortie rate and turnaround time by forward basing aircraft and aviation sustainment.
Clearing lanes through own obstacles.	Facilitates forward movement and grouping of assault units, particularly at night, usually immediately precedes an attack.
Reconnaissance, marking, and destruction of opponent's obstacles.	Facilitates movement of assault echelons through opposing obstacles.
Gap-crossing equipment (e.g., swimming vehicles, bridging, ferries, boats) located in forward areas (provided there is a water or large gap obstacle).	Maintains tempo of the assault echelons when faced with significant gap obstacles, normally concentrated with main effort.
Staging of airborne, air assault, or special forces with modes of transportation/insertion.	Such elements are used to provide depth to the assault and target friendly centers of gravity.
Increased signals traffic or radio silence.	May indicate intent to conduct offensive operations. (Increased traffic may be an attempt to deceive. Radio silence denies information derived from opponent's signals intelligence.
Signals intelligence and electronic warfare assets located forward.	Provides enhanced electronic attack and electronic warfare support for assault forces.

DEFENSIVE INDICATORS

Activity	Explanation
Preparation of battalion and company defensive areas consisting of company and platoon strong points.	Indicates intent for holding terrain with defense in depth, normally supported by armored counterattack forces.
Extensive preparation of field fortifications, obstacles, and minefields.	Indicates strong positional defense.
Attachment of additional antitank assets to frontline defensive positions.	Indicates intent to contest friendly armor in forward positions, and attempts to attrite and channel friendly armor into engagement areas for armor counterattack forces.
Formation of antitank strong points in depth along avenues of approach.	May allow penetration of friendly armor into rear engagement areas.
Preparation of alternate artillery positions.	Increases survivability of artillery in the defense.
Concentration of armor units in rear area assembly areas.	Indicates holding armor units in reserve for possible counterattack or counteroffensive.
Presence of concentrated antitank reserves.	Provides quick reaction capability against armor penetrations.
Displacement of logistics and medical units towards the rear.	Facilitates maneuver defense and counterattack.
Prestocking of ammunition, supplies, and engineer or pioneer equipment in forward positions.	Reduces the burden on logistics during the battle, reduces vulnerability of interdiction of supplies, and ensures strong points can survive for reasonable periods if bypassed or cut off.
Increased depth from the forward line of troops of artillery and surface-to-surface missile units.	Allows continued employment of artillery during maneuver defense without significant rearward displacement.
Increased use of land line communications.	Implies intent to remain in position because landlines are less vulnerable to electronic warfare.
Presence of dummy positions, command posts, and weapons.	Complicates friendly targeting and analysis of actual threat locations and strengths.
Air defense more concentrated in rear areas.	Indicates location of numerous high-value targets (e.g., armor, logistics, artillery, command posts) that dictates strong air defenses in rear areas.

DELAYING INDICATORS

Activity	Explanation
Withdrawal from defensive position(s) before becoming heavily engaged.	Indicates units' delaying actions to avoid decisive engagements.
Numerous local counterattacks with limited objectives; counterattacks broken off before position is restored.	Assists in disengaging units in contact, rather than restoring positions.
Units leapfrogging to new defensive positions.	Indicates units engaging then conducting local withdrawals to new positions while another force takes up the engagement
Maximum firepower located forward; firing initiated at long ranges.	Intends to inflict casualties, slow advance, and provide sufficient combat power to avoid decisive engagement.
Extremely large unit frontages as compared to normal defense.	Indicates delaying actions to economize force, allowing larger formations to withdraw.
Chemical or biological agent weapons in forward areas.	Causes significant delays to the advancing force when employed as barriers or in minefields.
Identification of dummy positions and minefields.	Causes delays by forcing the advancing force to determine whether minefields are active or inert.

WITHDRAWAL INDICATORS

Indications of threat intent to withdraw are often the same as those for delaying actions, with the addition of the following indicators.

Activity	Explanation
Systematic destruction of bridges, communications facilities, and other assets.	Denies the advancing force the use of infrastructure and installations in withdrawal areas.
Establishment of a covering force or rear guard.	Covers the withdrawal of the main body; usually consists of a sub-element of the main force; and usually engages only the rear guard element.
Increased rearward movement noted at night, particularly during inclement weather.	Attempts to withdraw units under the concealment of darkness and weather.
Minimal presence of logistic and medical units. Destruction of dumps and depots.	Indicates withdrawal of nonessential logistic and medical elements and the inability to move depots and dumps.
Establishing and marking withdrawal routes and traffic control points.	Facilitates the rapid movement of forces rearward.
Preparation of new defensive positions beyond supporting range of present positions.	Indicates attempt to establish new positions along suitable terrain prior to the arrival of deliberately withdrawn forces.
Increased engineer activity and stockpiling of explosives in the threat rear area near bridges, tunnels, built-up areas, etc.	Facilitates maintenance of lines of communications for own forces; indicates demolition of infrastructure in front of opposing force.
Rearward movement of long-range artillery.	Positions long-range artillery before withdrawal takes place.
Activation of command posts well removed (beyond doctrinal norms) from the present battle area.	Creates command and control nodes in the new position or assembly area to command and control arriving forces.

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR INDICATORS

Given the wide range of military operations other than war (MOOTW), the possible indicators of various activities can be enormous. However, most MOOTW evolutions still involve the requirement to identify risks to friendly forces. By their nature, MOOTW are generally concerned with indigenous populations, regardless of the nature of the mission. The following indicators focus on those indicators associated with possible threats emerging from indigenous populations. These lists provide the analyst with a point of departure for developing case specific indicators.

THREAT POPULATION INDICATORS

General Activities
Identification of agitators, insurgents, militias or criminal organizations, their supporters, and sympathizers who suddenly appear in, or move out of, an area.
New faces in a rural community.
Unusual gatherings among the population.
Disruption of normal social patterns.
Mass urban rural migration or vice versa.
Massing of combatants of competing power groups.
Increase in the size of embassy or consulate staffs from a country or countries which support indigenous disaffected groups, particularly those hostile to the United States and/or the current intervention.
Increase in neighboring countries of staff and activities at embassies or consulates of countries associated with supporting indigenous disaffected groups.
Increased travel by suspected subversives or leaders of competing power bases to countries hostile to the United States or opposed to the current intervention.
Influx of opposition resident and expatriate leaders into the operations area.
Reports of opposition or disaffected indigenous population receiving military training in foreign countries.
Increase of visitors (e.g., tourists, technicians, businessmen, religious leaders, officials) from groups or countries hostile to the United States or opposed to the current intervention.
Close connections between diplomatic personnel of hostile countries and local opposition groups.
Communications between opposition groups and external supporters.
Increase of disaffected youth gatherings.
Establishment of organizations of unexplained origin and with unclear or nebulous aims.
Establishment of a new organization to replace an existing organizational structure with identical aims.
Appearance of many new members in existing organizations such as labor unions.
Infiltration of student organizations by known agitators.
Appearance of new organizations stressing grievances or interests of repressed or minority groups.
Reports of large donations to new or revamped organizations.
Reports of payment to locals for engaging in subversive of hostile activities.
Reports of the formation of opposition paramilitary or militia organizations.
Reports of lists of targets for planned opposition attacks.
Appearance of "professional" agitators in gatherings or demonstrations that result in violence.
Evidence of paid and armed demonstrators' participation in riots.
Significant increase in thefts, armed robberies, and violent crime in rural areas; increase in bank robberies in urban areas.

Opposition-Directed Activities
Refusal of population to pay or unusual difficulty to collect rent, taxes, or loan payments.
Trends of demonstrated hostility toward government forces and/or mission force.
Unexplained population disappearance from or avoidance of certain areas.
Unexplained disappearance or dislocation of young people.
Reported incidents of attempted recruitment to join new movements or underground organizations.
Criminals and disaffected youth who appear to be acting with and for the opposition.
Reports of extortion and other coercion by opposition elements to obtain financial support from the population.
Use of fear tactics to coerce, control, or influence the local population.
Reports of host nation government and/or mission force facilities and personnel surveillance.
Activities Directed Against the Government/Mission Force
Failure of police and informer nets to report accurate information, which may indicate sources are actively supporting opposition elements or are intimidated.
Decreasing success of government law enforcement or military infiltration of opposition or disaffected organizations.
Assassination or disappearance of government sources.
Reports of attempts to bribe or blackmail government officials, law enforcement employees, or mission personnel.
Reports of attempts to obtain classified information from government officials, government offices, or mission personnel.
Classified information leaked to the media.
Sudden affluence of certain government and law enforcement personnel.
Recurring failure of government or mission force raids on suspected opposition organizations or illegal activities apparently due to forewarning.
Increased hostile or illegal activity against the government, its law enforcement and military organizations, foreigners, minority groups, and/or competing political, ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups.
Demonstrations against government forces, minority groups, or foreigners designed to instigate violent confrontations with government or mission forces.
Increased antigovernment or mission force rhetoric in local media.
Occurrence of strikes in critical areas intended to cast doubt on the government's ability to maintain order and provide for the people.
Unexplained loss, destruction, or forgery of government identification cards and passports.
Recurring unexplained disruption of public utilities.
Reports of terrorist acts or extortion attempts against local government leaders and businessmen.
Murder or kidnapping of government, military, and law enforcement officials or mission force personnel.
Closing of schools.

PROPAGANDA INDICATORS

General Propaganda Activities
Dissident propaganda from unidentified sources.
Increase in the number of entertainers with a political message.
Increase of political themes in religious services.
Increase in appeals directed at intensifying general ethnic or religious unrest in countries where ethnic or religious competition exists.
Increase of agitation on issues for which there is no identified movement or organization.
Renewed activity by dissident or opposition organizations thought to be defunct or dormant.
Circulation of petitions advocating opposition or dissident demands.
Appearance of opposition slogans and pronouncements by word-of-mouth, graffiti, posters, leaflets, etc.
Propaganda linking local ethnic groups with those in neighboring countries or regions.
Clandestine radio broadcasts intended to appeal to those with special grievances or to underprivileged ethnic groups.
Use of bullhorns, truck-mounted loudspeakers, and other public address equipment in "spontaneous" demonstrations.
Presence of nonmedia photographers among demonstrators.
Rallies to honor "martyred" opposition personnel. Mass demonstrations honoring local dissident heroes or dates significant to the opposition.
Nationwide strikes called to demonstrate the strength of the opposition movement(s).
Propaganda Activities Directed Against the Established Government
Attempts to discredit or ridicule national or public officials.
Attempts to discredit the judicial and law enforcement system.
Characterization of government leaders as puppets and tools of foreign intervention forces.
Agitation against government projects and plans.
Radio propaganda from foreign countries that is aimed at the target country's population and accuses the target country's government of failure to meet the people's needs.
Propaganda Activities Directed Against the Mission Force and Host Nation Military and Law Enforcement
Spreading accusations that the host nation military and police are corrupt and out of touch with the people.
Spreading accusations that mission force personnel will introduce customs or attitudes that are in opposition to local cultural or religious beliefs.
Character assassinations of mission, military, and law enforcement officials.
Demands to remove strong anti-opposition or anticrime military and law enforcement leaders from office.
Calls for the population to cease cooperating with the mission force and/or host nation military and law enforcement.
Deliberate incidents to provoke mission, military, or police reprisals during demonstrations or strikes.
Widespread hostile media coverage of even minor criminal violations or incidents involving mission force personnel.
Accusations of brutality or ineffectiveness or claims that mission or government forces initiated violence following confrontations.
Publication of photographs portraying repressive and violent acts by mission force or government forces.
Refusal of businessmen and shop owners to conduct business with mission force personnel.

Propaganda Activities Directed Against the Education System
Appearance of questionable doctrine and teachings in the educational system.
Creation of ethnic, tribal, religious, or other interest group schools outside the government educational system, which propagate opposition themes and teachings.
Charges that the educational system is only training youth to do the government's bidding.
Student unrest manifested by new organizations, proclamations, demonstrations, and strikes against authority.

COMMODITIES INDICATORS

Food-Related Activities
Diversion of crops or meat from markets.
Unexplained shortages of food supplies when there are no reports of natural causes.
Increased reports of foodstuffs pilfering.
Sudden increase in food prices, possibly indicating an opposition-levied tax.
Unwillingness of farmers to transport food to population centers, indicating a fear of traveling highways.
Spot shortages of foodstuffs in regions or neighborhoods associated with a minority group or weaker competing interest group, while food supplies are generally plentiful in other areas. Conversely, sudden local shortages of foodstuffs in rural areas may indicate the existence of an armed opposition group operating in that region.
Sudden increase of meat in markets, possibly indicating slaughtered livestock because of a lack of fodder to sustain them.
Appearance of emergency relief supplies for sale in black markets, possibly indicating diversion from starving population.
Appearance of relief supplies for sale in normal markets in a country or region recently suffering from large-scale hunger, which may indicate the severity of the food crisis is diminishing.
Arms and Ammunition-Related Activities
Increased loss or theft of weapons from military and police forces.
Discovery of arms, ammunition, and explosives being clandestinely manufactured, transported, or cached.
Attacks on patrols resulting in the loss of weapons and ammunition.
Increased purchase of surplus military goods.
Sudden increase in prices for arms and ammunition on the open market.
Reports of large arms shipments destined for neighboring countries, but not intended for that government.
Reports of known arms traffickers establishing contacts with opposition elements.
Increase in armed robberies.
Reports of thefts or sudden shortages of chemicals, which could be used in the clandestine manufacture of explosives.
Reports of large open-market purchases of explosives-related chemicals without an identifiable industrial user.
Appearance of manufactured or smuggled arms from noncontiguous foreign countries.
Clothing-Related Activities
Unusual, systematic purchase or theft of clothing materials, which could be used for the manufacture of uniforms or footwear.
Unusual scarcity of clothing or material used in the manufacture of clothing or footwear.
Distribution of clothing to underprivileged or minority classes by organizations of recent or suspect origin.
Discovery of caches of uniforms and footwear or the materials which could be used to manufacture uniforms and footwear.
Increase of males in the streets wearing military style clothing or distinctive markings.

Medicine-Related Activities
Large-scale purchasing or theft of drugs and medicines or the herbs used to manufacture local remedies.
Scarcity of drugs and medical supplies on the open or black markets.
Diversion of medical aid donations.
Discovery of caches of medical supplies.
Communications-Related Activities
Increase in the purchase and use of radios.
Discovery of caches of communications equipment.
Unusual increase in amateur radio or cellular telephone communications traffic.

ENVIRONMENT-RELATED INDICATORS

Rural Activities
Evidence of increased foot traffic in the area.
Increased travel within and into remote or isolated areas.
Unexplained trails and cold campsites.
Establishment of new, unexplained agricultural areas, or recently cleared fields.
Unusual smoke, possibly indicating the presence of a campsite or a form of communication.
Concentration of dead foliage in an area, possibly indicating use of camouflage.
Presence of foot traps, spikes, boobytraps, or improvised mines along routes and trails.
Urban Activities
Apartments, houses, or buildings being rented, but not lived in as homes.
Slogans written on walls, bridges, and streets.
Defacement of government and mission force information signs.
Sabotage of electrical power network; pollution of urban area's water supply.
Terrorist acts against physical targets such as bridges, dams, airfields, or buildings.
Change of residence of suspected agitators or opposition leaders.
Discovery of message dead-drops.
Increased smuggling of currency, gold, gems, narcotics, medical supplies, and arms into urban centers.
Appearance of abnormal amounts of counterfeit currency.
Increase in bank robberies.
Work stoppages or slowdowns in essential industries.
Marked decline in product quality in essential industries.
Marked increase in equipment failures in essential industries.
Unexplained explosions in essential utilities and industries.
Establishment of roadblocks or barricades around neighborhoods associated with opposition elements.
Attempts to disrupt public transport through sabotage.
Malicious damage to industrial products or factory machinery.

APPENDIX D. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT FORMAT

The periodic summary battle damage assessment (BDA) report on page D-2 is an example format that may be used by MEF major subordinate command intelligence personnel to provide consolidated Phase I BDA, physical damage assessment, to the intelligence battalion's production and analysis cell. The report is a compilation of BDA reporting from subordinate elements as well as BDA obtained at the MSC level during the designated time period. The theater intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures or the joint task force commander establishes BDA reporting formats for the joint task force, theater, and national level.

Normally, the aviation combat element is responsible for providing BDA on any air tasking order-related missions, while the ground combat element focuses on their subordinate elements' engagement results, to include observed close air support effects.

The target intelligence and BDA team, production and analysis company, intelligence battalion, is responsible for—

- Consolidating, deconflicting, and refining BDA reports.

- Introducing additional information and intelligence obtained from other sources.

- Preparing the Phase I BDA, physical damage assessment, for the MEF commander.

- Preparing Phase II BDA, functional damage assessment, based on the consolidated reporting from subordinate, higher, and adjacent commands.

- Adjusting the MEF order of battle data bases to reflect combat losses.

- Developing the combat strength assessment for each unit.

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT FORMAT EXAMPLE

SUBJECT: 6 HR BDA REPORT (SUBMIT TO INTELLIGENCE BATTALION'S TARGET INTELLIGENCE/ BDA TEAM, P&A CELL, AT SPECIFIED TIMES.)

REPORTING UNIT:

REPORTING PERIOD: (FROM/TO)

ENEMY UNIT OR FACILITY #1: (DOWN TO BDE NAME FOR MANEUVER, BN FOR FIRE SUPPORT, OR AS DIRECTED IN UNIT SOP OR OPORD. REPEAT THIS SECTION FOR EACH UNIT OR FACILITY.)

UIC OR BE#: DHGKNXXXXX

DAMAGED/DESTROYED:

	LOC	TYPE	#DEST	#DMGD/EXTENT

1. ARMOR:

2. FIRE SUPPORT:

3. TRUCKS:

4. AIR DEFENSE:

5. C2 SYSTEMS:

6. MOB/CNTRMOB: (ENGINEERS ASSETS, BRIDGES, LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, MINES, ETC.)

7. CSS:

	LOC	WIA	KIA

8. PERSONNEL:

REMARKS:

IF UNIT NAME IS UNKNOWN, INCLUDE TIME OF REPORT (TOR), UNDER HEADING "ENEMY UNIT: UNKNOWN". DO NOT SUMMARIZE; LIST EACH REPORT. FOR EXAMPLE:

ENEMY UNIT: UNKNOWN

UIC: UNKNOWN

DAMAGED/DESTROYED: LIST ALL UNKNOWN UNIT BDA REPORTS BY TIME

	TOR*	LOC	TYPE	#DEST	#DMGD/EXTENT

1. ARMOR:

2. FIRE SUPPORT:

3. TRUCKS:

4. AIR DEFENSE:

5. C2 SYSTEMS:

6. MOB/CNTRMOB: (ENGINEERS ASSETS, BRIDGES, LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, MINES, ETC.)

7. CSS:

	TOR*	LOC	WIA	KIA	EPW

8. PERSONNEL:

REMARKS: *TOR: TIME OF REPORT. (NOTE: REMARKS ARE A MEANS OF REPORTING INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT FIT INTO THE TABLES DESCRIBED ABOVE. SPELL IT OUT IN A REMARKS SECTION, FOR EACH UNIT IF NECESSARY OR IF YOUR ASSESSMENT GOES BEYOND NUMBER COUNTS.)

APPENDIX E. MAGTF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION PLAN FORMAT

Tab B (Intelligence Production Plan) to Appendix 16 (Intelligence Operations Plan) to Annex B (Intelligence) should explain how intelligence production elements under the command or supporting the MAGTF would be used to support this plan. Additionally, it provides basic guidance and direction to subordinate commanders and intelligence officers for the conduct of MAGTF intelligence production operations and the support of intelligence elements and personnel identified to fulfill the intelligence requirements (IRs) in support of this plan.

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TAB B TO APPENDIX 16 (INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS PLAN) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO OPERATION ORDER (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) (U)
INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION PLAN (U)

(U) REFERENCES: (The annex B originator must ensure that all receiving units and executing units have cited references.)
(a) Unit standing operating procedures (SOP) for intelligence, counterintelligence, reconnaissance, and others as appropriate.
(b) Joint task force, naval task force, other components, theater and national intelligence plans, orders and tactics, techniques, and procedures; and multinational agreements pertinent to intelligence operations.
(c) Documents, products, and online intelligence data bases that provide intelligence required for planning.
(d) Appropriate Marine Corps, naval, joint, and other doctrine publications.
(e) Others as appropriate.

(U) Time Zone: Zulu

1. (U) Situation. (May refer to Appendix 11 [Intelligence Estimate] as appropriate.)

    a. (U) Definition of the Area of Operations and Area of Interest. (Describe the limits of the area of operations [AO] and area of interest [AOI]. Summarize pertinent

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weather, terrain, and other area characteristics and conditions that may influence MAGTF production operations.)

b. (U) Enemy. (Refer to annex B and current intelligence estimates for threat capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, and order of battle pertinent to intelligence production operations.)

c. (U) Assigned MAGTF Organic and Supporting Production Assets. (Identify organic and supporting forces available to perform intelligence production and related functions.)

d. (U) Facts and Assumptions. (State facts and assumptions derived during the mission analysis step of the Marine Corps Planning Process.)

e. (U) MAGTF Intelligence Production Considerations. (List key production and intelligence or other considerations, which impact this operation plan [OPLAN] or contingency plan [CONPLAN].)

> (1) (U) Current Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), Unit Concept of Operations, Unit Main Effort's PIRs, and Other Commander's Guidance

> (2) (U) Availability of Intelligence

> (3) (U) Intelligence Production Support to and from Joint Task Force (JTF) and Other Component Headquarters

> (4) (U) Subordinate Units' Production Capabilities and Needs. (Include necessary establishment and manning of forward production elements.)

2. (U) Mission. (State concisely the MAGTF intelligence production mission as it relates to the command's planned operation.)

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Concept of Operations. (Reference the unit's intelligence SOP and the basic Appendix 16 to Annex B. Restate as appropriate the commander's intent and pertinent aspects of the unit's overall concept of operations as they relate to production operations. Outline the purpose and concept of MAGTF production operations and specified priorities. Summarize the means and agencies to be employed in planning and directing, collection, processing and exploiting, analyzing and producing, disseminating, and using intelligence during execution of the operation order [OPORD]. Address the integration of JTF, other components, theater, national, and allied forces' production operations.)

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b. (U) <u>Tasks for Production and Related Units and Organizations, Subordinate Units, and Task Force Commanders or Officers in Charge (OICs)</u>

(1) (U) <u>Orders to Subordinate, Attached, and Supporting Units</u>. (Use separate numbered subparagraphs to list detailed instructions for each unit conducting production operations, including the originating headquarters, subordinate commands, and separate intelligence support units with critical support to production roles. Some or all of the below units and sections may be addressed here; specific major subordinate commands [MSCs] and other intelligence producers will be tasked according to the unit SOP and mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time available [METT-T].)

    (a) (U) <u>Major Subordinate Commanders</u>

    (b) (U) <u>Commanding Officer, Intelligence Battalion</u>

       <u>1</u> (U) <u>OIC, Support Cell</u>

       <u>2</u> (U) <u>OIC, Production and Analysis (P&A) Cell</u>

          <u>a</u> (U) <u>Analysis Teams</u>

          <u>b</u> (U) <u>Order of Battle Teams</u>

          <u>c</u> (U) <u>Target Analysis and Battle Damage Assessment Teams</u>

          <u>d</u> (U) <u>Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Teams</u>

          <u>e</u> (U) <u>Platoon Commander, Imagery Intelligence Platoon</u>

          <u>f</u> (U) <u>Platoon Commander, Topographic Platoon</u>

          <u>g</u> (U) <u>Staff Noncommissioned OICs, Direct Support Teams</u>

          <u>h</u> (U) <u>Weather Analysis Element</u> (if assigned)

       <u>3</u> (U) <u>OIC, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Cell</u>

       <u>4</u> (U) <u>Commanding Officer, Counterintelligence (CI)/Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Company</u>

    (c) (U) <u>Commanding Officer, Radio Battalion</u>

    (d) (U) <u>Commanding Officer, Force Reconnaissance Company</u>

    (e) (U) <u>Commanding Officer, Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU)</u>

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(f) (U) <u>Commanding Officer, Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron (VMAQ)</u>

(g) (U) <u>Commander, Marine Corps Imagery Support Unit</u> (if tasked to provide support to the MAGTF)

(h) (U) <u>Others</u> (as appropriate)

(2) (U) <u>Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units</u>. Provide separate numbered subparagraphs pertaining to each unit not organic, attached, or supporting from which production support is requested, including other components, JTF headquarters, allied or coalition forces, as well as theater and national operational and intelligence elements.

c. (U) <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. (Reference Appendix 16, and command and other pertinent forces and organizations intelligence SOPs. Detail here or in supporting enclosures, key changes to SOPs. Include or emphasize additional topics [e.g., requesting production support; intelligence production requirement [IPR] numbering and other management issues; direct liaison among subordinate commanders and production elements' leaders, staff officers, and pertinent external organizations and agencies; routine and time-sensitive reporting procedures and formats; releasability to non-U.S. military organizations; security guidance].)

4. (U) <u>Administration and Logistics</u>

a. (U) <u>Logistics</u>. Reference Annex D (Logistics). (Identify production-unique logistic requirements and concerns [e.g., unique combat service support requirements, procedures, and other guidance to support MAGTF production units and operations; or procedures for specialized technical logistic support necessary from external organizations].)

b. (U) <u>Personnel</u>. (Identify unique production personnel requirements and concerns [e.g., critical personnel shortages, global sourcing requirements, security clearance issues, contractor support].)

5. (U) <u>Command and Control</u>

a. (U) <u>Command Relationships</u>. Reference Annex J (Command Relationships). (Provide necessary instructions regarding MAGTF command relationships that will influence production operations.)

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b. (U) <u>Information Management</u>. Reference Annex U (Information Management), Annex C (Operations), Appendix 16, and Tab C (Intelligence Dissemination Plan) to Appendix 16. (Provide any instructions necessary regarding information management [e.g., time-sensitive and routine reporting criteria, intelligence data base administration and authorities, periodic production status reporting from production elements, reports formats and changes] that will influence MAGTF production operations.

c. (U) <u>Communications and Information Systems</u>. Reference Appendix 16 and Annex K (Communications and Information Systems). (Provide any instructions necessary regarding communications and information systems [CIS] that will influence MAGTF production operations and its effective integration with MAGTF collection and dissemination operations.

d. (U) <u>Intelligence Command and Control Nodes and Facilities</u>. Reference the unit's intelligence SOP and Appendix 16. Provide necessary guidance and instructions regarding the establishment, relationships, and operations of MAGTF intelligence production nodes and facilities (e.g., P&A cell, the radio battalion operations control and analysis center, CI/HUMINT company command post).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name
Rank and Service
Title

ENCLOSURES:

1–Intelligence Production Matrix
2–Periodic Intelligence Production Status Report Instructions and Format

OFFICIAL:

//s//
NAME
Rank and Service
Title

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION MATRIX
INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMAT

The intelligence production matrix is a tool used by MAGTF intelligence officers, the intelligence support coordinator (ISC), and production leaders to effectively plan, direct, and manage intelligence production operations. Making the matrix accessible to subordinate units' intelligence officers and intelligence producers will improve overall collaborative intelligence planning and execution.

The sample below is one format for the intelligence production matrix. The unit specifies the particular format for a given operation. The complexity of the operation and other METT-T factors will determine which format is used.

PIR, IR, or IPR Number	Date Requested	Production Requirement	Event/ Operation/ Exercise	Requesting Unit/POC	Tasked Unit(s)	Tasked Unit(s) POC	Due Date or DTG	First Review Date or DTG	First Review Remarks	Second Review Date or DTG	Second Review Remarks

Third Review Date or DTG	Third Review Remarks	Status	Feedback	Estimated Man-Hours	Actual Man-Hours*	Estimated Cost*	Actual Cost*	Quality and Distribution	Distribution Follow-ups & New IRs/ IPRs	Additional Remarks

*Garrison use only

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION STATUS REPORT
INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMAT

The periodic intelligence production status report is used by designated MAGTF units with all-source or other significant intelligence production capabilities to keep commanders, intelligence officers and sections, and other staff elements apprised of the status of current and future intelligence production operations. For the effective management of unit production activities, intelligence officers or their production leaders may require that this report be used by designated production elements under their staff cognizance to report their production status.

The example report on page E-8 is only one format (refer to the unit's SOP for specific format and direction). Normally, variations of the SOP format will be established for text, voice, and record message traffic purposes. Changes for a particular operation will be clearly identified in Annex B.

The unit SOP or Annex B also establishes the timeframe covered by each report and identifies routine and nonroutine recipients. The report may be disseminated by various methods. Interim reports, when required, generally will be disseminated via either briefings or via the tactical data network (TDN). Principal dissemination methods for the production status report include—

- Intelligence section's homepage on the MAGTF SECRET-TDN (S-TDN), with necessary sensitive compartmented information (SCI) production status posted on the SCI-TDN intelligence section homepage.
- Stand-alone record message.
- Production data bases accessible via the S-TDN or SCI-TDN (or SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET] and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System [JWICS] for external commands).
- Separate paragraph within the daily intelligence summary.

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ENCLOSURE 2 TO TAB B TO APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX B TO OPERATION
ORDER (NUMBER) (OPERATION CODEWORD) (U)
PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION STATUS REPORT INSTRUCTIONS
AND FORMAT (U)

Subj: MEF PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION STATUS REPORT FOR THE
PERIOD 180001Z–182359Z NOV 99

1. (U)Production Operations Status. (Provide essential details to ensure supported
commanders, intelligence officers, and other planners are apprised of the current status of
key intelligence production operations. At a minimum, PIRs and IPR priorities should be
included.)

    a. (U) PIR/IR MEF 01-99

PIR/IR #	Intelligence Product	Requester; Other Recipients	Date Received	Latest Time Information of Value
MEF 01-99	intelligence estimate	III MEF CG and staff; copies to MSCs	031457Z NOV 99	2100001Z NOV 99

    (1) (U) Task Production Element(s). P&A cell and assistance from radio
battalion operations control and analysis center, CI/HUMINT company and
Marine Corps Imagery Support Unit (MCISU) as directed by ISC.

    (2) (U) Remarks. Production in support of contingency planning. Final product
is the initial Appendix 11 (Intelligence Estimate) with supporting CI estimate.
Product is 95 percent complete.

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b. (U) <u>PIR/IR MEF 002-99</u>

PIR/IR #	Intelligence Product	Requester; Other Recipients	Date Received	Latest Time Information of Value
MEF 002-99; Division 002-99, MAW 003-99, and FSSG 002-99 relate	OPLAN Support	III MEF G-2/3/5; copies to MSCs	031645Z NOV 99	230700Z NOV 99

(1) (U) <u>Task Production Element(s)</u>. MEF lead P&A cell developing, in coordination with JFT joint intelligence support element (JISE) and the joint force land component commander intelligence section.

(2) (U) <u>Remarks</u>. Production in support of contingency planning. (Provide template locations and dispositions of estimated enemy command and control [C2] headquarters, maneuver, and logistic elements down to the brigade and regiment level, and fires elements down to battalion level, in support of the five locations specified to support MEF course of action development.) Product is currently in work. Current intelligence is available on the MEF G-2 SCI-TDN homepage. Spreadsheet will be forwarded to staff sections and MSCs upon completion.

c. (U) <u>MEF 003-99</u>

PIR/IR #	Intelligence Product	Requester; Other Recipients	Date Received	Latest Time Information of Value
MEF 003-99	expeditionary support product (phase 1)	Originator, III MEF G-2/3/4/5/6; copies to Division, FSSG, MAW	062207Z NOV 99	240700Z NOV 99

(1) (U) <u>Task Production Element(s)</u>. P&A cell; imagery intelligence platoon (IIP), topographic platoon, and MCISU assist as directed.

(2) (U) <u>Remarks</u>. Expeditionary support product in support of phase 1 scheme of maneuver and course of action analysis. Product is 75 percent complete. Completed helicopter landing zone study, which is posted on MEF G-2 S-TDN homepage. Targets within G-2 designated priority areas are 95 percent scanned.

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d. (U) <u>PIR/IR Division 005-00</u>

PIR/IR #	Intelligence Product	Requester; Other Recipients	Date Received	Latest Time Information of Value
Division 005-99	map update and reproduction	Division; copy to FSSG	080423Z NOV 99	Initial 10, 140100Z NOV 99; remainder, 270001Z NOV 99

(1) (U) <u>Task Production Element(s)</u>. Topographic platoon lead; IIP assist as required.

(2) (U) <u>Remarks</u>. Production in support of division planning and C2. Integrating current geographic intelligence (GEOINT) products with current external imagery in order to update 1993 edition maps. Initial distribution requirement made; remainder 85 percent complete. Anticipate full IR satisfaction by 230001Z NOV 99.

e. (U) <u>PIR/IR MAW 003-99</u>

PIR/IR #	Intelligence Product	Requester; Other Recipients	Date Received	Latest Time Information of Value
MAW 003-99	CIB graphics	1st MAW G-2; Division, MEF G-5 and FFC	101457Z NOV 99	011000Z DEC 99

(1) (U) <u>Task Production Element(s)</u>. IIP assisted by P&A cell, red team, and force fires cell (FFC) future operations personnel as required.

(2) (U) <u>Remarks</u>. Production to support MAW target development and planning. Produce kill boxes using controlled image base (CIB) imagery. Product will be a 5-meter CIB overview of indicated areas, including a graphic reference grid with kill boxes annotated. Product is 80 percent completed.

f. (U) <u>PIR/IR Division 007-99</u>

PIR/IR #	Intelligence Product	Requester; Other Recipients	Date Received	Latest Time Information of Value
Division 007-99; FSSG 004-99	LOC study	Division G-2; III MEF G2, FSSG	120937Z NOV 99	140200Z DEC 99

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(1) (U) <u>Task Production Element</u>. Topographic platoon assisted by IIP and P&A cell.

(2) (U) <u>Remarks</u>. Production in support of wargaming and planning. Produce a detailed lines of communications (LOC) intelligence study. Product must maintain a classification level of unclassified. The bridge portion of this product can only be completed 45 percent due to lack of data sets and imagery.

g. (U) <u>PIR/IR MEF 010-99</u>

PIR/IR #	Intelligence Product	Requester; Other Recipients	Date Received	Latest Time Information of Value
MEF 010-99; Division 009-99	target area/objective studies	MEF G-3 and FFC; Division and MAW	072103Z DEC 99	100400Z DEC 99

(1) (U) <u>Task Production Element(s)</u>. P&A cell; IIP and topographic platoon support as required.

(2) (U) <u>Remarks</u>. Production of imagery products and supporting all-source intelligence reports for six specified areas within the division's area of operations. Production is completed; final dissemination ongoing and will be completed by 191000Z Nov 99. Follow-up conference call between MEF G-3/G-2 (P&A cell lead), division G-3/G-2 and MAW G-3/G-2 to verify fully satisfied IR and new IRs scheduled for 191600Z Nov 99.

h. (U) <u>PIR/IR FSSG 016-99</u>

PIR/IR #	Intelligence Product	Requester; Other Recipients	Date Received	Latest Time Information of Value
FSSG 016-99	elevation/slope tint	FSSG; Division	130303Z NOV 99	050600Z DEC 99

(1) (U) <u>Task Production Element</u>. Topographic platoon.

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(2) (U) Remarks. Production in support of FSSG site locations assessments and rear area security planning. Produce elevation and slope tint at 1:50,000 scale for defined areas. Slope tint will be provided in place of comprehensive cross-country movement study for two areas because there is no terrain data; possible new information from yesterday's JTF imagery collection missions. Product is 80 percent complete.

i. (U) PIR/IR MEF 012-99

PIR/IR #	Intelligence Product	Requester; Other Recipients	Date Received	Latest Time Information of Value
MEF 012-99	enemy C2 and CIS template	MEF G-5/G-3; MAW and Division	071457Z DEC 99	140100Z DEC 99

(1) (U) Task Production Element(s). Radio battalion operations control and analysis center; P&A cell, MAW G-2, and VMAQ tactical electronic reconnaissance processing and evaluation system assist as required.

(2) (U) Remarks. Production in support of MEF C2 warfare and targeting planning. Provide template locations and dispositions of estimated enemy C2 headquarters, maneuver, and logistic elements down to the brigade and regiment level, and fires elements down to battalion level, with estimated key CIS emitters in support of the five locations specified to support MEF COA development and wargaming. IR modified 071800Z DEC 99 to incorporate specified enemy radars and other noncommunications emitters to support MAW suppression of enemy air defenses planning. Product is 75 percent complete. Final product dissemination will be restricted to U.S. and designated multinational intelligence and operations elements.

2. (U) Production Problems. (Identify and describe significant production problems [e.g., anticipated delays meeting the latest times information of value for validated PIRs and higher priority IRs; CIS difficulties; releasability issues].)

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3. (U) Production Detachments. (In initial report, identify intelligence detachments in support of MAGTF subordinate units that have a production capability. In subsequent reports, identify detachment name and annotate "NO CHANGE," if applicable, and new detachments deployed since the last status report. Other supporting information will be according to unit SOP and may include: period of support; detachment's intelligence support purpose; personnel and military occupational specialty information; anticipated near-term detachments support.)

Who	Dates/Period	Supported Unit	Purpose
Intelligence Battalion 1-99 (P&A cell)	01 Nov 00–(to be determined)	JTF J-2/ JISE	one 0202, two 0231s, and one 0241 for liaison and targeting support
Intelligence Battalion 2-99 (P&A Company, Direct Support Team #1)	10 Nov 99–(to be determined)	Division G-2	MEF main effort support
Intelligence Battalion 3-99 (P&A Company, Direct Support Team #2)	15 Nov 00–(to be determined)	FSSG G-2	rear area security support
Intelligence Battalion 4-99 (HUMINT Support Team #1)	19 Nov 99–(to be determined)	Division G-2	CI force protection support
Intelligence Battalion 5-99 (HUMINT Support Team #2)	22 Nov 99–(to be determined)	FSSG G-2	CI force protection support
Intelligence Battalion 6-99 (HUMINT Support Team #3)	22 Nov 99–(to be determined)	MAW G-2	CI force protection support
Intelligence Battalion 7-99 (Topographic Platoon, Geographic Intelligence Support Team #1)	19 Nov 99–(to be determined)	Division G-2	GEOINT support
Intelligence Battalion 8-99 (Topographic Platoon, Geographic Intelligence Support Team #2)	1 Dec 99–(to be determined)	FSSG G-2	GEOINT support
Radio Company Command Element (Signals Support Unit lead echelon element)	1 Dec 99–(to be determined)	Division G-2	Signals Intelligence support
Intelligence Battalion 9-99 (Topographic Platoon, Geographic Intelligence Support Team #3)	5 Dec 99–(to be determined)	MAW G-2	GEOINT support

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4. (U) <u>Miscellaneous</u>. (Detail other information pertinent to ongoing collaborative intelligence production planning, direction, and operations. This may include items such as anticipated CIS problems, intelligence data base changes, nonscheduled cells or other intelligence briefings, critical intelligence collection and production issues, key external intelligence production items, security, and
dissemination issues.)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

                                                        Name
                                                Rank and Service
                                                        Title

OFFICIAL:
//s//
NAME
Rank and Service
Title

CLASSIFICATION

Appendix F. Intelligence Summary Format

The intelligence summary (INTSUM) provides a synopsis of the reporting unit's intelligence situation covering a specified period of time. It is used to report threat activities, changes to threat capabilities, and results of further collections, analysis, and production to higher, adjacent, and subordinate forces. The INTSUM updates the current intelligence estimate and provides a continual intelligence assessment of threat actions and estimated capabilities and courses of action.

The theater intelligence directorate (J-2) provides guidance on INTSUM reporting periods and submission deadlines. Theater tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and the specific operations plan or operation order (OPORD) designate INTSUM reporting requirements for subordinate joint task forces (JTFs) or Service and functional components. Based on those requirements, MAGTF intelligence officers (G-2/S-2) establish INTSUM reporting requirements for their major subordinate commands (MSCs) or elements; at the MEF CE level, the intelligence support coordinator establishes reporting requirements.

Established deadlines allow the intelligence battalion's production and analysis cell sufficient time to incorporate subordinate INTSUMs into intelligence products. The MAGTF MSCs and elements' G-2/S-2s determine INTSUM requirements for their headquarters and subordinate elements. The MEF TTP and standing operating procedures (SOP), which reflect anticipated theaters of operations TTP, should establish standard INTSUM reporting requirements.

Although any unit can produce INTSUMs, normally they are generated by major subordinate or higher level commands. An abbreviated INTSUM format focused on significant threat actions and anticipated future actions may be more appropriate for lower tactical echelons.

Higher command levels, particularly JTFs and unified commands, usually publish a daily intelligence summary (DISUM) every 24 hours. While INTSUMs generally provide a fine-grained tactical perspective, the DISUM encompasses more aspects of a threat country's elements of national power and focuses on operational-level intelligence analysis and estimates. Generally, MAGTF command elements tasked as JTF headquarters are required to submit DISUMs to the combatant command's commander in chief. The combatant command's TTP provides for the DISUM format, which may vary from theater to theater.

Generally based on the intelligence estimate format, the INTSUM should be tailored and focused on the mission, type of unit, and information and intelligence needs of the commander. Formats for INTSUMs can be in written or graphic and text formats.

WRITTEN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FORMAT

The sample below provides a written INTSUM format that may be posted on a website. This format is representative of an INTSUM format used at the MAGTF or MSC level for conventional military operations. Generally, this format is modified to meet the unique needs of military operations other than war (MOOTW).

Note: Paragraphs not applicable to the reporting unit are annotated "NA" or the paragraph may be skipped (paragraph numbering should remain the same). If no significant information or intelligence is available for a particular paragraph, the notation "NSTR" (nothing significant to report) may be used. The annotation "( )" reflects classification of that information line.

CLASSIFICATION/RELEASABILTY
INTSUM #: (Sequentially numbered such, as "DD-001-97")
DTG: DDHHMM (time zone) (month) YY
INFO cutoff DTG
PERIOD: DDHHMM TO DDHHMM (month) YY

I. (U) Highlights:

A. (U) Ground: Highlights of the current ground situation, usually divided by area or sector.

B. (U) Air: Highlights of the current air situation.

II. (U) Summary of Enemy Situation: (Each category should use the commander's related priority intelligence requirements [PIRs] as the basis for the analysis and assessment. For MOOTW operations, separate paragraphs for each category of threat or significant power group may be created to supplement or replace the below categories.)

A. (U) Ground: Detailed analysis of the battlefield by area or sector with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours.

B. (U) Air: Detailed analysis of the air and air defense situation with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours.

C. (U) Naval: Detailed analysis of the naval situation with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours.

D. (U) Surface-to-Surface Missile and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Detailed analysis of the surface-to-surface missile and weapons of mass destruction situation with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours.

E. (U) Special Operations Forces: Detailed analysis of the special operations forces, force protection, and rear area security situation with comments on projected activity in the next 12 hours.

F. (U) Other: May be used for detailed analysis of paramilitary, insurgent, terrorist, or other significant threat categories not discussed elsewhere.

III. (U) MEF or MSC Assessment:

A. (U) Most Likely Course of Action:

B. (U) Most Dangerous Course of Action:

C. (U) Others: (as necessary)

IV. (U) Enemy Movement During the Reporting Period: Major enemy units (to include at least two levels below that of the reporting command) and universal transverse mercator [UTM] coordinates of the new position.

V. (U) PIRs: The commander's PIRs and current satisfaction level (i.e., partially satisfied, satisfied, not satisfied) assessment for each requirement.

VI. (U) Intelligence Plans, Missions, and Systems Status: Key intelligence collection, production, and dissemination plan updates; information on planned intelligence and reconnaissance missions; and intelligence systems status (generally only those systems that are less than fully operational). (The unit SOP or annex B to the OPORD prescribes the period covered by this paragraph.)

GRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS

In an effort to enhance the understanding of the INTSUM and to save dissemination time, the INTSUM is graphically portrayed as a single or set of map overlays. Intelligence summaries can be posted in graphic and text formats on web-based automated information systems, which provides MAGTF intelligence users with access to the web site the option of pulling intelligence and products.

There are limitations to electronically generated graphic INTSUMs. Graphics can require large bandwidth and processing power to be pulled over a web-based system, with possible degradation of the overall MAGTF tactical data network. Lower-level tactical units and allied nation forces may not possess the means to access and use the information, which generally requires graphic and text INTSUMs to be disseminated using other electronic transmission methods and hard copy delivery.

Graphic INTSUMs must convey essential intelligence and other information in a clear, concise, and easy to understand visual format. Because of the volume of detail to be presented, most graphic INTSUMs, particularly at higher commands, have evolved into digital slide shows. The unit SOP or Annex B to the OPORD establishes graphic INTSUM formats, which are tailored to the level of command, type of operation, and the commander's intelligence requirements. Generally graphic INTSUMs contain the same elements. The following are examples of common graphic INTSUM elements:

- Weather Graphics—Composite graphics, based on satellite imaging, showing area weather fronts, cloud coverage, high and low pressure areas, etc. May include forecast graphics for specified future periods.

- 5-Day Forecast—Similar to television weather forecasts, showing forecast weather conditions (e.g., cloudy, partly cloudy, rainy), high and low temperatures, winds, normal temperatures based on climatology, and any other elements that may be of interest to the commander; should also include light data for the same period.

- Weather Impacts Graphics—Normally presented in green, yellow, and red colored chart format; should include those forces, types of operations, or critical items of equipment that are essential to friendly and enemy unit mission performance.

- PIRs—Current and new PIRs, and may include a satisfaction level (i.e., not answered, partially answered, answered) assessment for each requirement.

- Activities and Assessments—Consists of a graphical situation map denoting locations of threat forces of interest and, if possible, graphically indicating status or combat effectiveness using color coding or other symbology. Depending on the level of command and information needs, separate graphics for categories of threat forces (i.e., ground, air, air defense) may be created to increase clarity. Each graphic should—

  ■ Note significant threat activity over the reporting period with text comment boxes tied to locations or an event numbering system with marginal text comments.

  ■ Provide an assessment based on the commander's PIRs.

  ■ Use supporting graphics to examine items in detail, such as aircraft sortie analysis or the location and status of a particular category of force or equipment (e.g., heavy equipment transporter systems, specialized units).

- Collection, Production, and Dissemination Plans and Status of Planned Missions and Tasks—Graphically presents locations of organic collection assets (e.g., reconnaissance teams, radio battalion assets, unmanned aerial vehicle tracks, sensor strings) and/or provides a time line showing daily projected availability windows and mission tracks (as applicable) of nonorganic supporting assets (e.g., Airborne Warning and Control System, RC-135, U2); also identifies changes to previous production and dissemination plans and any new plans.

- Outlook or Assessment—Provides an overall assessment of estimated threat courses of action (at a minimum, the threat's most likely and most dangerous courses of action). The assessment may be broken into estimate time periods, such as 24-48 hours, 48-96 hours, or whatever periods of time are applicable to the commands requirements to plan future actions. Courses of action should be graphically portrayed. In prehostilities or MOOTW, these graphics may be used to address anticipated political or societal actions or events that may impact the force.

APPENDIX G. INTELLIGENCE REPORT FORMAT

An intelligence report (INTREP) is a standardized report that is used to disseminate important intelligence without regard to a specific schedule. The first intelligence element acquiring the information prepares and disseminates the INTREP as rapidly as possible to units requiring the information. Generally, each report will concern only a single item.

An INTREP is generally required whenever an event occurs that is likely to result in a change in the friendly plan or when a change to the current or future analytical assessment is made. The intelligence element generally initiates an INTREP when facts influencing threat capabilities have been observed or when a change in threat capabilities has taken place. The commander's priority intelligence requirements serve as the basis for determining what information warrants an INTREP.

Whenever possible, the INTREP should include the originator's significant intelligence assessment as well as a source reliability and accuracy evaluation. The format below is a sample INTREP that would be posted on a web site or forwarded via SECRET internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) or MAGTF tactical data network (TDN) electronic mail.

CLASSIFICATION/RELEASABILITY

INTREP#: DD-001-97 (Sequentially numbered by originating unit)

DTG: DDHHMM(Time Zone) (Month) YY

I. ( ) Significant Event(s): Summarize the significant event(s) or developments that initiated the INTREP. Answer either the 5Ws (i.e., who, what, where, when, and why) or the SALUTE (i.e., size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) formats.

II. ( ) Assessment: Describe the effect of the current activity on threat capabilities or courses of action.

III.( ) Evaluation of Source: State the original information source and evaluate the accuracy and reliability of that source.

Note: ( ) Reflects classification of that information line.

APPENDIX H. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION BRIEF

The intent of the intelligence information brief is to enhance situational awareness and impart understanding. Intelligence information briefings may be as simple as a quick verbal update to a commander in front of a situation map or as complex as a Marine expeditionary force or joint task force level daily update to the commanding general and staff. At lower tactical levels, briefings are generally less formal and often short-notice. Higher commands generally employ regularly scheduled daily update briefings, which include intelligence. Regardless of the degree of formality or the level of command, a standard briefing format or outline can help intelligence personnel to rapidly and effectively organize for the brief.

To develop and deliver an effective intelligence information brief, intelligence personnel should—

● Know the audience. Is the audience the commander, the staff, or subordinate commanders? Who is the focus of the brief? What is audience's level of knowledge concerning the subject? Does the commander have any briefing preferences?

● Know the purpose and intent of the briefing. Is the brief a critical events update, or is it intended to describe in detail the threat and area of operations prior to crisis action planning?

● Concentrate on essential information and intelligence; prepare to provide details or expand intelligence should questions arise.

● Use clear, concise, readable graphics; ensure graphics can be seen from the rear of the room.

● Know the information; anticipate questions on unfamiliar subjects and arrange to have a subject matter expert present or take questions for follow-up research; never make up an answer.

● Distinguish between known facts and gaps or estimates.

The most common type of intelligence information briefing is the boardwalk. The boardwalk is an informal, on-demand brief conducted using the combat operations center map boards or screen displays from automated systems. Generally, the brief only presents significant changes to threat capabilities or courses of action. This brief also provides the commander an opportunity to ask direct questions.

At higher command echelons, the most common type of intelligence information brief is the commander's morning or evening update brief. Usually more formal and detailed, these briefs are scheduled for set times either once or twice per day. The planning, decision execution, and assessment cycle or unit standing operating procedure determines the schedule. In addition to briefing the current situation and significant events, this brief may address the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs); collection, production, dissemination plans and status; weather; and estimates of future threat actions. Often briefings are presented using graphics software.

By focusing on intelligence and events that correspond to the commander's PIRs, the briefer can quickly organize information and intelligence as well as ensure that the commander is given the most essential information in the shortest amount of time. The brief is also used to present significant occurrences affecting current or future plans.

The following are examples of update briefing elements:

● Weather Forecast.

● Weather Effects Assessment.

● PIRs and Intelligence Requirements (IRs).

● Situation (e.g., ground, air, air defense) Keyed to PIRs.

- Collection, Production, and Dissemination Plan Status.
- Intelligence Estimate (at a minimum, the most likely and most dangerous enemy courses of action).

These elements closely follow the elements of the web-based intelligence summary (INTSUM) graphic. See appendix F. Because the INTSUM and the update provide the same intelligence and other information, using the same format and graphics can save time and resources. To save more time, elements that have not changed since the last briefing can be briefed as "no change." However, the weather forecast, PIRs, plans status, and intelligence estimate should always be briefed.

APPENDIX I. PRODUCTION REQUIREMENT
AND REQUEST FOR INTELLIGENCE FORMAT

An intelligence production requirement (IPR), production requirement (PR), or request for intelligence (RFI) begins as an intelligence requirement (IR) levied on a unit's intelligence section. If the unit cannot satisfy the requirement with the available resources, the requirement must be forwarded up the chain of command for satisfaction. The requirement then becomes either an intelligence collection requirement (ICR), an RFI, or an IPR. Single or multiple requests for information may be combined into one PR.

A requirement must contain the following four basic elements:

- Who—Organization and specific office or individual that submitted the original requirement.
- What—Statement describing the intelligence required.
- When—Latest time information of value.
- How—Requested product format (e.g., hard copy, soft copy, verbal report), quantities, all receiving units.

Most theater tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) combine the three forms of requirements into one basic PR or RFI format. The joint task force headquarters intelligence directorate or combatant command joint intelligence center receiving the requirement determines whether collection or product development is necessary.

Defense Intelligence Agency also has an established basic PR or RFI format. This format is used in the Community On-Line Intelligence System for End Users and Managers (COLISEUM), which has become the standard medium for requirements submission throughout the Department of Defense intelligence production community. The following COLISEUM format is from Defense Intelligence Management Document (DIMD) 0000-151C-95, *Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP): Production Procedures.* Although theater TTP formats generally follow the same elements, they are modified according to the specific theater needs. Marine air-ground task forces and Marine Corps forces headquarters must follow the procedures established in their theater of operation.

Item 1. PR Number—A 12-space number with 10 alphanumeric characters and 2 separation dashes (e.g., C610-94-0001). The unit intelligence section requesting the information or production enters this number, which is unique to the unit. The first four characters are the customer's statement of intelligence interest (SII) account number or in a crisis, the customer's unit identification code (UIC). The second two numbers are the fiscal year. The last four numbers are the customer's sequence number for PRs or RFIs submitted in the fiscal year.

Item 2. Subject—A short descriptive, unclassified (if possible) title. Clarity is more important than keeping the subject unclassified.

Item 3. Customer's Organization—This line should include the end user's name, organization, mailing address, electronic-mail address (clearly identify Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems [JWICS] or Secret internet protocol router network [SIPRNET]), naval message address, and if possible, the customer's commercial and DSN phone numbers.

Item 4. Date of Request—Entered by the supporting intelligence office in YYMMDD format.

Item 5. Date Product Required—The latest date the product or information will be of value to the customer. Also referred to as latest time information of value (LTIOV).

Item 6. Form and Frequency of Response—This item is key to getting the desired response to the requirement. Sub items should be narrative with an emphasis on clarity:

- **Media**—Identify the preferred product form and second and third alternatives. Examples are message, floppy disk, CD-ROM, on-line data base, data base printout, bound hard copy report, study, or handbook. In addition to the media requested, the production element often disseminates intelligence and pertinent information in other media to increase access to a wider number of potential users.
- **Frequency**—Specify request for scheduled, non-crisis-related production as one-time, as required, or recurring. Crisis or immediate production requests are normally handled as one-time requests unless otherwise specified.
- **Revision or New Product**—Specify the existing product requiring update as completely as possible, or specify as a new PR.
- **Classification and Releasability**—Provide the desired classification and the highest classification that can be used by the customer. If the product needs to be releasable to foreign forces, specify which forces, if known, and justify the release.

Item 7. Statement of Requirement—The first paragraph should provide a summary of the requirement in 50 words or less. If the requirement supports an operation plan or contingency plan, the first sentence should identify which plan. Subsequent paragraphs should provide greater detail, specific intelligence and information elements, and a justification. The justification should specify what intelligence and other information sources have been consulted and why they were not sufficient to answer the requirement. If the requirement addresses separate questions, or multiple countries or topics, they must be prioritized. If all requests carry the same priority, list them by time urgency.

Item 8. Comments—Additional comments as necessary.

Item 9. Security Classification—The highest classification of the question and information contained in the requirement. The lower the classification, the easier it will be to process and use; however, clarity should not be sacrificed for lower classification. Codeword or special access program requirements will be submitted through appropriate channels and may require additional time to transmit and process.

APPENDIX J. GLOSSARY

SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AA...................... avenue of approach
ACE .... aviation combat element
AC/S .... assistant chief of staff
ADA .... air defense artillery
AFP .... all-source fusion platoon
AI .... air interdiction
AIntP......... allied intelligence publication
AO....................... area of operations
AOA .... amphibious objective area
AOI .... area of interest
ATARS .... advanced tactical airborne
reconnaissance system
ATF................. amphibious task force
ATO .... air tasking order
AWACS .... Airborne Warning and
Control System

BDA .... battle damage assessment
BDE .... brigade
BE.................... basic encyclopedia
BP .... battle position

C2 .... command and control
C2W .... command and control warfare
CA................... combat assessment
CAS................... close air support
CATF ..... commander, amphibious task force
CATK .... counterattack
CCIR....... commander's critical information
requirements
CD-ROM .... compact disc read only memory
CE..................... command element
CG.................... commanding general
CHATS...... CI/HUMINT automated tool set
CI .... counterintelligence
CIA .... Central Intelligence Agency
CIB .... controlled image base
CIC .... combat intelligence center
CINC................. commander in chief
CIS .... communications and
information systems
CNTRMOB................ countermobility
COA .... course of action
COC .... combat operations center
COG .... center of gravity

COLISEUM............ Community On-Line
Intelligence System for
End Users and Managers
CONPLAN................. contingency plan
COO............. combined obstacle overlay
CP........................ command post
CPX .... command post exercise
CSS .... combat service support

D3A .... decide, detect, deliver, assess
DDHHMM............... day, hour, minute
DEST .... destination
DIA .... Defense Intelligence Agency
DIMD ...... defense intelligence management
document
DISUM........... daily intelligence summary
DMGD......................... damaged
DMS............... Defense Message System
DOD .... Department of Defense
DODIPP............ Department of Defense
Intelligence Production Program
DON .... Department of the Navy
DP .... decision point
DPM........ Dissemination Program Manager
DSN .... Defense Switched Network
DST .... decision support template
DTG...................... date-time group
DZ .... drop zone

EA .... electronic attack
e.g. .... for example
EPW................ enemy prisoner of war

FARP ..... forward arming and refueling point
FDA .... functional damage assessment
FFC .... force fires cell
FFIR............. friendly force information
requirements
FLIR.............. forward-looking infrared
FM .... field manual (Army)
FMFRP................. Fleet Marine Force
reference publication
FSSG .... force service support group

G-1............. manpower or personnel staff
officer/organization

G-2 . . . . intelligence staff officer/
organization
G-3 . . . . . . operations staff officer/organization
G-4 . . . . logistics staff officer/organization
G-5 . . . . plans officer/organization
GCE . . . . ground combat element
GENSER. . . . . general service
GEOINT . . . . geographic intelligence

HF . . . . high frequency
HLZ. . . . . helicopter landing zone
HN. . . . . host nation
HPT. . . . . .high-payoff target
HPTL . . . . .high-payoff target list
HQ. . . . . .headquarters
HUMINT . . . . human intelligence
HVT . . . . high-value target

i.e. . . . . that is
I&W . . . . indications and warning
IAS . . . . .intelligence analysis system
ICR . . . . intelligence collection requirement
IDR . . . . intelligence dissemination requirement
IIP . . . . imagery intelligence platoon
IMINT. . . . . .imagery intelligence
IMO. . . . . .imagery and mapping officer
intel bn . . . . intelligence battalion
INTELINK . . . . intelligence link
INTELINK-S . . . . . . intelligence link-SECRET
INTREP . . . . intelligence report
INTSUM. . . . . .intelligence summary
IOC . . . . intelligence operations center
IPB . . . . intelligence preparation of
the battlespace
IPR . . . . . . intelligence production requirement
IR . . . . .intelligence requirement
ISC . . . . intelligence support coordinator
ISM . . . . . . .intelligence synchronization matrix
ISS. . . . . .intelligence synchronization sheet

J-2 . . . . .intelligence directorate
JAC. . . . . joint analysis center
JCS . . . . Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDISS . . . . Joint Deployable Intelligence
Support System
JDS . . . . .Joint Dissemination System
JFC . . . . .joint force commander
JFIC. . . . . . .Joint Forces Intelligence Command
JIC . . . . joint intelligence center
JISE. . . . . joint intelligence support element
JOG-A. . . . . joint operations graphic-air

JP. . . . . .joint publication
JSIPS. . . . . .Joint Services Imagery
Processing System
JSTARS . . . . . . joint surveillance, target attack
radar system
JTF . . . . .joint task force
JWICS. . . . . .Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System

KIA . . . . killed in action
km . . . . kilometer
KOCOA . . . .key terrain, observation and fields
of fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles, and avenues of approach,
and mobility corridors

LCAC . . . . .landing craft air cushion
LOA . . . . limit of advance
LOC . . . . line of communications
LOS. . . . . line of sight
LTIOV . . . . latest time information of value
LZ . . . . .landing zone

MAGTF . . . . Marine air-ground task force
MARFOR . . . . .Marine Corps forces
MAW . . . . .Marine aircraft wing
MCDP. . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCIA . . . . . Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
MCISU . . . Marine Corps Imagery Support Unit
MCOO . . . modified combined obstacle overlay
MCRP . . . . .Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP . . . . Marine Corps warfighting
publication
MEA . . . . mission effectiveness assessment
MEF . . . . Marine expeditionary force
METT-T . . . . .mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, troops and
support available-
time available
MEU(SOC). . . . . Marine expeditionary unit
(special operations capable)
MIDB . . . . .modernized integrated database
mm . . . . millimeters
MOB . . . . mobility
MOOTW. . . .military operations other than war
MOS . . . . military occupational specialty
MSC . . . . major subordinate command
MSE . . . . .major subordinate element
MTI. . . . . moving target indicator
MTW. . . . . major theater war

NA. . . . . .not applicable

NAI . . . . named area of interest
NAIC. . . . . National Air Intelligence Center
NATO . . . . . North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC . . . . .nuclear, biological, and chemical
NEF. . . . . .naval expeditionary force
NEO . . . . . noncombatant evacuation operation
NGIC. . . . . National Ground Intelligence Center
NGO . . . . .nongovernmental organization
NIMA . . . . .National Imagery and
Mapping Agency
NIPRNET . . . . nonsecure internet protocol
router network
NIS . . . . .national input segment
NIST . . . . . . national intelligence support team
NMIC . . National Maritime Intelligence Center
NOE .nap of the earth
NSA . . . . National Security Agency
NSTR . . . . .nothing significant to report
NVG . . . . night vision goggles

obj . . . . .objective
OCAC . . . . operations control and
analysis center
OIC . . . . .officer in charge
OMFTS . . . operational maneuver from the sea
OOB . . . . .order of battle
OPCON . . . . .operational control
OPLAN. . . . . .operation plan
OPORD. . . . . .operation order

P&A . . . . production and analysis
PDA . . . . physical damage assessment
PDE&A. . . . . planning, decision, execution,
and assessment
PIR . . . . priority intelligence requirement
POC. . . . . point of contact
POL. . . . . .petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PR . . . . production requirement
PVO . . . . .private voluntary organization

RAG . . . . regimental artillery group
RC. . . . . reconnaissance capable
recon . . . . reconnaissance
rep . . . . .representative
RFI . . . . .request for intelligence
RR . . . . .reattack recommendation
RRS. . . . . remote receive station

S-1. . . . . . .manpower or personnel staff officer/
organization
S-2. . . . . . intelligence staff officer/organization
S-3. . . . . . . operations staff officer/organization

SALUTE. . . . . .size, activity, location, unit,
time, equipment
SAM . . . . surface-to-air missile
SARC . . . . surveillance and reconnaissance cell
SATCOM . . . . satellite communications
SCI . . . . . sensitive compartmented information
SCR. . . . . .single channel radio
SIDS . . . . secondary imagery dissemination
system
SIGINT . . . . .signals intelligence
SII . . . . statement of intelligence interest
SIPRNET . . . . .SECRET Internet Protocol
Router Network
SOA . . . . sustained operations ashore
SOP. . . . . .standing operating procedure
SPMAGTF . . . . special-purpose Marine
air-ground task force
SPP . . . . shared production program
STANAG . . . . standardization agreement
(NATO)

TAA . . . . .tactical assembly area
TAI . . . . targeted area of interest
TCAC . . . . technical control and analysis center
TDN . . . . tactical data network
T/E . . . . table of equipment
TEG. . . . . tactical exploitation group
TERPES . . . . tactical electronic reconnaissance
processing and evaluation system
T/O . . . . table of organization
topo . . . . topographic
TOR . . . . time of report
TPC. . . . . topographic production capability
TPL. . . . . time phase lines
TRSS. . . . . .tactical remote sensor system
TSA. . . . . target system assessment
TTP . . . . tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAV . . . . .unmanned aerial vehicle
UIC . . . . unit identification code
U.S. . . . . United States
UTM . . . . .universal transverse mercator

VHF . . . . very high frequency
VMAQ . . . . .Marine tactical electronic
warfare squadron
VMU . . . . .Marine unmanned aerial
vehicle squadron
VO. . . . . validation office

WIA . . . . wounded in action
YYMMDD . . . . .year, month, day

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

a priori—Probabilities, in the absence of other information; presupposed by experience.

all-source intelligence—Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, including, most frequently, human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data, in the production of finished intelligence. (JP 1-02)

amphibious force—An amphibious task force and a landing force together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations. (Proposed by JP 3-02 for inclusion in JP 1-02)

amphibious objective area—A geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of command and control within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force's mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. Also called AOA. (JP 1-02)

amphibious task force—A Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. The amphibious task force, together with the landing force and other forces, constitutes the amphibious force. Also called ATF. (Proposed by JP 3-02 for inclusion in JP 1-02)

analysis—In intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. See also intelligence cycle. (JP 1-02) The sifting and sorting of evaluated information to isolate significant elements with respect to the mission and operations of the command. (MCWP 2-1)

area of interest—That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of operations—An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

aviation combat element—The core element of a Marine air-ground task force that is task-organized to conduct aviation operations. The aviation combat element provides all or a portion of the six functions of Marine aviation necessary to accomplish the Marine air-ground task force's mission. These functions are anti-air warfare, offensive air support, assault support, electronic warfare, air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles. The aviation combat element is usually composed of an aviation unit headquarters and various other aviation units or their detachments. It can vary in size from a small aviation detachment of specifically required aircraft to one or more Marine aircraft wings. The aviation combat element may contain other Service or foreign military forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. The aviation combat element itself is not a formal command. Also called ACE. (Approved for inclusion in next version of MCRP 5-12C)

basic intelligence—Fundamental intelligence concern-ing the general situation, resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign countries or areas which may be used as reference material in the planning of operations at any level and in evaluating subsequent information relating to the same subject. (JP 1-02)

battle damage assessment—1. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02) 2. In Marine Corps usage, the timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. BDA estimates physical damage to a particular target, functional damage to that target, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations. (MCWP 5-12C)

battlespace—All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum which encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (MCRP 5-12C)

battlespace dominance—The degree of control over the dimensions of the battlespace which enhances friendly freedom of action and denies enemy freedom of action. It permits force sustainment and application of power projection to accomplish the full range of potential operational and tactical missions. It includes all actions conducted against enemy capabilities to influence future operations. (MCRP 5-12C)

branch(es)—A contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of the force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions. See also sequel(s). (MCRP 5-12C)

centers of gravity—1. Those characteristics, capa-bilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COG. (JP 1-02) 2. A key source of strength without which an enemy cannot function. (MCDP 1-2)

centralized control—In military operations, a mode of battlespace management in which one echelon of command exercises total authority and direction of all aspects of one or more warfighting functions. It is a method of control where detailed orders are issued and total unity of action is the overriding consideration. (MCRP 5-12C)

collate—1. The grouping together of related items to provide a record of events and facilitate further processing. 2. To compare critically two or more items or documents concerning the same general subject; normally accomplished in the processing phase in the intelligence cycle. (JP 1-02)

collection—Acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing and/or production elements. (JP 1-02) In Marine Corps usage, the gathering of intelligence data and information to satisfy the identified requirements. (MCWP 5-12C)

collection agency—Any individual, organization, or unit that has access to sources of information and the capability of collecting information from them. (JP 1-02)

collection asset—A collection system, platform, or capability that is supporting, assigned, or attached to a particular commander. (JP 1-02)

collection management—The process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking, as required. (JP 1-02)

collection manager—An individual with responsibility for the timely and efficient tasking of organic collection resources and the development of requirements for theater and national assets that could satisfy specific information needs in support of the mission. (JP 1-02)

collection plan—A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment—The determination of the overall effectiveness of tactical force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components, (a) battle damage assessment (BDA), (b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) future course-of-action (COA) or reattack recommendation. Also called CA. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

combat data—Data derived from reporting by opera-tional units. (MCWP 5-12C)

combatant command—A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combined operation—An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. (JP 1-02)

command and control—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02) Also in Marine Corps usage, the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. (MCRP 5-12C)

command and control warfare—The integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Also called C2W. (Excerpt from JP 1-02)

command element—The core **element** of a Marine air-ground task force that is the headquarters. The command element is composed of the commander, general or executive and special staff sections, headquarters section, and requisite communications support, intelligence and reconnaissance forces, necessary to accomplish the MAGTF's mission. The command element provides command and control, intelligence, and other support essential for effective planning and execution of operations by the other elements of the Marine air-ground task force. The command element varies in size and composition and may contain other Service or foreign military forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Also called CE. (Approved for inclusion in next version of MCRP 5-12C)

commander's critical information requirements—Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identi-

fied by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decisionmaking. Also called CCIR. NOTE: CCIRs are normally divided into three primary subcategories: priority intelligence requirements; friendly force information requirements; and essential elements of friendly information. (MCRP 5-12C)

commander's intent—A commander's clear, concise articulation of the purpose(s) behind one or more tasks assigned to a subordinate. It is one of two parts of every mission statement which guides the exercise of initiative in the absence of instructions. (MCRP 5-12C)

commander's planning guidance—Directions and/or instructions which focus the staff's course of action de-velopment during the planning process. (MCRP 5-12C)

communications intelligence—Technical and intel-ligence information derived from foreign communi-cations by other than the intended recipients. (JP 1-02)

communications security—The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. (Excerpt from JP 1-02)

coordination—The action necessary to ensure adequately integrated relationships between separate organizations located in the same area. Coordination may include such matters as fire support, emergency defense measures, area intelligence, and other situations in which coordination is considered necessary. (MCRP 5-12C)

counterintelligence—1. Information gathered and ac-tivities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or

assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (JP 1-02) **2.** Within the Marine Corps, counterintelligence constitutes active and passive measures intended to deny a threat force valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions. Also called CI. (MCRP 5-12C)

crisis action planning—The time-sensitive planning for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occurs in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. Crisis action planners base their plan on the circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. (JP 1-02)

critical information—Specific facts about friendly in-tentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

critical intelligence—Intelligence which is crucial and requires the immediate attention of the commander. It is required to enable the commander to make decisions that will provide a timely and appropriate response to actions by the potential/actual enemy. It includes but is not limited to the following: **a.** strong indications of the imminent outbreak of hostilities of any type (warning of attack); **b.** aggression of any nature against a friendly country; **c.** indications or use of nuclear-biological-chemical weapons (targets); **d.** significant events within potential enemy countries that may lead to modification of nuclear strike plans. (JP 1-02)

critical node—An element, position, or communica-tions entity whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades the ability of

a force to command, control, or effectively conduct combat operations. (JP 1-02)

critical vulnerability—An aspect of a center of gravity that if exploited will do the most significant damage to an adversary's ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a key strength. (MCRP 5-12C)

daily intelligence summary—A report prepared in message form at the joint force headquarters that provides higher, lateral, and subordinate headquarters with a summary of all significant intelligence produced during the previous 24-hour period. The "as of" time for information, content, and submission time for the report will be as specified by the joint force commander. Also called DISUM. (JP 1-02)

data—Representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic means. Any representations such as characters or analog quantities to which meaning is or might be assigned. (JP 1-02)

data base—Information that is normally structured and indexed for user access and review. Data bases may exist in the form of physical files (folders, documents, etc.) or formatted automated data processing system data files. (JP 1-02)

database replication—Process by which like databases reflect commonality in information and timeliness of that information. (MCRP 5-12C)

debriefing—Interviewing of an individual who has completed an intelligence or reconnaissance assignment or who has knowledge, whether through observation, participation, or otherwise, of operational or intelligence significance. (MCRP 5-12C)

decentralized control—In military operations, a mode of battlespace management in which a command echelon may delegate some or all

authority and direction for warfighting functions to subordinates. It requires careful and clear articulation of mission, intent, and main effort to unify efforts of subordinate leaders. (MCRP 5-12C)

deception operation—A military operation conducted to mislead the enemy. A unit conducting a deception operation may or may not make contact with the enemy. Deception operations include demonstrations, diversions, displays, feints, ruses, actions, events, means, and objectives. (MCRP 5-12C)

decision point—An event, area, or point in the battlespace where and when the friendly commander will make a critical decision. Also called DP. (MCRP 5-12C)

deliberate planning—A planning process for the deployment and employment of apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation. Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when the plan is executed. (JP 1-02)

deliberate targeting—The methodical identification, compilation, and analysis of potential fixed or semifixed targets followed by the decision of which potential targets will be attacked, when, and/or by what weapon and ordnance. It is practiced primarily during the planning phase of an operation, when planning for an attack, or when the tempo of combat is slow. (MCRP 5-12C)

descriptive intelligence—Class of intelligence which describes existing and previously existing conditions with the intent to promote situational awareness. Descriptive intelligence has two components: *basic intelligence*, which is general background knowledge about established and relatively constant conditions; and *current intelligence*, which is concerned with describing the existing situation. (MCRP 5-12C)

detachment—1. A part of a unit separated from its main organization for duty elsewhere. 2. A temporary military or naval unit formed from other units or parts of units. (JP 1-02)

direction finding—A procedure for obtaining bearings of radio frequency emitters by using a highly directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept receiver or ancillary equipment. (JP 1-02)

direct support—A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force's request for assistance. (JP 1-02)

dissemination—Conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. (JP 1-02)

dissemination management—Involves establishing dissemination priorities, selection of dissemination means, and monitoring the flow of intelligence throughout the command. The objective of dissemination management is to deliver the required intelligence to the appropriate user in proper form at the right time while ensuring that individual consumers and the dissemination system are not overloaded attempting to move unneeded or irrelevant information. Dissemination management also provides for use of security controls which do not impede the timely delivery or subsequent use of intelligence while protecting intelligence sources and methods. (MCRP 5-12C)

effective damage—That damage necessary to render a target element inoperative, unserviceable, nonproductive, or uninhabitable. (JP 1-02)

effectiveness—The measurement of the results of military action against a target by lethal or nonlethal means. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

effects—The result of military action against a target by lethal or nonlethal means. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

effects assessment—A determination of the overall effectiveness of force or weapon system employment during military operations and recommends future courses of action. Effects assessment is conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels-of war or MOOTW. Effects assessment is the assessment of all execution effects, and includes steps commonly associated with combat assessment. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

electromagnetic spectrum—The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. (JP 1-02)

electronic attack—That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. (JP 1-02)

electronic intelligence—Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from foreign noncommunications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. (JP 1-02)

electronic protection—That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment or electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. (JP 1-02)

electronic reconnaissance—The detection, identifica-tion, evaluation, and location of foreign electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. (JP 1-02)

electronic warfare—Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three

major subdivisions within electronic warfare are electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Also called EW. (Excerpt from JP 1-02)

electronic warfare support—That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT). (JP 1-02)

essential elements of friendly information— 1. Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Also called EEFI. (JP 1-02) 2. Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities needed by adversaries to plan and execute effective operations against our forces. (MCRP 5-12C)

estimative intelligence—Class of intelligence which attempts to anticipate future possibilities and probabilities based on an analysis of descriptive intelligence in the context of planned friendly and assessed enemy operations. See also **descriptive intelligence**. (MCRP 5-12C)

evaluation—In intelligence usage, appraisal of an item of information in terms of credibility, reliability, pertinence, and accuracy. Appraisal is accomplished at several stages within the intelligence cycle with progressively different contexts. Initial evaluations, made by case officers and report officers, are focused upon the reliability of the source and the accuracy of the

information as judged by data available at or close to their operational levels. Later evaluations by intelligence analysts, are primarily concerned with verifying accuracy of information and may, in effect, convert information into intelligence. Appraisal or evaluation of items of information or intelligence is indicated by a standard letter-number system. The evaluation of the reliability of sources is designated by a letter from A through F, and the accuracy of the information is designated by numeral 1 through 6. These are two entirely independent appraisals, and these separate appraisals are indicated in accordance with the system indicated below. Thus, information adjudged to be "probably true" received from a "usually reliable source" is designated "B-2" or "B2," while information of which the "truth cannot be judged" received from a "usually reliable source" is designated "B-6" or "B6."

Reliability of Source

A - Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Unreliable
F - Reliability cannot be judged

Accuracy of Information

1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - Doubtful
5 - Improbable
6 - Truth cannot be judged (JP 1-02)

fires—The effects of lethal or nonlethal weapons. (JP 1-02)

force protection—Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations

security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (JP 1-02)

force reconnaissance company—A unit whose mission is to conduct preassault and deep postassault reconnaissance operations in support of a landing force and its subordinate elements. (MCRP 5-12C)

friendly force information requirements—Information the commander needs about friendly forces in order to develop plans and make effective decisions. Depending upon the circumstances, information on unit location, composition, readiness, personnel status, and logistics status could become a friendly force information requirement. Also called FFIR. (MCRP 5-12C)

functional damage assessment—The estimate of the effect of military force to degrade/destroy the functional or operational capability of the target to perform its intended mission and on the level of success in achieving operational objectives established against the target. This assessment is based upon all-source information, and includes an estimation of the time required for recuperation or replacement of the target function. (Upon approval of JP 3-60, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

fusion—In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (JP 1-02)

fusion center—In intelligence usage, a physical location to accomplish fusion. It normally has sufficient intelligence automated data processing capability to assist in the process. (JP 1-02)

future operations section—1. In MAGTF operations, a section normally under the staff cognizance of the G-3 which focuses on planning/producing new fragmentary orders or the next change of major subordinate command

mission; this section forms and leads the integrated planning effort with a planning horizon of 72-120 hours out. It develops branch plans and sequels. **2.** In Marine aviation, that portion of the tactical air command center and aviation combat element commander's battlestaff responsible for the detailed planning and coordination of all future air operations conducted by the aviation combat element in support of the Marine air-ground task force. The future operations section plans for and publishes the next air tasking order(s) (normally a 48/72-hour period). (MCRP 5-12C)

general military intelligence—Intelligence concerning the (1) military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations or (2) topics affecting potential US or allied military operations, relating to the following subjects: armed forces capabilities, including order of battle, organization, training, tactics, doctrine, strategy, and other factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness; area and terrain intelligence, including urban areas, coasts and landing beaches, and meteorological, oceanographic, and geological intelligence; transportation in all modes; military materiel production and support industries,; military and civilian C4 systems; military economics, including foreign military assistance; insurgency and terrorism; military-political-sociological intelligence; location, identification, and description of military-related installations; government control; escape and evasion; and threats and forecasts. (Excludes scientific and technical intelligence.) (JP 1-02)

general support—That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 1-02)

geographic coordinates—The quantities of latitude and longitude which define the position of a point on the surface of the earth with respect to the reference spheroid. (JP 1-02)

geographic intelligence—The process of collecting, organizing, analyzing, synthesizing, disseminating and utilizing geospatial information and services (GI&S) with regards to the military aspects of the terrain. Also called GEOINT. GEOINT is the integration and analysis of all-source geospatial information in support of specific Marine Corps operations. The analysis is focused on a specific mission and includes intensification of information detail and resolution to meet tactical requirements. GEOINT analysis is focused on the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process and addresses key terrain, observation & fields of fire, cover & concealment, obstacles, avenues of approach & mobility corridors. This analysis is commonly referred to as KOCOA for easy reference.

geospatial information and services—The concept for collection, information extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery (both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the earth's surface. These data are used for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, mission planning, mission rehearsal, modeling, simulation and precise targeting. Geospatial information provides the basic framework for battlespace visualization. It is information produced by multiple sources to common interoperable data standards. It may be presented in the form of printed maps, charts, and publications; in digital simulation and modeling data bases; in photographic form; or in the form of digitized maps and charts or attributed centerline data. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and also includes instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data. (JP 1-02)

global sourcing—A process of force provision or augmentation whereby resources may be drawn from any location/command worldwide. (MCRP 5-12C)

ground combat element—The core element of a Marine air-ground task force that is task-organized to conduct ground operations. It is usually constructed around an infantry organization but can vary in size from a small ground unit of any type, to one or more Marine divisions that can be independently maneuvered under the direction of the MAGTF commander. It includes appropriate ground combat and combat support forces and may contain other Service or foreign military forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. The ground combat element itself is not a formal command. Also called GCE. (Approved for inclusion in next version of MCRP 5-12C)

helicopter landing zone—A specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites. Also called HLZ. (JP 1-02)

high-payoff target—A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets, identified through wargaming, which must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission. Also called HPT. (JP 1-02)

high-value target—A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander's area of interest. Also called HVT. (JP 1-02)

human intelligence—1. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. (JP 1-02) 2. In Marine Corps usage, human intelligence operations cover a wide range of activities encompassing reconnaissance patrols, aircrew debriefs,

debriefing of refugees, interrogations of prisoners of war, and the conduct of counterintelligence force protection source operations. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance—Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (JP 1-02)

hydrography—The science which deals with the measurements and description of the physical features of the oceans, seas, lakes, rivers, and their adjoining coastal areas, with particular reference to their use for navigational purposes. (JP 1-02)

imagery exploitation—The cycle of processing and printing imagery to the positive or negative state, assembly into imagery packs, identification, interpretation, mensuration, information extraction, the preparation of reports, and the dissemination of information. (JP 1-02)

imagery intelligence—Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called IMINT. (JP 1-02)

imagery interpretation—The process of location, recognition, identification, and description of objects, activities, and terrain represented on imagery. (JP 1-02)

immediate targets—Targets upon which are detected too late to be included in the normal targeting process, therefore, effects have not been scheduled. Immediate targets have three subcategories: unplanned, unanticipated, and time-sensitive. (Upon approval of JP 3-60, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

indications and warning—Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied military, political, or economic interests or to US citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear/non-nuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to United States reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events. Also called I&W. (JP 1-02)

indirect effects—Result created through an inter-mediate effect or mechanism to produce the final outcome, which may be physical or psychological in nature. Indirect effects tend to be delayed, and may be difficult to recognize. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

information—1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (JP 1-02)

information exchange requirement—The requirement for information to be passed between and among forces, organizations, or administrative structures concerning ongoing activities. Information exchange requirements identify who exchanges what information with whom, as well as why the information is necessary and how that information will be used. The quality (i.e., frequency, timeliness, security) and quantity (i.e., volume, speed, and type of information such as data, voice, and video) are attributes of the information exchange included

in the information exchange requirement. (MCRP 5-12C)

information report—Report used to forward raw information collected to fulfill intelligence requirements. (JP 1-02)

information requirements—Those items of information regarding the enemy and his environment which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. (JP 1-02)

integration—A stage in the intelligence cycle in which a pattern is formed through the selection and combination of evaluated information. (JP 1-02)

intelligence—1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02) Also in Marine Corps usage, intelligence is knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding environment needed to support decision-making. This knowledge is the result of the collection, processing, exploitation, evaluation, integration, analysis, and interpretation of available information about the battlespace and threat. (MCRP 5-12C)

intelligence annex—A supporting document of an operation plan or order that provides detailed information on the enemy situation, assignment of intelligence tasks, and intelligence administrative procedures. (JP 1-02)

intelligence cycle—The steps by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. (Excerpt from JP 1-02)

intelligence data—Data derived from assets primarily dedicated to intelligence collection such as imagery systems, electronic intercept

equipment, human intelligence sources, etc. (MCRP 5-12C)

intelligence discipline—A well-defined area of intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting using a specific category of technical or human resources. There are five major disciplines: human intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence (communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence), and open-source intelligence. (JP 1-02)

intelligence estimate—The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (JP 1-02)

intelligence journal—A chronological log of intelligence activities covering a stated period, usually 24 hours. It is an index of reports and messages that have been received and transmitted, and of important events that have occurred, and actions taken. The journal is a permanent and official record. (JP 1-02)

intelligence operations—The variety of intelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities. (Excerpt from JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace— 1. An analytical methodology employed to reduce un-certainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, en-vironment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (JP 1-02) 2. In Marine Corps usage, the

systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. (MCRP 5-12C)

intelligence report—A specific report of information, usually on a single item, made at any level of command in tactical operations and disseminated as rapidly as possible in keeping with the timeliness of the information. Also called INTREP. (JP 1-02)

intelligence requirement—1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. (JP 1-02) 2. In Marine Corps usage, questions about the enemy and the environment, the answers to which a commander requires to make sound decisions. Also called IR. (MCRP 5-12C)

intuitive decisionmaking—The act of reaching a conclusion which emphasizes pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. This approach focuses on assessment of the situation vice comparison of multiple options. (MCRP 5-12C)

joint deployable intelligence support system—A transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a joint intelligence center to a joint task force or other tactical user. Also called JDISS. (JP 1-02)

joint force—A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint intelligence center—The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the

national intelligence community. Also called JIC. (JP 1-02)

joint intelligence support element—A subordinate joint force forms a joint intelligence support element as the focus for intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. Also called JISE. (JP 1-02)

joint operations—A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1- 02)

joint targeting coordination board—A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and preparing and/or refining joint target lists. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. (JP 1-02)

joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System—The sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information System Network. It incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multipoint information exchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing. Also called JWICS. (JP 1-02)

large-scale map—A map having a scale of 1:75,000 or larger. (JP 1-02)

line of communications—A route, either land, water, and/or air, which connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (JP 1-02)

list of targets—A tabulation of confirmed or suspect targets maintained by any echelon for informational and fire support planning purposes. (JP 1-02)

main effort—The designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power and is directed against a center of gravity through a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 5-12C)

maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. (MCRP 5-12C)

mapping, charting, and geodesy—Maps, charts, and other data used for military planning, operations, and training. These products and data support air, land, and sea navigation; weapon system guidance; target positioning; and other military activities. These data are presented in the forms of topographic, planimetric, imaged, or thematic maps and graphics; nautical and aeronautical charts and publications; and, in digital and textual formats, gazetteers, which contain geophysical and geodetic data and coordinate lists. (JP 1-02)

Marine air-ground task force—The Marine Corps principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the MAGTF are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element,

a ground combat element, and a combat service support element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not formal commands. The basic structure of the Marine air-ground task force never varies, though the number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs, other Service and/or foreign military forces, to be assigned or attached. Also called MAGTF. (Approved for inclusion in next version of MCRP 5-12C)

Marine Corps Planning Process—A six-step methodology which helps organize the thought processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It focuses on the threat and is based on the Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of command and supports the establishment and maintenance of tempo. The six steps consist of mission analysis, course of action development, course of action analysis, comparison/decision, orders development, and transition. Also called MCPP. NOTE: Tenets of the MCPP include top down planning, single battle concept, and integrated planning. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine expeditionary force—The largest Marine air-ground task force and the Marine Corps principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine force service support groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across the range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. It may also contain other Service or foreign military forces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Also called MEF. (Approved for inclusion in next version of MCRP 5-12C)

Marine expeditionary unit—A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a helicopter squadron reinforced, and a task-organized combat service support element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps forward sea-based deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary unit provides an immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of limited combat operations. It may contain other Service or foreign military forces assigned or attached. Also called MEU. (Approved for inclusion in next version of MCRP 5-12C)

Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable)—The Marine Corps standard, forward-deployed, sea-based expeditionary organization. The MEU(SOC) is a MEU, augmented with selected personnel and equipment, that is trained and equipped with an enhanced capability to conduct amphibious operations and a variety of specialized missions, of limited scope and duration. These capabilities include specialized demolition, clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance, raids, in-extremis hostage recovery, and enabling operations for follow-on forces. The Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) is not a special operations force but, when directed by the National Command Authorities, the combatant commander in chief, and/or other operational commander, may conduct limited special operations in extremis, when other forces are inappropriate or unavailable. It may also contain other Service or foreign military forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. Also called MEU (SOC). (Approved for inclusion in next version of MCRP 5-12C)

measurement and signature intelligence—Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features

associated with the target. The detected feature may be either reflected or emitted. (JP 1-02)

medium-scale map—A map having a scale larger than 1:600,000 and smaller than 1:75,000. (JP 1-02)

meteorological data—Meteorological facts pertaining to the atmosphere, such as wind, temperature, air density, and other phenomena which affect military operations. (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war—Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

modified combined obstacle overlay—A product used to depict the battlespace's effects on military operations. It is normally based on a product depicting all obstacles to mobility, modified to also depict the following, which are not prescriptive nor inclusive: cross-country mobility classifications (such as RESTRICTED); objectives; avenues of approach and mobility corridors; likely locations of countermobility obstacle systems; likely engagement areas; and key terrain. Also called MCOO. (MCRP 5-12C)

multinational operations—A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

multi-spectral imagery—The image of an object obtained simultaneously in a number of discrete spectral bands. (JP 1-02)

munitions effects assessment. Conducted concurrently and interactively with battle damage assessment, the assessment of the military force applied in terms of the weapon system and munitions effectiveness to determine and

recommend any required changes to the methodology, tactics, weapon system, munitions, fusing and/or weapon delivery parameters to increase force effectiveness. Munitions effects assessment is primarily the responsibility of operations with required inputs and coordination from the intelligence community. Also called MEA. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

named area of interest—A point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity is expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity within a named area of interest will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action. Also called NAI. (MCRP 5-12C)

national intelligence support team—A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from either Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or any combination of these agencies. Also called NIST. (JP 1-02)

near real time—Pertaining to the timeliness of data or information which has been delayed by the time required for electronic communication and automatic data processing. This implies that there are no significant delays. (JP 1-02)

noncombatant evacuation operations—Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEO. (JP 1-02)

no-strike target list—A list designated by a commander containing targets not to be destroyed. Destruction of targets on the list would interfere with or unduly hamper projected friendly military operations, or friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments. (JP 1-02)

open-source intelligence—Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. (JP 1-02)

operational architecture—A description (often graphical) of the operational elements, assigned tasks, and information flows required to support the warfighter. It defines the type of information, the frequency of exchange, and what tasks are supported by these information exchanges. (MCRP 5-12C)

operational control—Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operations control and analysis center—Main node for the command and control of radio battalion signals intelligence operations and the overall coordination of MAGTF signals intelli-

gence operations. Processes, analyzes, produces, and disseminates signals intelligence-derived information and directs the ground-based electronic warfare activities of the radio battalion. Also called OCAC. (MCRP 5-12C)

operational level of war—The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JP 1-02)

order of battle—The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. Also called OOB. (JP 1-02)

paramilitary forces—Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 1-02)

physical damage assessment—The estimate of the quantitative extent of physical damage (through munitions blast, fragmentation, and/or fire damage effects) to a target resulting from the application of military force. This assessment is based upon observed or interpreted damage. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

planned targets—Targets that are known to exist in an operational area and which effects are scheduled in advance or are on-call. Examples range from targets on joint target lists (JTLs) in applicable campaign plans, to targets detected in

sufficient time to list in the air tasking order (ATO), mission-type orders, or fire support plans. Planned targets have two subcategories: *scheduled* or *on call*. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

priority intelligence requirements—**1.** Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking. Also called PIR. (JP 1-02) **2.** In Marine Corps usage, an intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. (MCRP 5-12C)

production—The conversion of information into intelligence through the integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of all-source data and the preparation of intelligence products in support of known or anticipated user requirements. Production is a process of synthesis—the most important action in developing usable intelligence for the commander. (MCWP 2-1)

production management—Encompasses determining the scope, content, and format of each intelligence product, developing a plan and schedule for the development of each product, assigning priorities among the various production requirements, allocating processing, exploitation, and production resources, and integrating production efforts with intelligence collection and dissemination. (MCRP 5-12C)

reach back—The ability to exploit resources, capabilities, expertise, etc., not physically located in the theater or a joint operations area, when established. (MCRP 5-12C)

reactive target—The method used for targeting targets of opportunity. It is used when time and situation do not allow for targeting; i.e., during deliberate targeting, during an attack, when defending against an attack, or upon discovery of the location of a target such as a

radio jammer, tank, or antiaircraft weapon. (MCRP 5-12C)

reattack recommendation—An assessment, derived from the results of battle damage assessment and munitions effects assessment, providing the commander systematic advice on reattack of targets and further target selection to achieve objectives. The reattack recommendation considers objective achievement, target, and aimpoint selection, attack timing, tactics, weapon system and munitions selection. The reattack recommendation is a combined operations and intelligence function. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

request for information—Any specific time-sensitive ad hoc requirement for intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence production. A request for information can be initiated to respond to operational requirements and will be validated in accordance with the theater command's procedures. (JP 1-02)

scheduled targets—Planned targets that are known to exist in an operational area and are located in sufficient time for deliberate planning to meet specific campaign objectives. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

scientific and technical intelligence—The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information which covers: **a.** foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and **b.** scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture. (JP 1-02)

SECRET internet protocol router network—Worldwide SECRET level packet switch network that uses high-speed internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information Systems Network circuitry. Also called SIPR-NET. (JP 1-02)

sensitive compartmented information—All information and materials bearing special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established. Also called SCI. (JP 1-02)

sensitive compartmented information facility—An accredited area, room, group of rooms, or installation where sensitive compartmented information may be stored, used, discussed, and/or electronically processed. SCIF procedural and physical measures prevent the free access of persons unless they have been formally indoctrinated for the particular SCI authorized for use or storage within the SCIF. (JP 1-02)

sensor data—Data derived from sensors whose primary mission is surveillance or target acquisition, such as air surveillance radars, counterbattery radars, and remote ground sensors. (MCRP 5-12C)

sequel(s)—Major operations that follow the current major operations. Plans for these are based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) associated with the current operation. (MCRP 5-12C)

signals intelligence—1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (JP 1-02)

situational awareness—Knowledge and understanding of the current situation which promotes timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of

friendly, enemy, and other operations within the battlespace in order to facilitate decisionmaking. An informational perspective and skill that foster an ability to determine quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding. (MCRP 5-12C)

special purpose Marine air-ground task force—A Marine air-ground task force organized, trained and equipped with narrowly focused capabilities. It is designed to accomplish a specific mission, often of limited scope and duration. It may be any size, but normally it is a relatively small force--the size of a Marine expeditionary unit or smaller. It may contain other Service or foreign military forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. Also called SPMAGTF. (Approved for inclusion in next version of MCRP 5-12C)

staff cognizance—The broad responsibility and authority over designated staff functions assigned to a general or executive staff officer (or their subordinate staff officers) in his area of primary interest. These responsibilities and authorities can range from coordination within the staff to the assignment or delegation to the staff officer by the commander to exercise his authority for a specified warfighting function or sub-function. Staff cognizance includes the responsibility for effective use of available resources and may include the authority for planning the employment of, organizing, assigning tasks, coordinating, and controlling forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. Marine Corps orders and doctrine provide the notional staff cognizance for general or executive staff officers, which may be modified by the commander to meet his requirements. (Draft MCWP 6-2)

surveillance and reconnaissance cell—Primary element responsible for the supervision of MAGTF intelligence collection operations. Directs, coordinates, and monitors intelligence collection operations conducted by organic, attached, and direct support collection assets.

Also called SARC. (Change approved for inclusion in next version of MCRP 5-12C)

sustained operations ashore—The employment of Marine Corps forces on land for an extended duration. It can occur with or without sustainment from the sea. Also called SOA. (MCRP 5-12C)

synthesis—In intelligence usage, the examining and combining of processed information with other information and intelligence for final interpretation. (JP 1-02) Note: The piecing of information into a coherent, meaningful picture of the battlespace based on the ongoing or previous analysis of information and events taking place in the area of operations.

tactical intelligence—Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. (JP 1-02) In Marine Corps usage, tactical intelligence is concerned primarily with the location, capabilities, and possible intentions of enemy units on the battlefield and with the tactical aspects of terrain and weather within the battlespace. (MCRP 5-12C)

tactical effect—Result of action(s) at the individual unit, mission, or engagement level. Can be either direct or indirect, and typically acts in concert with other tactical effects to produce results at higher levels of war. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

target—A geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. (JP 1-02)

target analysis—An examination of potential targets to determine military importance, priority of attack, and weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or casualties. (JP 1-02)

targeted area of interest—The geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction will cause the enemy to either abandon a particular course of action or

require him to use specialized engineer support to continue, where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not all targeted areas of interest will form part of the friendly course of action; only targeted areas of interest associated with high-payoff targets are of interest to the staff. These are identified during staff planning and war-gaming. Target areas of interest differ from engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all available weapons. Targeted areas of interest might be engaged by a single weapon. Also called TAI. (MCRP 5-12C)

target complex—A geographically integrated series of target concentrations. (JP 1-02)

target component—A major element of a target complex or target. It is any machinery, structure, personnel, or other productive asset that contributes to the operation or output of the target complex or target. (JP 1-02)

target concentration—A grouping of geographically proximate targets. (JP 1-02)

target critical damage point—The part of a target component that is most vital. Also called critical node. (JP 1-02)

target dossier—A file of assembled target intelligence about a specific geographic area. (JP 1-02)

target folder—A folder containing target intelligence and related materials prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target. (JP 1-02)

targeting—The process to detect, select, and prioritize targets, match the appropriate action, and assess the resulting effects based on the commander's objective, guidance, and intent. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

target intelligence—Intelligence which portrays and locates the components of a target

or target complex and indicates its vulnerability and relative importance. (JP 1-02)

target materials—Graphic, textual, tabular, digital, video, or other presentations of target intelligence, primarily designed to support operations against designated targets by one or more weapon(s) systems. Target materials are suitable for training, planning, executing, and evaluating military operations. (JP 1-02)

target of opportunity—A target visible to a surface or air sensor or observer, which is within range of available weapons and against which fire has not been scheduled or requested. (JP 1-02)

target priority—A grouping of targets with the indicated sequence of attack. (JP 1-02)

target signature—The characteristic pattern of a target displayed by detection and identification equipment. (JP 1-02)

target stress point—The weakest point (most vulnerable to damage) on the critical damage point. Also called vulnerable node. (JP 1-02)

target system—1. All the targets situated in a particular geographic area and functionally related. (DOD) 2. A group of targets which are so related that their destruction will produce some particular effect desired by the attacker. (JP 1-02)

target system assessment—The broad assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of the full spectrum of military force applied against the operation of an enemy target system or total combat effectiveness (including significant subdivisions of the system) relative to the operational objectives established. (Proposed by JP 3-60 for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

target system component—A set of targets belonging to one or more groups of industries and basic utilities required to produce compo-

nent parts of an end product such as periscopes, or one type of a series of interrelated commodities, such as aviation gasoline. (JP 1-02)

technical control—The performance of specialized or professional service, or the exercise of professional guidance or direction through the establishment of policies and procedures. (Proposed USMC definition per MCWP 6-2 and the next revision of MCRP 5-12C.)

tempo—The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time. (MCRP 5-12C)

terrain analysis—The collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of geographic information on the natural and manmade features of the terrain, combined with other relevant factors, to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations. (JP 1-02)

terrain study—An analysis and interpretation of natural and manmade features of an area, their effects on military operations, and the effect of weather and climate on these features. (JP 1-02)

time-sensitive targets—Those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity. (JP 1-02)

validation—A process normally associated with the collection of intelligence that provides official status to an identified requirement and confirms that the requirement is appropriate for a given collector and has not been previously satisfied. (JP 1-02)

vulnerability—**1.** The susceptibility of a nation or military force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight

diminished. **2.** The characteristics of a system which cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile environment. **3.** In information operations, a weakness in information system security design, procedures, implementation, or internal controls that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to information or an information system. (JP 1-02)

warfighting functions—The six mutually supporting military activities integrated in the conduct of all military operations are:

1. **command and control**—The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken.

2. **maneuver**—The movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy.

3. **fires**—Those means used to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities as well as affect the enemy's will to fight.

4. **intelligence**—Knowledge about the enemy or the sur-rounding environment needed to support decision-making.

5. **logistics**—All activities required to move and sustain military forces.

6. **force protection**—Actions or efforts used to safe-guard own centers of gravity while protecting, concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities. (MCRP 5-12C)

weaponeering—The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapon effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage criteria, probability of kill, and weapon reliability. (JP 1-02)

APPENDIX K. REFERENCES

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)

2022	Intelligence Reports
2077	Orders of Battle
2936	Intelligence Doctrine-AIntP-1(A)

Defense Intelligence Management Documents (DIMDs)

0000-151-94	Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP)
0000-151C-95	Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP): Production Procedures

Defense Intelligence Report

DI-2820-2-99	Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Reference Handbook (final draft)

Joint Publications (JPs)

1-02	Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
2-0	Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
2-01	Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations
2-01.3	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
2-02	National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations
2-03	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information and Services Support to Joint Operations
3-02	Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
3-02.1	Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations
3-07	Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War
3-09	Doctrine for Joint Fire Support
3-13	Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
3-13.1	Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare
3-50.3	Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery
3-55	Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Support for Joint Operations
3-60	Doctrine for Joint Targeting (Draft)
5-00.2	Joint Task Force (JTF) Planning Guidance and Procedures

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Publications

1586-001-96	MAGTF Contingency Reference Guide
1586-005-99	Urban Generic Information Requirements Handbook

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1	Warfighting
1-2	Campaigning
2	Intelligence
3	Expeditionary Operations
5	Planning
6	Command and Control

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

0-1.1	Componency
2-1	Intelligence Operations
2-12.1	Geographic Intelligence
2-14	Counterintelligence
2-15.2	Signals Intelligence
3-2	Aviation Operations
3-16	Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element
3-35.3	Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
3-35.7	MAGTF Meteorological and Oceanographic Support
4-1	Logistics Operations
5-1	Marine Corps Planning Process
6-22	Communications and Information Systems

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

5-12C	Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
5-12D	Organization of Marine Corps Forces

Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM)

6	Ground Combat Operations (under revision as MCWP 3-1)

Army Field Manuals (FMs)

34-8-2	Intelligence Officer's Handbook
34-81	Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations
34-81-1	Battlefield Weather Effects
34-130/FMFRP 3-23.2	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (under revision as MCRP 2-12A)
101-5-1/MCRP 5-2A	Operational Terms and Graphics